History 6000

History 6320

Chapter Ten

New  Bern and Fort Macon.

New Bern is a consequential place. Settled in 1710 by Swiss and German immigrants who named it after the Swiss capital of Bern, New Bern is North Carolina's second oldest town.[i]   It is situated at the confluence of the Trent and Neuse rivers and was the Colonial and State capital of North Carolina from 1746 until the establishment of Raleigh in 1792.   It was a major North Carolina port in Colonial times  and still enjoyed considerable prominence at the outbreak of the Civil War, having a population of about 6,000.  The Neuse River , some four miles wide just below the town,  flows directly into Pamlico Sound and makes New Bern readily accessible to sea-borne commerce. West Indian and European vessels had regularly docked there over the years to pick up cargoes of  pitch, tar and tobacco.  In late 1861 and early 1862, New Bern was teeming with Confederate troops who were busily engaged in erecting fortifications for the defense of the town against the anticipated Yankee onslaught.  "We are ordered down on the Cost to Newburn or there abouts," William Morris wrote on January 7, 1862.  "They are Expecting an attack Every day at Newburn."[ii]

Morris's letters to his wife show what camp life was like for the rank-and-file rebel troops in and around New Bern.  His regimental commander,  Colonel Charles C. Lee, spent a lot of time attempting to maintain morale, no easy task when soldiers suffered from a variety of ailments, including "Yellow Janders," measles, and pneumonia.  "I have been confined to My bed for a week," said Morris on January 27^th.  Morris reported that 5 lieutenants in his 37^th North Carolina Regiment had gone home.  "Some of them I think was onley home Sick," he exclaimed.  Morris complained bitterly about the cost of provisions.  "We Get plenty To Eat but have To pay for it," he told his wife.  "20 cts a lb for pickled port, 4 Dollars pr hundred for Flower, butter is Selling at 60 cts a Pound in Newburn but we Don’t Eat any butter.  At that price Chickins Sells at 50 cts a peace & Eggs Not atall.  We can Doo very well without," Morris insisted.[iii]

 Colonel Lee often used religion to encourage his troops to stay put and fight the Yankees.  Morris described  in a letter he wrote on February 26^th what he called the "Best Sermon I ever heard"  Lee, he said, "contended that we was Engaged in a Just war but Not To Lay Down our arms that God had given us to defend our selves against that foe that would hold us in Chains through Eternity."   Morris  drew upon the Divine  to bolster the spirits of his wife and their children, who were at home in Gaston County.  "It is my My Constant Preyer that you May all Keep well & that God May Give you Courage To beare up under presant Circumstances," he exclaimed.  Morris had to deal with the possibility that he might not survive and that he and his wife would never see one another again.  "There for Let us put our trust in God as the Onley Source of peace or happiness," he told his wife, " & if  we are so unfortunate as Not to Meet on Earth, any More, May God prepair us to Meet in Heaven above where parting will be no more."[iv] 

  Henry or "Harry" King Burgwyn, Jr. (1841-1863), an officer in the North Carolina 26^th Regiment, was stationed at New Bern in early 1862.  A man of probing intelligence and plenteous self-discipline, Burgwyn had graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1861 after having been an honor student at the University of North Carolina. "He was clearly a man of ambition, determined to be a leader," writes Burgwyn's biographer.[v] Henry's father, one of the most successful plantation owners in the Roanoke River Valley,  was a military advisor to Governor Clark.  Not surprisingly, father and son exchanged letters filled with observations about the state of military affairs in North Carolina.

