Chapter Seven

Port Royal Sound

     On November 7, 1861 , Robert E. Lee, the 54-year-old son of Revolutionary War hero Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee, boarded a train in Charleston and headed south on the Charleston and Savannah Railroad. [1] As the train trudged past towns like Jacksonboro and Salkehatchie, the rhythmic clatter of the wheels on the rails suggested that everything was routine.   Lee knew that the situation was otherwise.

    Six days before, Judah P. Benjamin (1811-1884), Confederate Secretary of War, had warned Governor Pickens that a sizeable Federal fleet was most likely headed for Port Royal Sound, a sweeping expanse of water at the mouth of the Broad River about three-fourths of the way south from Charleston on the South Carolina coast toward Savannah .   “I have just received information, which I consider entirely reliable that the enemy’s expedition is intended for Port Royal ,” Benjamin had exclaimed. [2] Before leaving Charleston , Lee had learned that the Federal fleet had already arrived.

     Acrid smoke billowed from the bulbous smokestack of the wood-burning locomotive. Steam spewed from beneath the churning drive wheels of the 4-4-0 locomotive whenever the engineer took the train on to a siding to let a locomotive approaching from the opposite direction get by.   When the train stopped at one of the many water tanks along the route, all but the first-class passengers had to disembark to help gather lumber for the tender, all the while listening for the signal from the engine’s whistle telling them that it was time to return to the cars.

     Lee watched the mixed forest of   pine and hardwoods and the sandy soil of the South Carolina Coastal Plain pass by his window.   He arrived at Coosawatchie, the railroad stop closest to Port Royal Sound, and disembarked at mid-day on November 7th. Spanish moss hung from the twisted branches of coastal oaks as if to augment the somberness of the military situation.    A man of enormous self-control and precise, analytical intellect, Lee was superbly suited to tackle the formidable tasks that awaited him.

Stratford Hall

     Robert Edward Lee, named for two of his mother’s brothers, was born on January 19, 1807, in Stratford Hall, a magnificent, H-shaped, brick plantation house on the Potomac River about 90 miles downstream from Washington, D.C.   Like D. H. Hill, Lee belonged to a family that had lost most of its money.   The culprit in Lee’s case was his profligate father. Partly because of bad luck, partly because of his penchant for investing in grandiose, unrealistic schemes, “Light Horse Harry” Lee had squandered his fortune and had suffered the humiliation of being put in debtor’s jail in 1809.

      In 1810, “Light Horse Harry” and his wife, Ann Carter Lee, and their four children, including three-year-old Robert, had experienced another embarrassment.   They   had had to leave Stratford Hall, because Henry Lee, “Light Horse Harry’s” son by his first wife, Matilda Lee, had come into his inheritance of the plantation.   The family had moved to Alexandria , Virginia , where Robert E. Lee was to spend the remainder of his childhood and his early manhood.

     Life for “Light Horse Harry” and his family continued to be toilsome.   On July 28, 1812 , the old Revolutionary War general was attacked and beaten unmercifully by a horde of drunken brutes in Baltimore because of his defense of a newspaper editor who, like him, opposed the War of 1812.   The mob poured hot candle grease into Lee’s eyes, thrust penknives into his flesh, and even threatened to cut off his nose.   The elder Lee survived, but he remained a disfigured invalid for the rest of his life.

   Wholly dependent upon the income from his wife, thoroughly demoralized, and still hounded by creditors, “Light Horse Harry” sought to escape his woes by leaving his family behind in Alexandria and settling in the British West Indies .   He left in 1813 and sailed down the Potomac , never to return.   “Light Horse Harry” did try to get back five years later to see Ann Carter Lee and their children.   He became critically ill during his return voyage, however, and was put ashore on Cumberland Island on the extreme southern coast of Georgia , where, ironically, he died in the plantation home of Nathanael Greene, his Revolutionary War commander, on March 25, 1818 .

     The vexing circumstances of his father’s last years had a profound impact upon Robert E. Lee.   “Young Robert Lee," states one scholar, "never forgot his father’s disgrace.” [3]   Only six years old when his father left home and just eleven when “Light Horse Harry” expired, Lee was reared almost solely by his mother and her family, the Carters of Shirley Plantation.   “To her death, Robert Lee was his mother’s son,” proclaims historian Thomas L. Connelly. [4]

    Insistent that her youngest son would develop the self-discipline that his wayward, passionate father had so tragically lacked, Ann Carter Lee did not refrain from whipping Robert to compel him to obey.   It worked.   “But she had taken Henry’s tragedy to heart, and the reasons for his fall, and she was determined that his grim cycle of promise, overconfidence, recklessness, disaster, and ruin should not be rounded in the lives of her children,” writes Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee’s best known biographer.  “Self-denial, self-control, and the strictest economy in all financial matters," Freeman continues, "were part of the code of honor she taught them from infancy.” [5] In a letter to one of Robert’s older brothers his mother wrote: “You must repel every evil and allow yourself to indulge in such habits only as are consistent with religion and morality.” [6]

Robert E. Lee as a young officer

     Robert E. Lee did not drink alcohol.   He did not smoke.   He did not swear. "Lee's correspondence does not contain the echo of a liaison, the shadow of an oath, or the stain of a single obscene suggestion," says Freeman. [7]   A perfectionist and a person of profound religious conviction, Lee foreswore all inclinations toward self-aggrandizement or promotion. “It was full of humility and self-reproach,” said Lee about a sermon he especially enjoyed. [8]

     Always seeking to be gentlemanly in his behavior, Lee preferred the company of women and children, not surprising since he spent a substantial part of his life nursing sickly women, first his mother and later his arthritic wife.   “In social life he liked to talk to women or children,” commented one of his staff officers in the Army of Northern Virginia.   “I have seen him with a child on his knee, and he never seemed to tire of its prattle, while the talk of an ordinary man would have bored him almost to extinction.” Not a gifted speaker, Lee lacked spontaneity. “And I never heard General Lee laugh,” observed the same officer.   “He would have his joke and was very fond of having it, and his face would light up with a smile, but I never heard the sound of his laughter.” [9]

    

