Chapter Ten

Roanoke Island.

     Ambrose E. Burnside (1824-1881) was a native of Liberty, Indiana and the great grandson of Scottish immigrants who had  settled in upcountry South Carolina before the Revolutionary War.  Exuberant, gregarious, even playful, he had a wonderfully inventive mind, although he never liked nor excelled at public speaking. Burnside graduated from West Point in 1847.  He was best remembered at the Academy for his deportment, not  his grades. Six feet tall, broad shouldered and barrel chested,  Burnside was a good humored man who easily won the affection of others.  He received 198 demerits during his second year, 11 alone for leaving his post and celebrating his birthday. Such escapades caused Burnside to rank 207^th in terms of behavior in a class of 211.  Distaste for returning to the rigors of farm life and a realization that he could not afford to continue his education elsewhere eventually persuaded Burnside  to concentrate on his studies.

      On July 1, 1847, Burnside accepted a commission in the 3^rd U.S. Artillery, then fighting in the Mexican War.  The conflict was virtually over by the time he arrived at the front in early December.  While in Mexico, Burnside frequented the local gambling houses, where he became notorious for recklessly increasing the stakes regardless of the quality of the cards he held.  Faro and blackjack were his favorites.   His brown hair already thinning atop his soon to be bald head, Burnside would sit for hours at the gaming tables, puffing cigars and continuously putting more money in the pot.  He lost six months' pay in a matter of weeks. Burnside had an "incurably hospitable nature," writes William Marvel, Burnside's biographer.[1]

     After a brief assignment to Fort Adams on Narragansett Bay in Rhode Island, Burnside returned to the 3^rd Artillery for duty on the New Mexico frontier.  He spent most of the next two and a half years  escorting U.S. mail shipments across the desert or fighting Apache Indians.  He also participated in a survey to delineate the new boundary between the United States and Mexico. Returning to Fort Adams in 1853, Burnside married Mary Richmond Bishop of Providence, by whom he was to have no children. Soon after his wedding, he resigned  from the U. S. Army and established a rifle factory in Bristol, R. I..

      Burnside aspired to become wealthy by perfecting and manufacturing a breech-loading rifle that he had designed some years earlier.  It was an excellent weapon.  Assured orally  by Secretary of War John Floyd in 1857 that the United States military would purchase $90,000 worth of his rifles, Burnside borrowed substantial amounts of money and prepared to begin production.  The next year he was forced to assign all his business assets to his creditors when Floyd withdrew his offer.  Burnside had an "optimistic view of human nature," explains Marvel.  "He found it nearly impossible to believe another person could wish him harm until the evidence fairly knocked him on the head, and sometimes not then."[2] The U.S. Army would use thousands of Burnside's guns during the Civil War, but the inventor sadly never made a nickel from the transaction.

      Burnside was determined to pay off his debts.  He moved to St. Paul, Minn. in 1858 in hopes of finding work with one of the many  railroads being built in the Midwest.  Burnside contacted George McClellan, a friend and former classmate at West Point,  and asked him for a job.  McClellan had recently left the Army to become chief engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad.  Telling his fiancée that he wanted to help this "noble man," McClellan proffered Burnside a position as cashier of the railroad's land company.[3]  Burnside accepted, moved to Chicago and lived in McClellan's home for two years.  In 1860, the always optimistic Indianan became treasurer of the Illinois Central's New York office. Burnside remained at that post until April, 1861, when the Governor of Rhode Island requested that he take charge of a militia regiment being organized in response to President Lincoln's call for troops to fight the Confederacy.  Burnside arrived in Providence on April 16th.

    Colonel Ambrose Burnside commanded four regiments at the Battle of First Manassas  on July 21, 1861.  His troops performed well in what otherwise turned out to be an embarrassing defeat for the North.  After returning to Providence on July 28^th, Burnside ended his service with the Rhode Island militia when the 1^st Rhode Island was disbanded.  He remained a civilian for just over a week.  On August 6^th, he received from President Lincoln's desk a commission as brigadier general of United States Volunteers and was ordered to report to Washington, D.C., where his fellow West Pointer and former railroad cohort George McClellan had just assumed control of the newly formed Army of the Potomac.

      Only 35 years old, McClellan faced the awesome task of setting aside the pessimism produced in the North by the Battle of  First Manassas and forging a fighting force that could hopefully defeat the Confederate legions gathering  in Virginia.   He no doubt welcomed Burnside's arrival in Washington.  The two men trusted and respected one another and had been effective collaborators at the Illinois Central. Burnside's first assignment was overseeing the training of thousands of raw recruits who were arriving in Washington.  He possessed a "blend of strict disciple and paternal devotion," says Marvel.[4]

    The origins of the Burnside Expedition to  North Carolina are somewhat obscure. Burnside claimed that the idea was his.  "One evening . . . General McClellan and I were chatting together over the affairs of the war, when I mentioned to him a plan for the formation of a coast division to which I had given some thought," he told an audience in 1880. Burnside proposed to create a force of 12,000 to 15,000 New Englanders who had the requisite seamanship and technical skills to operate as an independent unit and put them aboard ships and boats specially outfitted to navigate in the shallow sounds and  tidal rivers of the Confederacy.

    This body of men, Burnside explained, "could be rapidly thrown from point to point on the coast with a view of establishing lodgments on the Southern coast, landing troops, and penetrating into the interior, thereby threatening the lines of transportation in the rear of the main army then concentrating in Virginia, and holding possession of the inland waters on the Atlantic coast."[5]  According to Burnside, McClellan liked the concept, obtained Secretary of War Cameron's approval in October, and told Burnside to proceed with the plan.

    Perhaps Burnside did originate the idea of forming an amphibious division that could act independently,  but it was McClellan  who devised a strategy that included  the launching of multiple combined operations against the Confederacy.  On September 4, 1861, the commander of the Army of the Potomac had dinner with Charles Henry Davis (1807-1877), a naval member of the Blockade Board.  McClellan told Davis how he would go about defeating the South.  The essential component of his plan was to seize key railroad junctions and paralyze the Confederacy's internal lines of communication.