 Their views were pessimistic.  "None of our Regiments are so efficient as they should be," the younger Burgwyn complained in one letter.[vi]  In another instance Henry expressed concern about General Gatlin's decision to place Confederate troops in several isolated outposts.   "We may expect disaster & defeat however just so long as we expose small detachments, unsupported by any convenient troops, to attacks by the enemy," he declared.[vii]  He told his mother that it was a "very great mistake . . . to divide our troops so as to expose the detachments to a certain defeat just whensoever they may be attacked."[viii]  Henry thought the situation at New Bern was essentially hopeless unless reinforcements were sent fast.  "It appears to me therefore to be plain that whenever New Berne is attacked by the force Burnside will have it will fall," he told his father in late February.  "Do not understand me giving up," Henry continued, "but I do wish to see better generalship & that a fair show be given to our men."[ix]

The commander of the Confederate troops at New Bern was Lawrence O'Bryan Branch (1820-1862).  He was a Princeton graduate, a three-term member of the United States House of Representatives, and the nephew of a former North Carolina Governor.   Arriving in New Bern in November, 1861, Branch inspected the fortifications protecting the town and concluded that he did not have a sufficient number of  troops to man them properly. "They had been originally planned for a force much larger than any ever placed at my disposal," Branch insisted.[x]

 The principal defensive line, a three-quarters-mile long series of entrenchments known as the Croatan Works, lay astride the tracks of the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad on the far side of the Trent River and about 10 miles south of New Bern.  Branch believed it was untenable. Troops placed there, he insisted, would be at the mercy of an attacking force, not only because they would be greatly outnumbered but also because the Confederates did not have enough artillery pieces mounted along the Neuse River to prevent the Yankees from steaming upstream and cutting off the defenders from the rear. ". . . the enemy could land and take the Croatan works in reverse," said Branch [xi] 

The Confederate commander decided to build a new fortified line about six miles north of the Croatan Works.  "I was for six weeks engaged in making the necessary changes," Branch wrote in his official report.[xii]  Circulars went out to slaveowners in the region, asking them to send  bondsmen with picks and shovels to speed up the completion of the job. Branch complained bitterly about the lukewarm response. "I got but a single negro," he grumbled.[xiii]  Troops had to perform most of the labor on the new entrenchments. Approximately 500 soldiers were dispatched daily to dig the new fortifications, many without tools, others carrying "worn and broken shovels and axes."[xiv] 

  The linchpin of the Confederate defensive line  was Fort Thompson, an earthen fortress on the banks of the Neuse River. It had thirteen guns, but only three protected the landward approaches to the garrison.  The Confederate engineers had incorrectly assumed that the Yankees would attempt to approach New Bern by water.  "They are a disgrace to any engineer," moaned one Confederate officer.[xv]  The new fortifications extended westward from Fort Thompson approximately one mile to a brick-making plant beside the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad.  The Old Beaufort Road crossed the Confederate defenses about half way between the river and the railroad and continued northward to the Trent River, where it crossed into New Bern over a bridge.

 Branch's original intent was to construct breastworks west of the railroad, but there was not enough time.  The Confederate commander did build an improvised series of embankments and rifle pits just to the north of Bullen's Creek, a stream that ran beneath the railroad about 150 yards north of the brick plant.  Bullen's Creek flowed westward for a little over a mile to Weathersby Road at the far side of the battlefield and then on to Bryce's Creek. Branch hoped that the rough terrain in that sector and the difficulty of crossing a stream  would keep the enemy from penetrating the Confederate right if they should decide to concentrate their forces at that point.

 The fatal flaw in this defensive arrangement was that it created a gap in the Confederate fortifications at the brick plant.  This break resulted from placing the Confederate right behind Bullen's Creek.  "To guard this gap I directed that the old brick-kiln on the railroad should be loop-holed, and the evening before the battle had ordered two 24-pounder guns to be brought from New Bern and placed in battery there," Branch explained.  "The enemy's skirmishers drove the laborers from the battery when an hour more would have enabled them to get the guns into position."[xvi]  Compounding the problem for the Confederates was the fact that Branch inexplicably put his least experienced troops, a local militia battalion without uniforms, armed with shotguns and hunting rifles, at the brick plant.  It was not difficult to foretell what would happen if  Burnside's soldiers decided to come that way.  And come they did.