   Beneath Lee’s facade of almost total self-composure burned a fiery, spirited temperament. “When I lose my temper, don’t let it make you angry,” he once advised an aide. [10] Another member of Lee’s staff described a most revealing conversation he overheard between Lee and General James Longstreet in the very last days of the Civil War, when the shattered Army of Northern Virginia was retreating westward from Petersburg , Va.   “I must have slept for an hour at least, when again I was awakened by the loud, almost fierce tones of General Lee, saying, ‘I tell you, General Longstreet, I will strike that man (U. S. Grant) a blow in the morning.'” [11]   According to Confederate General Edward Porter Alexander (1835-1910), Lee had   the “combative instinct in him as strongly developed as any man living.” [12]   “I believe all his officers feared him,” said another of Lee’s subordinates.   “They loved him as men are seldom loved, but they feared him, too.” [13]

    

    From his earliest days of schooling, at private academies in Alexandria , Robert E. Lee   demonstrated a preference for mathematical and technical subjects.   “His mind was scientific in its interests,” observes Freeman. “As among the sciences," writes Freeman, "the applied meant more to him than the theoretical, though his devotion to mathematics was always high.” [14]   Lee was an excellent student.   He was never late, never disobedient, always eager to please his instructors.   Indicative of Lee’s commitment to excellence was his habit of drawing exquisite illustrations on a slate for his geometry teacher even though they would all have to be erased almost immediately to make way for the next lesson.

     Again like D. H. Hill, Lee sought an appointment to West Point because it was the only way he could afford to continue his education.   “He is about 18 years of age, and of excellent disposition,” wrote one of his sponsors. [15]   “Robert Lee was formerly a pupil of mine.   While under my care I can vouch for his correct and gentlemanly deportment,” said another of his teachers. [16]   Lee enrolled in the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1825.   He did not disappoint his backers. A diligent student, who possessed an affable if not convivial personality, Lee was singled out for special recognition at West Point .   At the end of his first year he was made a staff sergeant.   In 1828-29 he served as adjutant of the corps, the highest-ranking position in the student body.   Lee graduated second in a class of 46 cadets in June 1829.

     Robert E. Lee served in the Corps of Engineers until the mid-1850's and became an expert at constructing defensive works.   His first assignment was to Savannah , Ga. , where he participated in the building of Fort Pulaski on Cockspur Island near the mouth of the Savannah River .   In 1831, he was dispatched to Hampton Roads, Va. and spent about three and one-half years strengthening fortifications at the mouth of Chesapeake Bay .   It was during these years that Lee married Mary Custis, daughter of George Washington Parke Custis, the grandson of Martha Washington and the adopted son of George Washington. [17] Unkempt, habitually tardy, and a disorganized housekeeper, Mary would bear Lee seven children in fourteen years.   “In her engagements she was forgetful and habitually late, an aggravating contrast to the minute-promptness of her husband,” says Douglas Southall Freeman. [18]

     After three years of duty in Washington , D.C. as assistant to the Army’s chief engineer, Lee received orders on April 6, 1837 , to go to St. Louis , Missouri to oversee the removal of obstructions to navigation on the Upper Mississippi River and its tributaries. He benefited from his stay in the West, which lasted until October 1840.   For the first time serving as an independent supervising engineer, Lee “developed his ingenuity in the practice of his profession and it strengthened still further his quiet confidence in his ability to meet unexpected problems,” asserts Freeman. [19]

      Lee’s typical approach to any task was to ponder all possibilities before committing himself to a specific course of action. His logical mind fixed upon a problem like a vise. “As he left the West,” Freeman contends, “he was more than ever convinced that study of a problem—detached and adequate study on the ground—was the engineer’s first duty and his greatest pledge of success.” [20] Some call it bull-headedness.   Others call it stubbornness.   Whatever term one uses, once Lee decided how to proceed, he acted quickly and decisively, abjuring any suggestions that he deviate from the unrelenting pursuit of his objective.

     The early and mid-1840’s found Lee mostly in New York City superintending the improvement of fortifications in New York Harbor .   He did make a brief visit to the North Carolina coast in late 1840 and inspected Fort Macon near Beaufort and probably visited Fort Caswell near the mouth of the Cape Fear River .   A major turning point in Lee’s career occurred on August 19, 1846 , when he was selected for service in the Mexican War.   Lee performed magnificently as a combatant. A member of Winfield Scott’s general staff, he participated in the bombardment of the Mexican citadel at Vera Cruz in March 1847, and conducted reconnaissance missions deep behind enemy lines when American troops moved inland.   He won praise for his part in the battles of Cerro Gordo , Padierna, Churubusco, and those at the approaches to Mexico City in August and September.   “You have no idea what a horrible sight a field of battle is,” Captain Robert E. Lee proclaimed in a letter to his son Custis. [21]   His protestations about the horrors of war notwithstanding, Lee profited professionally from the Mexican War, largely because he became a favorite of General Winfield Scott's.

     Lee honed his military skills during the 20 months he spent in Mexico . He learned the importance of reconnaissance as a preparatory step to engagement and came to appreciate the effectiveness of well-placed artillery and the value of defensive field fortifications. Participating in combat for the first time, he developed a sense of supreme trust in his own strategic abilities and became a bold, even audacious commander   -- a quality many scholars have not held in high regard. "The aggressiveness of Robert E. Lee," contends historian Grady McWhiney, "the greatest Yankee killer of all time, cost the Confederacy dearly." [22] Frank Vandiver argues that Lee "lost a lot of men by attacking and attacking and attacking." [23] Freeman concedes that "audacity, even to the verge of seeming overconfidence, was the guiding principle of the strategy he employed." [24] Connelly goes so far as to suggest that Lee was a daring soldier because of the need to satisfy some deep inner psychological impulse. "War thus provided an emotional release for a man who had contained strong emotions beneath a mantle of reserve," Connelly avers. [25]

     Lee returned to his duties as an Army engineer following the Mexican War.   Until August 1852, he devoted most of his energies to overseeing the construction of Fort Carroll in Baltimore Harbor . [26]   He then became the Superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West Point , a position he held with distinction until March 1855. [27]   Leaving the Engineer Corps for the first time, Lee journeyed that year to Louisville , Kentucky and became an officer in   the 2 ^nd Cavalry, a unit recently formed for service on the frontier.  