     As a member of an observation team that had been sent by the U.S. Army to the Crimean War in 1855, McClellan had come to appreciate the tactical advantages defensive forces were acquiring due to the advent of rifled artillery.  In his opinion, this development invalidated the strategy of slow strangulation that Winfield Scott had made the centerpiece of the Anaconda Plan.  Able to shift troops more quickly  from one front to the other,  the South, McClellan argued, would be able to prolong the war by making better use of its more limited resources, including its smaller reserves of manpower. In McClellan's judgment, to achieve a quick victory the United States would have to act boldly and organize amphibious forces that could take full advantage of the maneuverability associated with seaborne operations.

     "His basic concept was simple," writes Rowena Reed.[6]   McClellan understood that locomotives hauling supplies to the huge Confederate army in and around Richmond, Va. would have to travel across the South's two primary rail networks -- the lines running east from the Mississippi Valley and those moving up the eastern seaboard, including the Wilmington and Weldon.  He reasoned that if Federal troops could capture and hold  strategic points along these systems, the rebel troops defending the Confederate capital would be unable to sustain themselves logistically.  " . . . the roads had to grasped in the middle, preferably at their junction with connecting lines," says Reed.[7]

     Of greatest interest to McClellan were those railroad depots that Federal troops could approach by water. They were the most vulnerable.  High on the list of potential objectives was Goldsboro, N.C.  By seizing this  strategic junction of  three railroads -- the Wilmington and Weldon, the Atlantic and North Carolina, and the North Carolina --  the United States could cut off all Confederate supplies moving westward by rail from Morehead City and Beaufort and northward from Wilmington.  Moreover, Goldsboro could become a base of operations for an attack upon Raleigh, the loss of which would prevent the Confederates from transporting any goods by rail through North Carolina, a truly calamitous setback for the South.  When McClellan succeeded Winfield Scott on November 1^st as general-in-chief of U. S. forces, he moved quickly to implement his strategic plan. He accordingly urged Ambrose Burnside to accelerate the  outfitting of the amphibious division the two men had discussed some weeks earlier.

    Burnside got to work.  He visited the New York and New England governors and asked for troops.  This  task was made more difficult by the fact that Thomas Sherman had just been recruiting men  for the Port Royal Expedition.  Burnside established a temporary training camp at Hempstead, Long Island, where his soldiers and sailors spent seemingly endless hours practicing the tactics of amphibious landings.  The troops crouched in small skiffs as they were slung up on the shore.  They tried to learn how to keep their weapons and powder dry even in heavy surf.  Burnside's amphibious force consisted of three brigades.  The brigade commanders were John G. Foster, the same enterprising engineer who had served with Robert Anderson at Fort Sumter, Jesse L. Reno (1823-1862), a Pennsylvanian and classmate of  McClellan's at West Point, and John G. Parke (1827-1900), a gifted officer who had graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1849.

     Burnside liked to tinker with machines and gadgets.  He no doubt enjoyed assembling the odd assortment of ships and boats that would be suitable for his expedition.  Although the point of attack had not yet been determined, Burnside knew that the fleet would have to be seaworthy in the Atlantic and also be capable of navigating in the shallow sounds and inlets that dotted the Confederate coast.  As in the great majority of military operations, logistics would be the biggest problem.  McClellan was committed to respecting private property rights in the South.  He therefore expected Burnside to take all his supplies with him.  McClellan  had a "traditional, narrowly circumscribed approach" to war, writes historian Stephen V. Ash.[8] Burnside began transferring the first contingent of his approximately 20,000 troops to Annapolis, Md., in November  That same month he learned  that North Carolina would be the target of his ambitious expedition.

    The man who played the largest part in persuading President Lincoln and General McClellan to select  the Tar Heel State as the point of attack for the campaign was Colonel Rush Hawkins (1831-1920).  An energetic New Yorker who had served under Benjamin Butler in the successful assault upon Fort Hatteras and Fort Clark in August, 1861, Hawkins, as already mentioned, had briefly commanded the Union garrison on Hatteras Island.  While there he became increasingly convinced that considerable Unionist sentiment existed in the counties that bordered Ablemarle Sound and Pamlico Sound. "My belief is that troops could be raised here for the purpose of suppressing rebellion in North Carolina upon the assurance that they would not be called on to go out of the State," Hawkins told his military superiors. President Lincoln was intrigued by Hawkins's proposal.  On September 16^th, he  instructed Winfield Scott "to frame an order for recruiting North Carolinians at Fort Hatteras." [9]

    Hawkins was correct in his belief that many North Carolinians were anxious to support the undoing of the Confederacy.  To assume that the majority of the white residents of the counties bordering Albemarle Sound and Pamlico Sound  supported the Southern war effort is to ignore the political complexities that characterized the region.  Washington County, for example, would contribute some 350 white men to the Confederate Army and about the same number  to the Union Army.  In his study of neighboring Bertie County, Divided Allegiances.  Bertie County during the Civil War, Gerald W. Thomas explains that he was inspired to write the book when his Aunt Nora told him that his great-grandfather had fought for the Yankees.  "I could hardly believe what my aunt had said," Thomas admits.  "I could not conceive that my great-grandfather, who was born, lived his complete life, and died in Bertie County served in the Union army."[10]  804 Bertie County whites joined the Confederate army, 159  the Union army, and 63 fought for both sides.

     The white population of eastern North Carolina during the Civil War can be divided most readily into three more or less distinct social and economic groups -- planters, yeoman farmers, and wage laborers, including tenant farmers. Unlike South Carolina, where slaveholders monopolized political power, yeoman farmers and wage laborers  in North Carolina  were active participants in electioneering, except for those who could not or would not pay the poll tax.