 Ambrose Burnside and about 11,000 Federal soldiers and sailors steamed from Roanoke Island on March 11^th and, after an overnight stay at Hatteras, headed across Pamlico Sound toward the mouth of the Neuse River.  "The Expedition began to move this morning early," wrote Private Gangewer.[xvii] The weather was magnificent.  The stillness of the late winter air made the waters of Pamlico Sound shine like a mirror.  "This was the most beautiful day I have every ever seen," commented one of Burnside's men.  "Not a breeze rippled the waves--not a cloud in the sky--all was blue--blue overhead--blue underneath--blue all around."[xviii]   It was easy for some of the men to imagine that they were on a holiday.  One Rhode Island soldier said the scene reminded him "of our summer steamers with excursionists."[xix]

The  Federal flotilla started up the Neuse on the afternoon of March 12^th. Gangewer spied  bonfires along the shoreline.  " . . . the Rebels lighting signal fires all along the beach," he recorded in his journal.[xx] Gangewer and his cohorts knew that the Confederate outposts were warning Branch that Burnside was making his final push toward New Bern.  Even the splendid weather could no longer keep the harsh realities of impending battle from taking center stage in everyone's consciousness--North and South.  "On Wednesday, the 12^th, at 4 p.m., the approach of the enemy's fleet was reported to me," Brigadier General Branch stated in his official report, "and at dark I learned that twelve vessels had anchored below the mouth of Otter Creek and about forty-five were ascending the river in their rear."[xxi]

March 13^th was a day of feverish activity. At 6:30 a.m. Burnside signaled Stephen Rowan, his naval commander, to send Yankee gunboats toward the mouth of Slocum's Creek about 16 miles south of New Bern and shell the beaches and forest where the Federals planned to go ashore.  The technique for landing the troops was identical to that used at Roanoke Island.  "The steamers having grounded," Burnside explained, "the men on them leaped overboard and waded to the shore, holding their cartridge-boxes out of the water." [xxii] The landings were unopposed, and Yankee morale was high.  Cheers rang out as the troops began to gather at the edge of the woods. The entire force had disembarked by 2 p.m.

 Burnside ordered Captain Robert S. Williamson to take a small reconnaissance party inland to probe the Confederate defenses and ascertain what the Union troops would encounter.  Williamson and his compatriots traveled by horseback up the Old Beaufort Road and soon reached the Croatan Works.  "This we found to be deserted," said Williamson.  Gangewer was glad  that the Confederates had pulled back.  ". . . the first Battery we met with," he said, "was an immense concern with Rifle pits in front of the entrenchments about 8 feet deep, which the rebels left on our approach and fled to another about 5 miles distant."[xxiii] 

Meanwhile, the weather turned worse.  It began raining intermittently, and fog  engulfed the pine and hardwood forest through which the small band of Yankee horsemen was riding.   The reconnaissance party reached Fisher's Landing near the mouth of Otter Creek by later afternoon.  It was here that Branch had expected the Federals to land.  There was still no sign of the rebels.  "This was also deserted," Williamson reported.[xxiv]  A black resident told Williamson that the Confederates had been there with artillery the night before but had withdrawn.

Colonel James Sinclair's 35^th North Carolina Regiment had arrived at Fisher's Landing during the early evening of March 12^th .  The rebel troops had occupied the rifle pits and breastworks near the shore in anticipation that Burnside's men would come ashore at Otter Creek.  Shortly after daybreak, Sinclair became aware that the Yankees were disembarking near Slocum's Creek instead.  "I could distinctly hear the music of his bands and even the singing of his men on the fleet," he remarked.[xxv]  Colonel Sinclair withdrew from Fisher's Landing on the morning of March 13^th.  The order came from Colonel Reuben P Campbell, commander of the North Carolina 7^th, whom Branch had placed in charge of all Confederate troops east of the railroad. Campbell visited Fisher's Landing and observed that Federal gunboats were "throwing shell and canister," said Sinclair. He "ordered me to fall back into the woods beyond reach of the enemy's fire, which I did, with my command in good order."[xxvi] Campbell judged that Sinclair could not hold off the Yankees unless he was heavily reinforced, especially with artillery, which the Confederates did not have in adequate numbers.