    Lee spent most of the next three years at isolated outposts in Texas , before returning in November 1857 to Arlington , his recently deceased father-in-law's plantation home across the Potomac River from Washington , D.C.   He remained on military leave, except for leading the attack against John Brown's ragtag force at Harper's Ferry in October 1859, until early 1860.   He devoted most of his energies during this period to fulfilling his responsibilities as executor of George Washington Parke Custis's estate, which had 169 slaves among its assets.   

      Before leaving Texas , Lee wrote a letter to his wife in which he set down on paper for the first time his views on the institution of slavery.  The question of how Lee stood on the   central issue of his era   has become a matter of considerable controversy among historians.   According to Freeman, Lee "believed steadfastly in gradual emancipation." [28] "The maintenance of slavery meant nothing to him," Freeman contends.   "He felt that if he owned all the slaves in the South he would cheerfully give them up to preserve the Union ." [29]     Nolan rejects the notion that Lee was "opposed to slavery." [30] He argues that Lee's position on human bondage was the same as that held by the majority of aristocratic Virginians.   While committed abstractly to the elimination of slavery, Lee believed that the "peculiar institution was exempt from the national political process." [31] Lee did tell his wife that the people of the North had no right "to interfere with & change the domestic institutions of the South." [32]

Arlington Plantation, Lee's wife's home

      Lee's framework of reference regarding the abolition of slavery was essentially religious.   He believed that human bondage existed because God had willed it and that only God could end it.   In the letter to his wife Lee stated that slavery was a "moral & political evil in any Country" and predicted that "Merciful Providence" would one day intervene and bring about the "final abolition of human Slavery." [33]   Lee did believe, however, that most blacks benefited from bondage.   White masters, their bestial impulses restrained by Christian teachings, provided slaves with the "painful discipline" that would "prepare & lead them to better things," he insisted. [34]

     Having completed the disposition of his father-in-law's estate, Lee left Arlington on February 10, 1860 , and set out on his return trip to Texas .  He arrived in San Antonio nine days later and assumed temporary command of the Department of Texas.   For the next fourteen months, as he rode at the head of cavalry units chasing Mexican bandits and marauding Indians or performed routine administrative duties, Lee watched the country drift slowly but irreversibly toward Civil War. "Like the fated victim in a Greek tragedy, he was coming under the influences of forces he could not control," says Freeman. [35] Lee was opposed to coercion of the South   by the Federal government.   In his opinion, no State should be compelled to remain in the United States .  

      Lee hoped that the Union could be preserved.   "If the Union is dissolved, which God in his mercy forbid, I shall return to you," he wrote in a letter to his son Custis. [36]   Lee had strong feelings of loyalty for Virginia , not for the South as a whole. "From the first commencement of our troubles," proclaimed Mary Custis Lee, "he had decided that in the event of Virginia 's secession, duty . . . would compel him to follow." [37]   Accordingly, when Virginia cast its lot with the Confederacy and seceded on April 17, 1861 , Lee, who had returned to Washington in February, did not hesitate to resign from the U.S. Army, even though with President Lincoln's concurrence he had been offered command of the Federal army that was being organized to subdue the South.   "I declined the offer . . . to take command of the army that was to brought into the field, stating as candidly and as courteously as I could, that though opposed to secession and deprecating war, I could take no part in an invasion of the Southern States," Lee explained in a letter he wrote in 1868. [38]   Lee left the U.S. Army on April 20 ^th .   "My husband has wept tears of blood over this terrible war, but as a man of honor and a Virginian, he must follow the destiny of his state," Lee's wife wrote in a letter to a friend some months later. [39]

    Lee traveled to Richmond and accepted command of all Virginia military forces on April 23, 1861 .   After several weeks of hectic activity organizing the defenses of his native State, Lee became a Confederate brigadier general on June 8 ^th .  His first field command occurred in western Virginia .   Sent by Jefferson Davis to coordinate military affairs in that exposed sector,   Lee,   by then a Confederate general, failed to dislodge a Federal force from Cheat Mountain on September 12 ^th   and was unsuccessful in attempting to mount an offensive in the Kanawha Valley in October.   Arriving in Richmond on October 31 ^st , Lee learned that some Southern newspapers were criticizing him for being too cautious and irresolute in his ill-fated forays into western Virginia .   Cynics began to call him "Granny Lee."   President Davis was firm in his support of Lee, however.   That is why Davis placed Lee in command of the defense of the lower Southeastern coast when word reached the Confederate capital that a Federal fleet was sailing for Port Royal Sound. "In pursuance of the instructions from the War Department, General R. E. Lee, C. S. Army, assumes command of the military department composed of the coasts of South Carolina , Georgia , and East Florida ," the orders read. [40]

    These were the circumstances that brought Robert E. Lee to Cossawahtchie , S.C. on November 7, 1861 .   The new commander did not have time to tarry and think about his illustrious past. There was not a moment to waste. As he rode out of Coosawahtchie on horseback and headed toward Hilton Head Island and Port Royal Sound, Lee could hear the distinct and loathsome growl of artillery fire in the distance. Lee was in a gloomy mood.   "Another forlorn hope expedition," he wrote in a letter to his daughter.   "Worse than western Virginia ." [41]

     Traveling up the sandy road from the field of battle came General Roswell S. Ripley (1823-1887), a brash, hot-tempered native of Ohio who had settled in South Carolina in 1853 and who now headed the troops from his adopted State.   Ripley gave Lee the news he did not wish to convey and the news Lee did not want to hear.   "He reported that the enemy's fleet had passed the batteries and entered the harbor.   Nothing then could be done but to make arrangements to withdraw the troops from the batteries to prevent their capture and save the public property,"   Lee told his superiors. [42]   Port Royal Sound was in Union hands.

       Political circumstances mandated that the North develop an offensive military strategy in the Civil War.   The fundamental aim of the United States was the complete and absolute destruction of the Confederate States of America .   Compromise of any sort and on any terms with the rebellious States was impossible.   Any success the Confederacy had in defending the inviolability of its territory would legitimize the existence of the Richmond government and constitute a defeat of the North.