    Predictably, the majority of planters, whose economic power and social prestige rested upon the ownership of slaves, were ardent secessionists, especially after Lincoln's call for troops to suppress the rebellious South.  Most of the yeoman farmers, on the other hand, owned few, if any, slaves and were understandably disinterested in placing themselves in jeopardy to safeguard the interests of their wealthier neighbors. Ellsberry Ambrose, a leader of the yeoman farmers in Washington County, was an especially outspoken critic of the Confederacy.  He and a friend  went so far as to announce that they intended to fly the American flag over their farms on July 4, 1861.  He told his fellow farmers that in the coming war  "the rich people were going to make the poor people do all the fighting."  When told that hoisting the Stars and Stripes might get him into trouble, Ambrose  announced that he "lived in a free country"  and that he had "plenty" of powder and shot if anybody tried to stop him.[11]

       Planters hired wage laborers to perform a variety of tasks.  They were coopers, sawyers, overseers, carpenters, machinists, boat makers, gin builders, ironmongers, and millwrights.  Others performed such menial tasks as spaying livestock, clearing ground, cutting and rolling logs, running errands, hunting runaway slaves, and digging or cleaning canals and ditches.  Obadiah Chambers, a day laborer in Washington County, expressed views that were shared by many people of his humble social standing.  Chambers welcomed the capture of Fort Hatteras and Fort Clark by Union troops, because it increased the chances of military support for an uprising that would topple the slaveholders' control of Southern society to the benefit of the economically disadvantaged.  "I be dambed if I don’t hope my head and all my limbs may be cut off before there ever is a southern government established in the southern states," Chambers told a secessionist neighbor.[12] Historian Richard Current notes that Unionists took "heart from the Federal occupation of Hatteras" and "prepared to assist the Yankees as soon as the Yankees approached the mainland."[13]

      Colonel Hawkins sent three residents of Hatteras Island across Pamlico Sound to Hyde County on "the opposite shore" in September 1861 to assess the level of public support for the Union.  The New Yorker was heartened by the reports his emissaries brought back.  Supporters were numerous.  They were holding secret meetings and establishing their own militia units.  According to Hawkins, the friends of the Union "have resolved to allow our forces to land without molestation if we will come in a force strong enough to protect them from the vigilance committees."[14]

       Confederate officials expressed great concern about the level of disloyalty in the Albemarle Sound and Pamlico Sound region.  "Governor Clark is urgent in his demand to have troops sent into Hyde County to counteract evil influences said to have extended from Hatteras to the mainland," declared Brigadier General Richard C. Gatlin (1809-1896), Confederate commander of the Department of North Carolina, on September 13, 1861.[15] "The disaffection in Hyde County demands the immediate presence of a regiment," North Carolina Governor Henry T. Clark told Adjutant and Inspector General Samuel Cooper the following day.[16]   On September 24^th, Clark reported that "seven or eight islanders had come over into Hyde County, bringing proclamations with them, and offering inducements to the citizens to take the oath of allegiance" to the Union.[17] 

       In his book  War of Another Kind.  A Southern Community in the Great Rebellion, Wayne K. Durrill contends that there were "many different wars fought between 1861 and 1865 in the United States."  The largest and the most obvious was the struggle between two national governments.  It is this contest, an essentially "bourgeois affair" fought according to "mutually respected rules of war," that has attracted the greatest attention.  This Civil War, says Durrill, was a struggle to preserve "all manner of possessions -- land, slaves, personal property, women, and children." 

    In places like Washington County, Bertie County, and Hyde County, however, there was another, less orderly contest underway.  It was a battle "among whites over who might rule at home."[18]  Ellsberry Ambrose and Obadiah Chambers  spoke for many yeoman farmers and wage laborers who sought to improve their economic standing by dispossessing the planter class and rich farmers of much of their property.  "They hoped," Durrill asserts, "to acquire by force possessions which could be distributed equitably among themselves, not to protect property that had become concentrated in the hands of a few planters and well-to-do yeomen."  In short, a civil war erupted within a larger civil war.  "Neighbor attacked neighbor," explains Durrill.  "Friends and allies alike turned on each other.  Washington County's war at home proved to be, above all, an uncivil war, a war of another kind." [19]

      President Lincoln and General McClellan met with Colonel Hawkins on November 5^th and were impressed with what New Yorker had to say.  The expectation that large numbers of Southerners would rally to the Union cause if protected from retribution by their rebel neighbors was a theory President Lincoln "desperately wanted to believe," says Marvel. [20] Commodore DuPont's seizure of Port Royal Sound on November 9^th further strengthened the military justifications for attacking the North Carolina coast. Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough convinced Secretary of the Navy Welles that the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, which Goldsborough headed, also needed a base of operations on the Confederate coast.  That decided the issue.  Burnside would invade North Carolina.

     One of the thousands of young men who began to assemble at Annapolis, Md. in November 1861 was Private Henry W. Gangewer (1827-1880) of the 51^st Pennsylvania Regiment.  Traveling through Baltimore, where the troops were "greeted by the people along the road with cheers and the waving of Flags," the 34-year-old Pennsylvanian arrived in Annapolis on November 25^th . Between then and January 9, 1862, when he and his cohorts went aboard ship to begin their hazardous voyage to Hatteras Island, Gangewer spent most of his days performing the dull, monotonous, routine duties of soldiery life.  "Drilled all day.  Was rainy . . . ," the diarist said about his first day in camp.  "Inspection in the morning after dinner recd. orders to turn out with Knapsacks Haversacks and Canteens," he wrote several weeks later.

    Noteworthy happenings did occur while Gangewer was in Annapolis, such as the arrival of the 11^th Pennsylvania Regiment on November 28^th.  " . . . whole Regt full of whiskey and during the night one of their men fell out of the third story window of the College buildings and fractured his skull. He died the next day," Gangewer reported.   Gangewer described a more inspiring event that happened on the day of embarkation.  "Gen Burnside passed through the fleet in a small boat in the rain, and was cheered by each vessel as passed -- during which he had his hat off which caused his bald head to get somewhat wet." [21]

     McClellan's orders to Burnside defined the purposes of the impending invasion of North Carolina.  "McClellan's main object for promoting this expedition was to gain a large and secure base of operations against the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad," says Rowena Reed.[22]  "Your first point of attack will be Roanoke Island and its dependencies," the orders read.  Located near the junction of Pamlico Sound and Ablemarle Sound, this low-lying, swampy island was the strategic heart of the sound region of North Carolina.  By seizing it, Burnside and Flag Officer Goldsborough, whose warships would accompany the Union troop transports to the Tar Heel State,  would be in a commanding position. 