    Total victory for the Union and total defeat for the Confederacy were the only outcomes that were acceptable to the Lincoln administration.   "The United States was fighting for unconditional surrender rather than for a favorable settlement," writes historian Archer Jones. [43]    Washington did not want to mount a massive invasion of the South, however. An offensive strategy carried to that level would necessitate the spilling of vast amounts of blood; and, even more importantly, it would alienate the white people of the South and make their incorporation back into the Union a more difficult task to accomplish.

The Anaconda Plan devised by General Winfield Scott

       Hoping to emulate his successes in the Mexican War, Winfield Scott hoped to achieve total victory without waging total war.   He devised a strategy, the so-called Anaconda Plan , that sought to surround the Confederacy and seal it off from the outside world. Unable to acquire adequate military supplies, the South, it was thought, would have no choice but to capitulate. The North, Scott explained,   "will thus cut off the luxuries to which the people are accustomed; and when they feel the pressure, not having been exasperated by attacks made on them within their respective States, the Union spirit will assert itself; those who are on the fence will descend on the Union side, and I will guarantee that in one year from this time all difficulties will be settled." [44] To Scott's way of thinking, an all-out invasion of the South was unnecessary and would be counterproductive to the achievement of the North's ultimate political objective of preserving the United States .

     An essential component of the Anaconda Plan was the Union blockade of the Confederate coastline. Although significant technological breakthroughs in naval warfare had occurred during the past two decades, most notably the introduction of steam power, the development of screw propellers, and the invention of armor-clad warships, the Federal Navy was not prepared to blockade over 3000 miles of shoreline from the Potomac to the Rio Grande.    "The United States Navy on the very eve of the Civil War was a drowsy, moth-eaten organization," concludes historian Ivan Musicant. [45] There was no system for retirement, meaning that many senior officers had been aboard ship since the War of 1812. The Navy had 90 ships, but only 42 were ready for action. Of these, 34   were powered by sail.

      Neither in terms of training nor in terms of equipment was the U.S. Navy ready to take on the responsibility of squeezing the South into submission.   It was a deep-water fleet ill-suited   for operations close to shore.    In October 1861, there were only 8 Union ships stationed off the South Carolina , Georgia , and east Florida coasts.   "The blockade is a perfect farce," reported a captain sitting off Savannah .   " . . . we can see steamers run up and down the coast every day, and we are so far off," he lamented,  " that we are useless; before we could get underway, they would be out of sight." [46]

     Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles moved quickly to strengthen the United States fleet.   Receiving a recommendation from his Blockade Board that the South Atlantic Coast   be divided into two administrative units, he announced on September 18 ^th the creation of   the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron to control shipping along the Virginia and North Carolina coasts and the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron to assume the same responsibility for the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and eastern   Florida.   Appointed to head the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron was   Captain Samuel F. Du Pont (1803-1865), a senior naval officer who was just completing his service as president of the Blockade Board that had met over the Summer of 1861 to devise Union naval strategy.  

     Welles increased the number of ships available for service against the Confederacy by summoning the overseas squadrons to home waters, by re-commissioning naval vessels long out of service, and by directing the Navy to purchase or charter merchant steamers capable of mounting artillery.   His most innovative move was to order the construction of completely new types of steam-powered   vessels that were specially designed to operate in the shallow coastal rivers and sounds of the South. "What we needed for this war, and the blockade of our extensive coast," Welles wrote some years later, were "many vessels of light draft and good speed, not large, expensive ships, for we had no navy to encounter but illicit traders to capture." [47]

      Fundamental to the success of any blockading fleet would be the availability of   safe and defensible harbors where coal and other vital supplies could be stored and where damaged ships could be repaired and upfitted.   "It seems to be indispensable that there should exist a convenient coal depot on the southern extremity of the line of Atlantic blockades, and it occurs to the conference that if this coal depot were suitably selected it might be used not only as a depot for coal, but as a depot of provisions and common stores," stated a Blockade Board report issued on July 5 ^th . [48]

     Secretary Welles and his subordinates considered several spots for the new base, including Fernandina on Amelia Island at the mouth of the St. Mary's River on the border of Georgia and Florida , Bull's Bay just north of Charleston , St. Helena Sound approximately half way between Charleston and Savannah , and Port Royal Sound.   The final decision was left to Du Pont.   After conferring with Brigadier General Thomas W. Sherman (1813-1879), a Rhode Islander who would command the Army contingent of this joint operation, Du Pont chose Port Royal Sound, both because of its easy access to the sea and because a supply depot placed on nearby Hilton Head Island could be easily defended if attacked from the mainland.  

General Thomas W. Sherman

     "The importance of this expedition upon the flank of the enemy can not be overestimated," Welles proclaimed. [49] The Union campaign to take and hold Port Royal Sound and its environs was the largest combined operation the United States military had undertaken.   Du Pont was apprehensive.   In September he confessed to his wife that he was awed by the "extent of the responsibility put upon me." [50]   The obligation for assembling a fleet that would be powerful enough to overwhelm Confederate shore defenses and large enough to transport some 13,000 soldiers and support personnel to assault and occupy Hilton Head Island   was Du Pont's alone.   He knew that the logistical challenges alone would be tremendous.

     Eight thousand bags of oats were loaded to feed 1500 horses.   Special magazines were stuffed with hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery and small arms ammunition.   Du Pont and Sherman instituted strict regulations   to husband such vital resources as food and water.   "As transports on sea voyages can carry but a limited supply of water, every precaution will be taken to prevent waste or its unnecessary use," an order from General Sherman's headquarters   stated on October 15 ^th . Each man was allotted one gallon of water for cooking and drinking. To reduce the chances of   accidental fire, no smoking was allowed between decks or in cabins. "Much attention will be paid to the cooking," the Army announced.    Frying meats or dough in fat, what the military called "fancy cooking," was disallowed. "Soups, boiled meats, and hard bread compose the true and healthy diet of the soldier on transports at sea," declared Army regulations. [51]   Loose bowels were a common ailment among Civil War troops, North and South.