    McClellan instructed Burnside next to "make a descent upon New Berne, having gained possession of which and the railroad running through it you will at once throw a sufficient force upon Beaufort, and take the steps necessary to reduce Fort Macon and open that port."  Beaufort would become the principal base of operations for Goldsborough's North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.  Finally, Burnside would turn his attention to the prospect of capturing Goldsboro and destroying the railroad tracks for several miles north and south of the town and the bridge that carried the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad across the Neuse River.  "When you seize New Berne, you will endeavor to seize the railroad as far west as Goldsborough, should circumstances favor such a movement," said McClellan.  "A great point would be gained," the General declared, "by the effectual destruction of the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad."  McClellan anticipated that Burnside might eventually be able to capture Wilmington, or maybe even Raleigh.[23]

      The General's ambitious military program did not include any attempts to tamper with the South's social institutions.  A Democrat, McClellan  sought to keep the war contained and not to let it become a social or political revolution.  "In no case would I go beyond a moderate joint proclamation with the naval commander, which should say as little as possible about politics or the negro," he told Burnside.  "Merely state that the true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union and upholding the laws of the General Government, and stating that all who conduct themselves properly will as far as possible be protected in their persons and property."[24]

     Burnside and Goldsborough left Fort Monroe, Va. with their armada and headed out into the Atlantic Ocean on January 11, 1862.  Henry Gangewer was assigned to the Scout, a two-masted schooner that the United States had purchased for twelve thousand dollars.  Strong winds blew the ship into the Gulf Stream, and it was not until January 16^th that Gangewer and the other men on board reached Hatteras Island.  Provided with provisions for a one-day journey, the men on the Scout, "being packed very close,"  endured considerable hardship.  The greatest suffering was due to inadequate supplies of drinking water.  "Water quite scarce three fourths of a quart given to each man," Gangewer recorded in his diary on January 15^th.  "One barrel of vinegar dealt out instead of water."  In mid-afternoon, while Gangewer sat mending his pants, several seaman, seeing dark clouds gathering on the horizon, scampered "on deck with tins for the purpose of catching water, the men suffering from thirst some offering one dollar for a pint." According to Gangewer,  the troops were also disgruntled because they had "no coffee, nothing but ham, sugar and vinegar."[25]

    Life continued to be arduous for the Union troops after they arrived at Hatteras Island.  The larger Yankee transports drew too much water to make it through Hatteras Inlet.  "I had been led to suppose, from conversations with Colonel Hawkins, that we should find pilots here whose experience in navigating the harbor would be of great service, but I find great difficulty in accomplishing my work for want of accommodations," he complained in a dispatch to McClellan.[26]  Burnside ordered troops and supplies ashore, while Goldsborough's seamen  slowly dragged the disencumbered ships toward Pamlico Sound.  Some provisions were simply tossed into the water.  "We however unloaded Seventy five tons of Pig Iron and threw it overboard for the purpose of lightening the vessel," Gangewer declared  on January 19^th. Boredom and tedium began to take their toll on Union morale.  ". . . nothing to do but eat and sleep" said  Private Gangewer, who reported that gambling was "becoming a nuisance on board."[27]

     Finally, on January 29^th, after being "incessantly engaged in getting . . . vessels over the bar into the sound," Burnside was able to inform General McClellan that he was ready to make an "advance on Roanoke Island."[28]  The troops, Burnside reported, were "eager for a forward movement."[29]  Gangewer was impressed by the size of the Union flotilla  anchored in Pamlico Sound.  "There are now thirty-five Steamers on this side of the 'bar' each one being Armed with from one to ten Rifled Cannon and they are practicing by firing at a wreck about a mile from our vessel we can see the shells burst and are fast becoming familiar with the peculiar whistle of the shells," he wrote on February 1^st.

    A poignant scene played itself out  two days later when Private Gangewer  and his compatriots observed a small boat coming straight toward them from the mainland.  " . . . it attempted to run away but was overhauled by one of the boats," said the Pennsylvania trooper.  The "smack" was filled with 19 black slaves  who had "run away from their masters."  They "became frightened when they saw the fleet," Gangewer explained, but  were in "high glee . . . over the rations they received from Gen. Burnside and are now singing and dancing." [30]

     There  was little joy among the Confederate defenders of coastal North Carolina. Fear and premonitions of misfortune spread like wild fire among the members of the planter class who lived near  Albemarle and Pamlico sounds. Along the Roanoke River, its stained waters filled with striped bass, the woods and swamps along its banks teeming with wildlife -- black bear, white tailed deer, fox, and bobcat -- rich folks hastily gathered their most precious belongings, including slaves, and headed inland. Catherine Edmondston was among them.  She left her Halifax County plantation to seek refuge in Raleigh.  "The 1^st of Jan found us with War staring us directly in the face!  War, obstinate, bloody & cruel, brought to our very hearthstones,"  she wrote on January 27^th.[31] "The fleet at Hatteras is certainly Burnsides," she declared on January 28^th, "& he intends an advance somewhere, as he is lightening his transports over the Bar."[32] 

    On February 8^th, William G. Morris (1825-1918), a Confederate solider stationed near New Bern, told his wife that his 37^th North Carolina Regiment had "received intelligence yesterday that the Burnside Expedition has gone to Roanoke Island" and predicted that New Bern would probably be attacked "before April."[33]  "Talked of Burnside and wondered what he intends to do," said Edmondston about a conversation she had at dinner at her sister's house in Raleigh on February 9^th.[34]

     North Carolina Governor Henry T. Clark had been imploring President Davis and other Confederate officials in Richmond to dispatch more soldiers and equipment to Eastern North Carolina ever since the Yankees had captured Fort Hatteras and Fort Clark in late August, 1861. Richmond repeatedly turned down Gatlin's requests for reinforcements.   "I regret to say that the necessities of the public service absolutely forbid the transfer of any troops from Virginia at the present time," Confederate authorities told Governor Clark on September 12^th. [35]   "We feel very defenseless here without arms, and I will not again report to you that this has been effected by our generosity to others," a disgruntled Clark stated in October, 1861.  "We see just over our lines in Virginia, near Suffolk two or three North Carolina Regiments, well-armed, and well-drilled, who are not allowed to come to the defense of their homes," the  Governor complained.[36] Clark was still asking for help in January, 1862, when "reliable information" suggested that Burnside was about to head for Pamlico Sound.  "We have no arms for volunteers of militia," he reported on January 5^th.  "Will you send us troops from Richmond or some of our own regiments from the James River?"[37]

     Clark's importunities achieved little.  Despite assurances that the Confederacy was "fully alive to the necessity of defending your coast," Secretary of War Benjamin  sent no significant help to the Tar Heel State.  "I regret that I am not able to fill your requisitions for arms," he told Governor Clark on on November 21^st.  "If we had them to spare they should cheerfully be placed at your disposal for the purpose designated."[38]  The Confederate War Department endeavored to lessen Governor Clark's concerns by dispatching more experienced officers to superintend the defenses of North Carolina.  Among the first to arrive was D. H. Hill, who was ordered to inspect Confederate fortifications in the Albemarle Sound and Pamlico Sound region.