     Du Pont left New York Harbor on October 16 ^th with a formidable flotilla of warships and transports and headed for Hampton Roads at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay .   His flagship was the USS Wabash , a   mighty 44-gun steam frigate.   The Wabash was one of six steam frigates built in 1855 for the U. S. Navy.   Outfitted with screw propellers and equipped with powerful artillery batteries, they "were regarded all the world over as the model men-of-war of the period," writes one scholar. [52]   Sherman's soldiers, mostly New Englanders, were boarding steamboats at Annapolis, Maryland  and moving down the Chesapeake to rendezvous with Du Pont.   Among them was a trooper from Connecticut barely in his twenties named William Thompson Lusk.   "And now we are embarked on the 'Vanderbilt,' bound, this much we know, for 'Dixie,'" he said in a letter to his mother.

Admiral Samuel Du Pont

    A sensitive, observant, educated person of high ethical standards, Lusk noted that many of his compatriots came to the Annapolis docks in less than gentlemanly condition.   "They are sent for, and arrive on shipboard in a horrible state of intoxication, with bloody faces and soiled clothes," he told his mother. [53]   Historian Bell Wiley   discusses the issue of drunken troops in The Life of Billy Yank , his   study of the everyday experiences of  Civil War soldiers from the North. "The quality of liquor drunk by soldiers ranged from choice to vile, with the vile being far more common than the choice," says Wiley. [54]

      Du Pont's armada arrived at Hampton Roads, Virginia on October 18 ^th . "Every moment of our time is occupied in some useful preparation, coaling, watering, exercising our boats with their howitzers, etc.," Du Pont told Secretary Welles. [55] The steamer Vanderbilt , with William Lusk   aboard, reached its destination the same day. Over the next week more troop transports pulled in from Annapolis, bringing the total number of ships in the fleet to nearly seventy-five. "The duties of the day were arduous, and for twenty-four hours I had no sleep," Lusk told his mother. [56]

Fort Walker After It had fallen to Union forces in November 1861.

     Du Pont knew that the Confederates had two earthen and log forts protecting the entrance to Port Royal Sound.   The larger was Fort Walker on the northeastern tip of Hilton Head Island.   The smaller, Fort Beauregard, was situated on the southern end of St. Phillips Island   2.7   miles across Port Royal Sound.   Anticipating that   artillery from these two strongholds would subject his invading fleet to a harsh crossfire, Du Pont planned to take the forts by combined tactics, a highly complicated and risky maneuver.   He would send Sherman's troops and a battalion of 350 marines ashore   in some 500 small boats to attack and overwhelm one of the Confederate citadels and silence its guns. "The surf-boats, with other means for disembarkment on hand, are believed to be capable of landing at once from 3,000 to 4,000 men," Army headquarters insisted. [57]   While Sherman was engaging one of the Confederate forts, Du Pont would concentrate his fire on the other Southern stronghold.  

     Remembering what had happened to the soldiers attempting to land on Hatteras Island the previous August, Du Pont was determined that his inexperienced amphibious force would receive proper training.   When stormy weather postponed the departure of the fleet from Hampton Roads, he   scheduled several additional training exercises. Again and again the young troopers scampered down the sides of their transports and jumped onto the light craft that would transport them to the South Carolina beaches. This delay also gave Du Pont the opportunity to peruse some last minute information about the difficulties of navigating through the sandbar that was situated about 10 miles seaward from the mouth of Port Royal Sound.

    Finally, on October 29, 1861, the signal was given to the mighty Union armada of 18 warships carrying 148 guns and escorting 39 transports packed to the gunnels with  Sherman's 13,000 solders and support personnel to head out into the Atlantic. William Lusk and about 1700 men were still aboard the "good ship 'Vanderbilt.'" [58]   The Port Royal Expedition was on its way.

    The voyage from Hampton Roads to Port Royal Sound was horrendous.   A   fierce wind struck the   Union fleet   on November 1 ^st , tearing   sails from their masts and sending rigging careening to the decks.   Many of the surf boats, so meticulously gathered to transport troops ashore, were damaged beyond repair or simply thrown overboard   to make the ships less cluttered.   Horses were driven from the decks and forced to plunge   to their watery graves.  

     Du Pont described the horrific scene that unfolded before his eyes as huge waves slammed against his armada.   "On Friday, the 1 ^st of November, rough weather soon increased into a gale, and we had to encounter one of great violence from the southeast, a portion of which approached to a hurricane."   "In reference to the men of war," he continued, "the Isaac Smith . . . had to throw her formidable battery overboard to keep from foundering." [59] Du Pont stated that one transport sank but that "the people on board . . . were saved under very perilous circumstances." [60]   William Lusk told his mother about the tempest.   He reported that the Vanderbilt "bravely rode the storm, while other good ships foundered in the sea." [61]  

     The battalion of marines aboard the transport Governor found itself in a particularly perilous situation.   The Governor's smokestack toppled into the sea.   The steam pipe burst. "About 3 o'clock Saturday morning the packing round the cylinder head blew out," the battalion commander declared, "rendering the engine totally useless for some time." [62] The rudderhead broke the next morning, making the Governor powerless against the raging wind and water.   The marines were eventually rescued and taken on board another ship but not without a tragic mishap.   "One was crushed to death between the frigate and the steamer in attempting to gain a foothold on the frigate," Reynolds reported. [63]   So weakened were the marines that the entire battalion had to be taken back to New York City.

      Du Pont's badly battered but essentially in-tact fleet began to reassemble off Port Royal Sound on November 3 ^rd .   By early morning on the 4 ^th there were 25 Union ships anchored just beyond the sandbar ten miles off shore, "with many more heaving in sight." [64]   William Lusk was anxious for the invasion to begin.   "We lay off Beaufort Harbor some sixty hours in idleness, waiting for the ball to open," he declared.   "That navy though," he continued in a letter to his mother, "is a slow affair, and we abused it mightily, being impatient to decide the fate of the expedition." [65]  

     Lusk did not appreciate or comprehend the dilemma in which Du Pont found himself.   The destruction of most of the landing craft, the death of large numbers of horses, and the departure of the marines meant that the entire battle plan had to be modified. Du Pont learned that the ship carrying practically all of the small-arms ammunition had been driven aground during the storm.    Clearly, it was no longer feasible to have the Army participate in the opening   attack against Fort Walker and Fort Beauregard.   "Sherman and his staff were humiliated and despondent," says historian Rowena Reed.   "Without landing craft and ammunition, there could be no combined operations." [66]   Just as at Fort Hatteras and Fort Clark, the job was going to be the Navy's alone.