   Hill went to New Bern.  He went to Fort Macon.  He went to Roanoke Island. The former superintendent of the North Carolina Military Institute did not like what he saw.  The essential problem was that the Confederates did not have enough men or supplies to defend the extended coastline between Beaufort and the Virginia line.  "Fort Macon has but four guns of long range, and these are badly supplied with ammunition," he reported in October, 1861.  "New Berne has a tolerable battery," he said, but "is badly supplied with powder."

      Hill was particularly concerned about the defensibility of Roanoke Island, which he called "the key to one-third of North Carolina."  From Roanoke Island the Yankees would be able to send gunboats into Albemarle Sound and up the Roanoke and Chowan rivers.  "The towns of Elizabeth City, Edenton, Plymouth, and Williamston will be taken, should Roanoke be captured or passed," he predicted. [39] Hill also knew from firsthand experience that there were many Union sympathizers in the counties bordering Albemarle Sound and Pamlico Sound.

    On October 31^st, Hill had to send a contingent of 21 cavalrymen into Washington County to arrest Unionist leaders, including Ellsberry Ambrose,  who had won elections in  several militia districts.  The Confederate soldiers told Ambrose to "put on his clothes & come instantly," applauded the wife of a prominent planter.[40]  The incarceration of Ellsberry Ambrose could not obscure the fact that there were still plenty of Unionists in places like Washington County and Bertie County, and the capture of Roanoke Island by the Yankees would inevitably invigorate people of such persuasion.   "There is much apathy among the people," complained D. H. Hill.[41] 

      Brigadier General Richard Gatlin, a native of Lenoir County, N.C., established his headquarters in Goldsboro.  An experienced military officer, he knew that the Yankees would possess overwhelming superiority in numbers of men and amount of firepower.  He also realized that the Union commanders  could overpower any naval force the Confederates sent against them and would, therefore, be able to choose when and where to concentrate their forces.   The only hope for success was to build strong outposts along the coast and place enough gunboats on the sounds to slow the Yankee advance.

    Gatlin devised a defensive strategy that called for holding a substantial number of   troops in reserve until the Yankees came ashore. "My plan was to place a sufficient number of troops at the exposed points, to hold the enemy in check should he land on the coast, and to establish a reserve of four or six regiments at Goldsborough, to be sent to the coast only upon the landing of the enemy," Gatlin explained several months later.[42]   The greatest danger was that the Yankees would send gunboats up the rivers and cut the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad at either Goldsboro or Weldon. "Owing to the capture of Hatteras it is very necessary to fortify the rivers running into the sound." Gatlin told Samuel Cooper.[43]  Realizing that the Yankees would be able most easily to reach the bridge carrying the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad across the Trent River, Gatlin put the largest number of his frontline soldiers at New Bern and ordered them to begin building earthen fortifications to protect the city.

       Gatlin's plan for defending the North Carolina coast was doomed from the outset. His reserve contingent was too small.  Also, the distances the troops at Goldsboro would have to travel to reach their embattled comrades along the coast were too great, and the coastal fortifications were too sparse to hold out against a sizable invading force.  Nonetheless, because Albemarle Sound extended so far into the North Carolina interior and offered via the Roanoke River such direct access to the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, Gatlin had no choice but to  place troops on Roanoke Island.

   The 3^rd Georgia Regiment was on its way to Hatteras Island in late August, 1861.  When Gatlin learned that Union forces had captured Fort Hatteras and Fort Clark, he ordered the Georgians to encamp on Roanoke Island.  Ambrose R. Wright (1826-1872), commander of the Georgians, worked hard to strengthen his position, but he was not optimistic about his chances for prevailing in any encounter with the Yankees. "I need not call your attention to the fact that the force on this island is entirely inadequate to the proper defense of this point. I shall do all that man can do, but feel very much crippled for want of men," Wright declared on September 11^th.[44]

     D. H. Hill departed North Carolina in late November, 1861, for service in Virginia.  His replacement as commander of the newly-created District of the Albemarle in northeastern North Carolina was Henry A. Wise (1806-1876) a former Governor of Virginia.  A man of impeccable character but no military training, Wise established his headquarters on Nags Head Island.  On December 12^th, he sent the North Carolina 31^st Regiment  to Roanoke Island to relieve Wright's Georgians, who had  left for Virginia, and to join Colonel H. M. Shaw's 8^th North Carolina Regiment.

    The situation was grim.   Slightly less than 1500 Confederates troops, most of them untested in battle,  would have to face Burnside's invading force of over 13,000  soldiers and seamen.  The rebel navy was likewise inadequate for the task it was expected to perform.    Its commander, Commodore W. F. Lynch, had only seven small gunboats with which to challenge Goldsborough's powerful armada.  "I am fearful that our northeastern counties are lost," Gatlin proclaimed on January 20^th.  "It is sad to think," he declared, "how obstinate the authorities at Richmond have been in regard to the destination of the fleet."[45]   Governor Clark had no doubts about the eventual outcome of the struggle for Raonoke Island.  "If you will glance at the map you will readily perceive the extent of the injury both to North Carolina and the Confederacy by an expedition into the interior from any part of Albemarle or Pamlico Sound," he told Judah P. Benjamin on Februray 1, 1862.  "And I regret again to allude to our inability to check so formidable an expedition, whatever route it may select."[46]

Having placed Shaw in command of the troops on Roanoke Island, Henry Wise inspected the Confederate defenses there in early January.  "I landed on the island, and in company with Colonel Shaw and Major Duffield made a personal reconnaissance," he reported on January 8^th. Wise found the condition of the troops deplorable.  "The infantry," he complained, "were undrilled, unpaid, not sufficiently clothed and quartered, and were miserably armed with old flint muskets in  bad order."[47]  Wise knew that the only hope the outnumbered defenders had to prevail was  to prevent the Yankees from outflanking them. It was hoped that if the Union troops were compelled to make frontal assaults they would be unable to take full advantage of their superior numbers because they would have to hurl themselves piecemeal against the Confederates. 