     At mid-afternoon on November 4 ^th DuPont dispatched six shallow-draft gunboats toward the entrance to Port Royal Sound and ordered the crews to take soundings and mark the channel with buoys.   This was to be the opening phase of the battle.   While carrying out their orders, the Union sailors aboard the gunboats at the mouth of the harbor were attacked by a small Confederate fleet commanded by Josiah Tattnall (1795-1871), that had sailed from Savannah two days earlier with a "frail river steamboat" and with "two or three tugs improvised into men-of-war." [67]   Recognizing that he was totally out-gunned, Tattnall broke off the action without inflicting serious harm on the Federal gunboats. The boilers and other mechanical equipment that powered his diminutive rebel fleet were directly exposed to enemy fire.    "The Confederates," writes one scholar, "did not have the wherewithal to contest the colossal force the North could throw at any point along   the South's long eastern coastline." [68]

Stephen R. Mallory, Confederate Sec. of Navy

     Stephen R. Mallory (1813-1873), a maritime attorney from Key West, Fla., was the Confederate Secretary of the Navy.   He was eminently qualified for the job.   Elected to the United States Senate in 1850, Mallory became Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee in 1853 and demonstrated   a marked capacity for imaginative thinking during his years of service in Washington. Mallory knew that the Confederacy had no hope of matching the North in terms of building a conventional navy. To break the Union blockade the South would have to depend upon quality, not quantity.   Mallory was a proponent of constructing ironclad warships.   He also came to appreciate that steam propulsion had given new life to the ancient technique of ramming enemy ships. The problem was that the Confederacy lacked the industrial capacity needed to fashion a fleet of modern warships.

     The only factories in the South capable of producing a full range of armament and ordnance were the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Va. and possibly the Etowah Iron Works near Cartersville, Ga.   Neither was able to respond quickly enough to provide essential components for ships that could be used at Port Royal Sound.   Moreover, the Confederate railroad system was severely limited in its ability to transport heavy   weapons, including artillery, to vulnerable spots along the coast. According to one Confederate naval officer, Mallory was "like a chieftain without a clan, or an artisan without the tools of his art." [69]  

     Any hope the Confederacy had of retaining control of Port Royal Sound would depend   upon the strength of Fort Walker and Fort Beauregard.   General Beauregard, who   had inspected the South Carolina coast during   May, 1861,   had advised Governor Pickens that Port Royal Sound was indefensible.   The essential problem was that the harbor was too wide.   Only rifled cannon, of which the South had precious few, could fire effectively from one shore to the other.   The paucity of such weapons meant that these two Confederates forts, unlike Fort Moultrie and Fort Johnston, could not support one another.   Also,   the Port Royal citadels could not be easily reinforced.   Skull Creek separated Hilton Head Island from the mainland, and a large marsh cut off Fort Beauregard from St. Helena Island and the South Carolina hinterland.

    Pickens refused to heed Beauregard's advice.   Unwilling to bear the political consequences of abandoning one of the wealthiest parts of South Carolina and a region populated with ardent secessionists and thousands of slaves, the Governor   persuaded Beauregard to put   his   concerns aside and   devise a scheme for defending Port Royal Sound.   This decision to resist a Northern attack comported with Confederate military strategy in the early phases of the Civil War.   "The governors of the Confederate . . . states and their Congressmen felt that the new nation could not survive unless it protected its citizens and their property," Rowena Reed asserts. [70]

      General   Beauregard had already demonstrated at Charleston Harbor that he was a talented military engineer.   His plan for fortifying Port Royal Sound was fundamentally sensible, at least in terms of design. Beauregard knew that the two Confederate forts at Port Royal Sound had to be heavily armed and   had to be strong enough to repulse the enemy without being reinforced.   Fort Walker and Fort Beauregard, he insisted, must be "armed with heaviest rifled guns that can be made." Beauregard even wanted a "steel-clad, floating battery" placed in the middle of the harbor. [71]   The problem was that the Confederacy did not have the wherewithal to meet these needs.   All of Beauregard's staff, writes historian Virginia Holmgren, "knew that the heavy guns recommended by Beauregard were imperative -- and all of them knew that the Confederacy did not have such weapons." [72]

        Leaving South Carolina on May 28 ^th for duty in Virginia, Beauregard turned over responsibility for administering the construction of coastal defenses to   Major Francis D. Lee, also an engineer.   Work began on the Port Royal fortifications in July.   Hundreds of slaves dug trenches, hauled palmetto logs to the site, and built gun emplacements, all the while singing the rhythmic chants that traditionally set the pace for their labor. South Carolina officials, including Governor Pickens, repeatedly requested that more troops, equipment, and supplies   be sent to their State. "I also earnestly beg, if possible, that you will order me, if you have it at Norfolk, 40,000 pounds of cannon powder," Pickens told the Confederate Secretary of War on September 1 ^st .   "If I could be sure of getting 40,000 pounds as a reserve for Charleston," the governor continued, "I would immediately order a full supply of cannon powder for about 100 guns I have now on our coast below Charleston." [73]

     The Richmond government responded on September 10 ^th .   "The cannon powder that you ask for cannot be spared by the Ordnance Office unless there be an absolute necessity for it," declared the Secretary of War.   "It is preferred that your excellency will retain your patience upon the subject for the present." [74]     By October, with the prospects for a Federal invasion looming ever larger, the messages from South Carolina   officials began to assume an even more urgent tone.    "I have been informed another large vessel has arrived at Saint Mary's with arms, &c," Pickens reported on October 21 ^st .   "From your last letter I am in hopes you will send 2,000 rifles for our flanking companies and 300 cavalry pistols for the men just mustered in.   It is essential to our service, as I have put out 4,000 of arms in a few days past, which entirely exhausted our supply." [75]