The best spots for invading troops to come ashore were on the western side of Roanoke Island. The Confederates therefore located most of their shore batteries along Croatan Sound, which separates Roanoke Island from the mainland. Three turfed and sand forts -- named Huger, Blanchard, and Bartow -- had been built along the northwestern edge of the island, and a floating battery, called Fort Forrest, had been placed on two barges rammed into the opposite shore of Croatan Sound.

 In Wise's opinion, none of the forts "was in the right position."  He argued that they should have been constructed at the southernmost approaches to Roanoke Island, forward of any of the invasion beaches. "I saw that the enemy might land at Pugh's or Ashby's a portion of their force, pass the batteries with all ease, round the north end of the island and land another portion of their forces, and gain the rear of all the batteries without exchanging a shot with them, or the least danger of damage," Wise declared.[48]  In an effort to keep Goldsborough's gunboats from escorting transports to the uppermost end of the island, the Confederates placed sixteen sunken vessels across Croatan Sound and were still putting down pilings when the battle began.  Lynch's gunboats were stationed behind this obstruction.

There was little guesswork about what Burnside would try to do once he came ashore.  Landing somewhere on the western side of Roanoke Island, he would  attempt to march his troops up the only road that led to the northern end of the island and compel the rebel defenders to flee or capitulate.  To stop him, the Confederates had built an eighty-foot, sod-and-sand redoubt with flanking breastworks across the narrowest part of Roanoke Island on a slight elevation called Suple's Hill.  It held three artillery pieces.  D. H. Hill's recommendation that breastworks be extended from shoreline to shoreline had not been acted upon.  The fate of the rebel defenders would ultimately depend upon whether the cypress swamps on both sides of the road were impassable. "That swamp on the right and the marshes on the left of Suple's Hill were reported to me by Colonel Shaw to be impassable. They appeared to be so, but I ordered them to be explored and the earthworks at Suple's Hill to be extended as far as possible on the right and left flanks," Wise declared.[49] 

Late on the morning of February 6^th a Confederate lieutenant picked up his spyglass and peered through the fog enshrouding Pamlico Sound.  He was  attempting to see more clearly the shapes of the ships that were anchoring about 8 miles south of Roanoke Island.  "The fog has cleared away from below," he reported by late morning, " and I can make out more than fifty vessels, either at anchor or under way in tow of steamers."[50]  When Colonel Shaw heard the news, he rushed to the southern tip of the island to see for himself.  He was understandably pessimistic about his chances in the upcoming engagement. "The orders contained in your dispatch will of course be carried out," he told Henry Wise. "I have to report to you," he declared, "that the available force at my command, exclusive of the detachments on duty at the batteries, is only about 800--808 by last report. The enemy numbers 10,000 men probably.”[51]

The Battle of Roanoke Island began at 10:30 a.m., February 7, 1862, when the guns at Fort Bartow, the only Confederate shore battery within range of the Yankee fleet, opened fire on the Federal armada that had steamed north from Cape Hatteras the day before.  "The firing was tremendous and from the deck of our vessel, we beheld a sight that was never seen from this continent in extent or beauty,"  Henry Gangewer exclaimed.[52]  Also aboard one of Burnside's transports was George Washington Whitman (1829-1901), the younger brother of famed poet Walt Whitman.  He too got caught up in the drama of the moment.  " . . . it was a fine sight the shells bursting all around the Batteries and sending up a column of sand 20 feet high and the Batteries throwing shot and shells like blazes," he wrote in a letter to his mother two days later.[53]

 Approximately 10,000 Federal troops had landed by nightfall, at a place called Ashby's Harbor, about three miles south of Fort Bartow.  "As the steamers approached the shore at a rapid speed each surf-boat was 'let go,' and with their acquired velocity and by direction of the steersman reached the shore in line," declared Burnside in his official report.[54]  The Confederates did not contest the landing.

 Gangewer explained that the "Secesh" had left lots of provisions behind, including liquor, "which were drunk by our boys."[55]   "We built fires and tried to dry ourselves as well as we could," Whitman said.  After eating "hard cracers" for supper, he and the other Yankee soldiers "laid down for the night." A light rain started falling about 11 p.m. "I stuck it out until my blanket got wet through, and then got up and stood around the fire till morning," Whitman told his mother. [56]  The popping of  sap in the burning logs and limbs must have reminded Whitman  that tomorrow he and his cohorts would hear the unmistakable clatter of battle.

  February 8^th dawned cool and misty.  John G. Foster's Brigade broke camp shortly after daybreak and led the way northward along the sandy trail that bisected the island.  The 25^th Massachusetts was the first to encounter rebel pickets, who fired upon the Yankees and quickly fell back.  Foster ordered his brigade to pause about 900 yards south of the main Confederate redoubt at Suple's Hill.  He reasoned that it might be possible for some of his soldiers to make their way through the swamps on either side of the causeway and turn the enemy's flanks.  If successful, this maneuver would seal the fate of the  defenders of Roanoke Island. "I subsequently received an order to march by a flank across the fire of the enemy and through an almost impenetrable swamp and turn his flank, and after all effort of two and a half hours of the most fatiguing and laborious exertion I succeeded in getting four companies into position to rake the left flank of the enemy's lines behind his work," explained Colonel John Kurtz, commander of the 23^rd Massachusetts.[57]  William Gangewer participated in this arduous march.  "We were at this time and all through the action in a marsh into which we sank at every step up to our knees and sometimes up to our middle," he explained.[58]

Foster sent the 25^th Massachusetts directly up the road to keep the Confederate gunners and infantry in the redoubt fully engaged, while elements of the 27^th Massachusetts waded through the Cyprus swamp on the left side of the causeway in hopes of flanking the rebel right. These troops also found the going tough, mostly because of the treacherous terrain.  "This, on account of the dense undergrowth of vines and bushes, the water and mud being also much deeper, was extremely difficult, and our progress consequently slow", remembered one Union officer.[59]

 Whitman's 51^st New York Regiment traversed the same route.  "It was might trying to a fellow's nerves as the balls were flying around pretty thick cutting the twigs off overhead and knocking the bark off the trees all around us," Whitman remembered.  The weather was chilly.  The Union troops, able to see  only a few yards ahead because of  dense undergrowth and thick forests, trudged slowly ahead, their uniforms soaked and their boots filled with dank swamp water.  "We could not see 10 yards on either side," said Whitman.  It took about and hour and a half for the 25^th Massachusetts to reach the right flank of the Confederate fortifications.  "Our Brigadier General gave the order to charge and away we went the water flying over our heads as we splashed through it," Whitman reported.[60] Yankee soldiers also assaulted the Confederate left, and Colonel Hawkins led the 9^th New York Regiment, nicknamed the "New York Zouaves" because of their flamboyant uniforms and alleged military verve, in an attack against the rebel center.[61]