      Beauregard had known that the Confederates would have to subject the invading Yankee fleet to a massive artillery barrage.   Consequently, he had wanted the water or forward-most battery at Fort Walker to   mount seven 10-inch Columbiads en barbette or on platforms, each protected   by traverses or earthen berms from flanking fire.   Unable to obtain so many large guns, Major Lee had to use twelve smaller cannon, only one of them rifled, plus a single 10-inch Columbiad.   To make room for 13 instead of 10 guns on the water battery, he decided to dispense with building traverses.   "This expedient was adopted," writes   Reed, "leaving all thirteen guns vulnerable to enfilade." [76]

     Francis Lee thought wrongly that the right or seaward flank of the fort was the more exposed.   Consequently, he put two 8-inch howitzers on improvised carriages at that point.   The landward side of the fort, where the Union fleet would concentrate its greatest effort, was left completely unprotected.   The howitzer intended for that location had arrived with no carriage and was not in place at the time of the battle.   Rifle pits about two miles south of Fort Walker were also unfinished, as was an artillery battery intended for the entrance to Skull Creek.   This unfortunate circumstance arose partly because of maladministration and partly because local planters had been stingy in providing slaves as laborers.   "In connection with the fort it was proper to construct a line of infantry works about 2 miles to the south, and also a battery at the outlet of Skull Creek into Broad River," Lee stated some days after the battle, "but for reason over which I had no control these work were never carried into execution." [77]   Fort Beauregard was also incomplete.   It had 13 guns, but only one was rifled.

       The commander of Fort Beauregard and Fort Walker was Brigadier General Thomas F. Drayton (1808-1891), whose cotton plantation stood on Hilton Head Island.   One can only guess at the depth of Drayton's feelings as he sat atop his white horse and looked seaward on November 4 ^th .   His brother, Pervical Drayton, was captain of the U.S.S. Pocohantas , one of the ships in the mighty Federal fleet that was assembling off shore.   A graduate of West Point, Thomas Drayton knew that his force was not strong enough to keep Du Pont   from entering Port Royal Sound.

     Commodore Tattnall's tiny fleet did steam   to the harbor entrance on November 5 ^th , but the Confederate boats were forced to withdraw after firing only a few long range shots at the most forward elements of the Union fleet. Drayton could at least take some solace in the fact that brisk winds and choppy seas compelled Du Pont to put off the invasion for two days. But all was calm when the sun rose over Port Royal Sound on November 7 ^th .   "Not a ripple upon the broad expanse of water to disturb the accuracy of the fire from the broad decks of that magnificent armada . . .   advancing in battle array to vomit forth its iron hail with all the spiteful energy of long-suppressed rage and conscious strength," stated the Confederate commander in his official report of the engagement. [78]   "The water was as smooth as glass," commented another Confederate officer. [79]

     Du Pont's revised   battle plan was not unlike that which Commodore Stringham had employed at Cape Hatteras.   As there, steam propulsion, screw propellers, and rifled artillery would allow the Union Navy to maneuver independently of the wind and fire its guns from longer range and with far greater accuracy than had been possible during the days of smooth bore cannon and sailing ships.   The U.S.S. Wabash would lead the main squadron of ten ships, carrying a total of 123 guns, into Port Royal Sound approximately   midway between Fort Walker and Fort Beauregard.

   

    The only Confederate guns capable of reaching Du Pont's ships at that distance would be Drayton's two pieces of rifled artillery, one in each fort.   A second squadron of   five shallow-draft gunboats would steam parallel to the Wabash and occupy a position north of   the two forts to protect the Federal armada from Tattnall's small fleet anchored near the mouth of Skull Creek.   After steaming past the two forts and moving up Port Royal Sound, the main squadron would turn left, bring its starboard guns to bear upon Fort Walker at a range of about 800 yards, and turn left again and   let loose its port batteries from a greater distance on the Hilton Head fortress, all the while ignoring Fort Beauregard.   The plan was for the Federal fleet to continue this elliptical maneuver and move ever closer to Fort Walker until the enemy citadel fell silent.

     The Battle of Port Royal Sound began at 8:30 A.M. on November 7, 1861, when DuPont gave the order to weigh anchor.   Two factors determined the timing of his move into Port Royal Sound.   The ships had to have sufficient light to navigate through the narrow, treacherous   channel; and the tide had to be near its apogee.   These conditions would allow the Wabash and the other large ships to pass over the bar without grounding and would enable the Union fleet to steam against the tide when it aimed its starboard guns toward Fort Walker.

    Having learned from reconnaissance that the landward side of Fort Walker was unprotected from flanking fire, DuPont decided to shell that spot as he turned seaward and then subject the Confederate citadel to repeated broadsides as he passed directly in front. "The greater part of the guns of Fort Walker were presented upon two water fronts, and the flanks were but slightly guarded, especially on the north, on which side the approach of an enemy had not been looked for," stated DuPont in his official report. [80]

      The first shots boomed from Fort Walker and Fort Beuregard just before 9:30 A.M. The Wabash and the other Federal ships almost immediately blasted back at the Confederate batteries, hurling salvo after salvo   into to the log and sand ramparts of Fort Walker at a rate that one Union officer insisted was "as fast as a horse's feet beat the ground in a gallop." [81]   "For four hours shots were poured thickly into the defenses of the besieged, and nearly as long a time the besiegers sent destruction among our ships," William Lusk told his mother.   "But the terrible explosions of our shell, the steady broadsides poured from the Frigate 'Wabash,' and the sure-aimed missiles sent from the little gunboats that would run up close to the shore, ensuring thus accuracy of aim -- all these things were terrible in their effect upon the foe." [82]

        Inside Fort Walker all was chaos.   The sound produced by this conflagration could be heard 75 miles away.   It rattled the windows and shook the walls of St. Helena's Episcopal Church in nearby Beaufort,   where most of the planters had their big houses. Rev Joseph Walker "cheered our hearts by his strong faith in our cause, and hope that the 'threatened evil would pass away like snow before the sun,'" wrote one member of the church. [83]

    Many Yankees were convinced   that God was on their side.   One Union officer argued that their attack must succeed because of   the "justness and holiness of our cause." [84]    William Lusk was struck by the depth of religious feelings among the Confederates.   "There is one thing very conspicuous in all letters from Southern soldiers," he observed.   "I refer to the deep religious vein pervading them." [85] But no Divine intervention was   going to rescue the   South Carolina coastal elite on this fateful day.

    These secessionists, so ardent in their convictions just a few months before, were now beginning to pay the full price for their political folly.   The ear splitting noise of DuPont's artillery signaled that the traditional patterns of life in the sea islands of South Carolina were coming to an end.    "Here lived the Pinckneys, the Draytons, and other high-blooded Hidalgos, whose effervescing exuberance of gentlemanly spirit have done so much to cause our present troubles," William Lusk observed, his remarks tinged with a slight sense of vengeance. [86]  

     Things went   badly for the defenders of Fort Walker almost from the outset.   Drayton's troops had difficulty zeroing in on the Union ships.   They could only catch glimpses of the enemy   because of the dense smoke that engulfed the battlefield. The fact that DuPont's fleet was continuously moving intensified this problem. "No sooner did we obtain his range when it would be changed and time after time rechanged, while the deep water permitted him to choose his own position and fire shot after shot and shell after shell with the precision of target practice," complained one officer in Fort Walker. [87]

     Especially damaging to the defenders was the enfilade fire from two Union gunboats stationed just north of the unprotected flank of the Confederate bastion.   One was the U.S.S. Ottawa .   Its captain, Lieutenant T. H. Stevens, reported that as he approached to within a 1000 yards of Fort Walker he discovered that he "occupied an enfilading position."   "I continued to occupy it," he explained, "until the enemy deserted their batteries." [88]   Drayton commented on the destructiveness of the salvos fired by the Ottawa and its sister ship.   "This enfilading fire on so still a sea annoyed and damaged us excessively," he declared. [89]

      By late morning the situation inside Fort Walker was becoming untenable.   Utterly exhausted, their sweaty bodies begrimed with gritty sand, the untested Confederate artillerymen ran from gun to gun in a desperate effort to answer the salvoes from DuPont's mighty frigates.   Others worked feverishly at the fort's ovens, heating cannon balls until they were cherry red in the expectation that the gunners could use hot shot to set the Yankee ships ablaze.   "They had been working at the guns in most cases in shirt sleeves; the sand had covered their knapsacks and muskets, sometimes 2 or 3 feet deep," remembered Colonel John A. Wagener of the South Carolina militia. [90]

      DuPont's fleet was far beyond the reach of Fort Walker's smooth bore cannons, and the Southern crews tended to aim high. "There is no doubt that we committed the great sin of the enemy in pointing too high, which was undoubtedly, in their case, the reason that so little damage was done us," said the captain of the U.S.S. Pawnee . [91]   By 2 P.M. all but three of the artillery pieces in the water battery in Fort Walker were disabled. The supply of   powder in the magazine was running low.   Fearful that they would be trapped on Hilton Head Island and killed or taken prisoner, the Confederate troops began to abandon their positions and move toward Ferry Point on Skull Creek and   cross to the mainland.   "At last a white flag floated from the parapet of their fortification," wrote William Lusk.   The young Connecticut trooper whooped when the Stars and Stripes appeared above Fort Walker a short while later.   "Hip, Hip, Hurrah!   We see -- ay -- we rub our eyes -- is it really true?   We see the American banner once more floating on the soil of South Carolina," he exulted. [92]

       The sandy soil outside the Confederate bastion   became littered with the debris of battle. Some of the   severely wounded rebel soldiers, their mangled bodies writhing in agonizing pain, were simply left behind.   "Six dead men, left by the enemy, were buried by the chaplain of Wabash ," reported a Union naval officer who was among the first wave of Yankee troops to land and occupy Fort Walker. [93] Evidence of the utter wastefulness of war was everywhere.   General Sherman, admitting that he was a "mere spectator" in the Battle of Port Royal Sound, described what he saw when he went ashore with his troops on the afternoon of November 7 ^th .   "The beautifully constructed work on Hilton Head was severely crippled and many of the guns dismounted,"   he wrote in his official report.   "Much slaughter had evidently been made there, many bodies having been buried in the fort, and some twenty or thirty were found some half a mile distant.   The island for many miles was found strewed with arms and accouterments and baggage of the rebels, which they threw away in their hasty retreat." [94]

      The fate of Fort Beauregard was never in doubt.   The officer immediately in charge of its defense was Colonel R. G. M. Dunovant.   Having briefly engaged elements of the Union fleet that had steamed to the mouth of the harbor on November 5 ^th , the gunners in Fort Beauregard participated fully in the main battle two days later.   "The batteries at Fort Beauregard were worked with great gallantry, skill, and energy," said Dunovant. [95]   The bravery of his men notwithstanding, Dunovant knew that the destiny of the defending force would be decided   on Hilton Head Island, not St. Phillips.   Just after 3 P.M. Dunovant learned that Fort Walker had gone silent.   He could hear the cheers emanating from the sailors and soldiers aboard DuPont's armada.   He could see the first wave of Union troops occupying Fort Walker and raising the American flag over Hilton Head.   "I . . . issued the necessary orders for the evacuation of the island," he stated in his official report. [96]  

     The only route from St. Phillips Island to the mainland was a strip of land about 50 yards wide and 1000 yards long that led to a huge swamp through which ran a single, narrow trail.   "Of the character of the route and the consequent impracticability of transportation I had been fully advised, and therefore did not undertake the removal of camp, equipage, stores, or heavy baggage," explained Dunovant. [97]      Union troops occupied Fort Beauregard without opposition later that   day and found the place deserted and in utter disarray. "Within the fort I found a great amount of ammunition scattered about in disorder," Leiutenant John S. Barnes   of the occupying force reported. [98]

    The Federal victory at Port Royal Sound was complete.   "The success is all that was expected, and more than we ought to have asked," wrote Secretary Welles in his congratulatory message to Commodore   DuPont. [99]