The Confederate defenders broke and ran when they saw the Yankees coming at them seemingly from all directions.  "There was nary a rebel in sight for as soon as they saw us start on a charge they started to run," Whitman told his mother.[62]  "They perceived our design . . . and commenced to destroy their stores," Gangewer declared.[63]  The rapid departure of the rebels gave Whitman and his colleagues a few moments to tour the Confederate fortifications. Discarded clothing littered the ground -- blankets, coats and knapsacks.  The horrors of war were not difficult to find.  "One of the rebels lay there dead by his gun," Whitman proclaimed.  " . . . another lay badly wounded," and "a few feet farther in the bushes lay an old man with beard perfectly white, dead."[64]

  Gangewer observed the same ghastly scene.  "We found quite a number of dead and wounded rebels in the fort," he said.[65] "We found two dead rebels lying in the woods, wrote Whitman, "and farther on lay another just dying, the top of his head being shot off."[66]  Yankees fell too.  A Union surgeon reported that a Connecticut soldier "was shot through the lung and died almost immediately."  A New York trooper "was also killed, by a ball passing through his brain."[67]

Henry Wise was not on  Roanoke Island during the battle.  He remained in bed in his tent on nearby Nags Head, ill with pleurisy.  The rumbling of the Yankee guns must have stirred the proud Virginian's  emotions, unable as he was to be with his men. Outnumbered more than 10 to 1 and with no hope of being reinforced, Shaw did not prolong the fight.  It is understandable that he refused to persist against such overwhelming odds.  "With the very great disparity of forces, the moment the redoubt was flanked I considered the island lost," he stated in his official report.   "The struggle could have been protracted, and the small body of brave men which had been held in reserve might have been brought up into the open space to receive the fire of the overwhelming force on our flank," he explained, "but they would have been sacrificed without the smallest hope of a successful result." [68]

   Shaw called the outcome a "disaster."  The number of Confederate casualties was relatively small -- 23 killed, 58 wounded, and 62 missing.  But some 2500 troops, many sent to the island just before it fell, were taken prisoner, including Colonel Shaw himself.  As D. H. Hill had predicted, the loss of Roanoke Island  also opened up the entire Albemarle Sound region to invasion and, even more ominously,  brought the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad under threat of attack by the enemy.

 Governor Clark understood how dangerous the situation had become.  "Roanoke Island has fallen; its garrison captured. We must organize another army for that section," he told Jefferson Davis. "I have only two regiments, which will go down forthwith to Weldon. Avenues to our railroads must be guarded. Send what assistance you can," the Governor pleaded.[69]  Yankee gunboats steamed virtually unopposed up the Pasquotank River to Elizabeth City on February 10^th, destroyed or captured all the boats in  Lynch's "mosquito fleet," and dispatched Yankee troops ashore. Elizabeth City was a ghost town, except for throngs of jubilant blacks along the wharf,.  Fires set by the retreating Confederates in accordance with instructions from Richmond sent plumes of  smoke billowing into the sky. "Take measures for destroying all supplies at Elizabeth City as soon as satisfied that they cannot be saved from seizure by enemy,"  Confederate Secretary of War Benjamin had ordered.[70]  Two entire blocks of the virtually abandoned town fell victim to the flames and crumbled to the ground.

Having gained control of the entrances to the  Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal, Stephen Rowan sent his gunboats  westward up Albemarle Sound.  On February 12^th, the Yankees reached the entrance to Edenton harbor.  They landed without opposition, spiked the guns guarding the town, took on provisions, put a few bales of cotton aboard, and continued onward toward the upper reaches of the Albemarle.  The Confederates were virtually helpless.  They had no armed vessels to send against the Yankees, and the number of soldiers in the region was woefully small.

The prospect that Burnside would send gunboats and troops up the Roanoke River and attempt to destroy the railroad bridge at Weldon  produced  great anxiety among the defenders of northeastern North Carolina.  The Confederates marched soldiers to Weldon and the lower reaches of the Roanoke in hopes of thwarting such a move. "Col. William J. Hoke, Thirty-eighth Regiment North Carolina troops, will proceed with his regiment to Weldon, N. C., and take such measures as the force at his command will permit for the defense of the bridge at that place," Confederate headquarters at Goldsboro announced on February 12^th.[71]  Secretary of War Benjamin tried to reassure the protectors of the Tar Heel State. "We are hard at work for you," he informed Governor Clark on February 14^th, "and you will see the result in a very few days. Keep your people in good heart. The danger is greatly exaggerated."[72] "The defense of North Carolina occupies my anxious attention. I am sending there all the aid I can procure," Jefferson Davis stated on February 15^th.[73]

Comforting dispatches from Richmond could not dispel the bad news emanating from the Ablemarle Sound region.  On February 20^th,  Federal gunboats headed up the Chowan River and attacked Winton, a town  Burnside believed could serve  as a strategic base from which to launch operations against the railroad running  northward from Weldon into Virginia  Because Confederate artillerymen guarding the town had ambushed and fired upon the Yankees the day before, Commodore Rowan and his men were not in a forgiving mood. 

Colonel Hawkins led the 9^th New York Regiment ashore.  They met no opposition.  The Zouaves had no difficulty taking control of the town, because the rebels, realizing that they were outnumbered, had evacuated the place just before the Yankees had arrived.  Federal troops proceeded to put Winton to the torch.  "It was determined by Captain Rowan and Colonel Hawkins to burn all the military stores that could not be removed, with the store-houses and the quarters occupied by the troops, which constituted almost the entire town, there not being over twenty houses in the place," Burnside explained.[74]  A good bit of pillaging occurred.  Union Private Byron G. Still wrote his mother that "court houses, churches, beautifully furnished dwellings with velvet carpets, pianos, etc., all sharing the same fate, and you may be sure that we gave it a pretty good ransacking while the flames were doing their work."[75]

 Colonel Hawkins felt compelled to justify the behavior of his troops at Winton.  He realized that this was the first time Yankee occupiers had ransacked unprotected property in North Carolina. "This, I believe, is the first instance during the war on our side where fire has accompanied the sword. It is to be regretted that such severe measures have to be adopted," he declared.  In Hawkins's opinion, destroying the buildings in Winton was appropriate for two reasons.  First, the Confederate defenders had used subterfuge to lure Yankee gunboats close to shore on February 19^th.  "Evidence of this," Hawkins began, "is that a negress, the property of one of the Confederate officers, was sent down to the wharf by her master to beckon the boat in to the wharf, when we were all to be slaughtered, or in the words of the negress, 'Dey said dat dey wan't goin' to let anybody lib at all, but was goth' to kill ebery one of'em. '"   Second, the buildings set afire were militarily significant. They had been "taken possession of by and were in the use of the rebel forces as store-houses and quarters, which forces had been raised, supported, and used by the States in rebellion for the purpose of subverting the Constitution and the laws of the United States,"  Hawkins explained.[76]

 Hawkins's justifications notwithstanding, the burning of Winton violated the lenient occupation policy that General Burnside had announced from his headquarters on Roanoke Island just four days before. "The mission of our joint expedition," the Union general  had told the local inhabitants, "is not to invade any of your rights, but to assert the authority of the United States, and thus to close with you the desolating war brought upon your State by  a comparatively  few bad men in your midst."

 Burnside had  dismissed out of hand the claims advanced by some Confederates that Union troops were going to pillage and burn private property. "They impose upon your credulity by telling you of wicked and even diabolical intentions on our part; of our desire to destroy your freedom, demolish your property, liberate your slaves, injure your women, and such like enormities, all of which, we assure you, is not only ridiculous, but utterly and willfully false,"  he had asserted.  Burnside had even used religion to buttress his arguments. "We are Christians as well as yourselves," the general had said, "and we profess to know full well and to feel profoundly the sacred obligations of the character."[77] 

  The people living  along  and near Albemarle Sound  were only too aware of what had transpired at Winton.  Catherine Edmondston, who had recently returned to her plantation on the upper Roanoke River to prepare for the worst, was outraged when she heard what the Yankees had done.  "The enemy bombarded the town of Winton and without notice burned it to ashes," she proclaimed on February 22^nd.  "Think of the wretches!"[78]  Planters  reckoned that the hierarchical social structure of the region might soon begin to collapse and  started  sending the majority of their slaves inland.  "I should have everything in readiness however to leave at once & send off my cotton even if I had to haul it," advised the son of one plantation owner."[79]  These were frenzied times along the Roanoke.   "Although fleeing meant abandoning real property, it meant saving a good deal of personal property -- especially slaves, but also other valuable, movable possessions such as currency bonds, jewelry, silverware, and furniture," explains historian Stephen V. Ash.[80]  Wagons full of black men and black women, often with fine chests of drawers and cupboards strapped to the sides, began rolling through towns like Edenton, Plymouth, Tarboro, and Murfreesboro, all heading west.

 It seemed that the very fabric of Southern society was coming unraveled. The social elite of northeastern North Carolina  feared for their very lives.  "Alas -- for our poor houseless neighbors in Winton!", lamented Catherine Edmondston.  "How soon your fate may be ours none of us can tell."[81] The distant growl of Federal artillery told everyone that Union troops were getting closer every day.  The wife of one plantation owner announced that she would "resist to the death."[82]  Desperate measures were employed to  keep the Yankees away.  The Confederates bolted  several boats together, filled them with turpentine, tar, and rosin, and put them in the Roanoke River.  "This is anchored at Rainbow Bend where the River makes a sudden turn," Edmonston explained on February 24^th.  "This is to be cut loose on the approach of the enemy & drifting slowly with the current  & extending entirely across the River it will, it is hoped, carry fire and destruction in its path."[83] 

Planters became even more apprehensive when they learned that some yeoman farmers, white laborers, and even prominent citizens were cooperating with the enemy. An especially disturbing incident of disloyalty occurred when Union gunboats  arrived at Edenton on February 12^th.  James Norcum, who announced that he was a "Union man delegated by the citizens to meet the Federal authorities," greeted the Yankees as they came ashore and assured them that they would meet no resistance.[84] 

Retribution was not long in coming once the Federal flotilla  steamed away and rebel troops returned to the town. "Major Brabble, First North Carolina Battalion, went into Edenton, and arrested Messrs. Norcom and Bland as traitors, in dealing with the enemy," Confederate Brigadier General A. G. Blanchard (1810-1891) reported on February 24^th.[85]  Another unsettling event unfolded while Confederate troops were retreating from Elizabeth City.  A man named Lester "deliberately shot a private who rode into his yard, and then barricaded himself in the upper rooms of his house, refusing to surrender," stated rebel Colonel C. F. Henningsen. "Captain Webb," Henningsen continued, "went up to him unarmed and pledged himself to protect him from violence if he came out. After appearing to consent he suddenly and treacherously attempted to fire at the captain, and did fire afterward several times at the men. I ordered the house to be fired. He was driven by the smoke to the window and shot by one of the artillery."[86]

Tar Heel officials continued to plead with Richmond to send more troops to the Albemarle Sound region. "Permit me to inform you that my command embraces a highly productive tract of country, which now contains provisions sufficient to subsist the whole Army of the Confederate States for at least half a year, and it is of the first importance that it should not be ravaged by the enemy," Colonel William J. Clarke told Secretary Benjamin.  Clarke proceeded to report that he had just over 1000 troops to defend the region between the Chowan and Roanoke Rivers.  "The white population is sparse, and they have been so long neglected that they are perfectly demoralized," Clarke declared.[87] 

One can only imagine what would have transpired if Burnside had made an all out effort to conquer northeastern North Carolina.  His principal objective, however, lay elsewhere.  "Burnside seems inclined, or is perforce made, to give us a little rest," Catherine Edmondston wrote on February 27^th.[88]  In keeping with his orders, the Union commander was making final preparations to attack and take possession of New Bern, the chief port on the lower Neuse River.  Rowena Reed contends that Burnside was also prevented from making a serious effort to proceed up the Roanoke River because the Union Navy had underestimated the amount of ammunition it would take to destroy the Confederate artillery outposts on Roanoke Island.  "The need to resupply after reducing enemy defenses delayed immediate follow-up," says Reed, "and gave the enemy time to reconsolidate and recover his morale." [89]