 Sinclair was to come under harsh criticism for his behavior during the Battle of New Bern.  Branch maintained  that he had expected the North Carolina 35^th to stay put and fight the Yankees at Fisher's Landing. "I was surprised . . . when the position was yielded," the Confederate commander proclaimed.  Branch insisted that he had wanted Sinclair to attack the Union troops when they first came ashore.  "I had  hoped," he exclaimed, "that a line of rifle pits I had caused to be made for a mile along the bluffs at and on both sides of Fisher's Landing would have enabled me to hold the enemy in check and to inflict on him serious loss at the first moment of his placing his foot on our soil."[xxvii] In truth, resistance would have been symbolic at best. One cannot help but conclude that Branch was searching for a scapegoat.

Burnside's men devoted considerable time and energy on March 13^th to bringing artillery pieces on shore and transporting them inland.  Heavy rains turned the roads into quagmires.  "We were detailed to dragg 6 Cannon said Cannon we dragged for the length of 7 miles in mud sometimes a foot deep, and composed of very stickey kind of clay, which made it very hard work," said Gangewer.[xxviii]  George Whitman was also slogging through the muddy approaches to New Bern.  He told his mother what it was like that night to sleep in an encampment beside the Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad.   " . . . it rained nearly all night and as we lay on the ground our blankets got soaked through."[xxix]

Williamson's reconnaissance party resumed its march before daybreak on March 14^th.   Slowly but inexorably the Yankee observers moved forward, peering through the thick morning fog to see where the rebels were waiting.   Williamson stopped when he came to an open place.  He noticed that  the pine trees just ahead had been cut down to give the enemy a clear line of fire. There they were. Large numbers of Confederate soldiers were arrayed some 350 yards away behind a series of entrenchments on both sides of the Old Beaufort Road.  "I dismounted and examined them with a glass," Williamson declared.  "The number of infantry in sight I estimated to be from 3,000 to 4,000."

General Burnside, who arrived in a few minutes, "immediately arranged for the attack," said Williamson. [xxx] The Federals launched a direct assault upon the Confederate fortifications below New Bern at about 8 a.m on March 14^th . General Foster commanded the troops between the railroad and the Neuse,  while General Reno led the attack to the west of the railroad.  Parke's Brigade was held in reserve along the tracks of the Atlantic and North Carolina, ready to come forward wherever it was needed.

The atmosphere in New Bern had been hectic during the previous two days. "The morning of the 13^th . . . my regmt formed & had previous to this received no order & were at that time perfectly ignorant where to go or what to do," said Henry Burgywn, Jr.[xxxi] The  Confederate ranks were dangerously thin.  Moving from east to west, the North Carolina 27^th  Regiment occupied the ground at Fort Thompson, and the 37^th, 7^th, and 35^th North Carolina stood between there and the railroad.  The militia was encamped at the brick plant, while the North Carolina 26^th Regiment defended the entrenchments west of the railroad.  Reasoning that Burnside would concentrate his attack on the Confederate left, Branch placed most of his artillery east of the railroad.  There was nothing for the rebels to do  but wait.  William Morris was among them.  "our County is about to be trodden Down under the foot of the North," he had told his wife.[xxxii]

The Yankee army struck like a sledgehammer.  The Battle of New Bern raged for almost five hours during the morning and early afternoon of March 14^th .  More death.  More pain.  More destruction. " . . . the bullits & shells fell as thick as hale about Me, " said Morris.[xxxiii]  Foster's troops led the way just as they had at Roanoke Island a month before.  "The firing was incessant and very severe from the breastwork and within a very short range," Foster declared.[xxxiv]  Colonel Thomas G. Stevenson (1836-1864), commander of the Massachusetts 24^th, ordered his men to lay down and shoot from a prone position. The ground was wet and cool from the drenching rain of the previous night. "Owing to the rain and wet to which the guns had been exposed many of my men experienced great difficulty in firing them," said Stevenson.[xxxv]

  The rebel artillery hurled grape and canister at the Federals whenever they rose and attempted to take the Confederate works by storm. We "opened on them with grape from three 32-pounders with such terrible effect that after about six shots they fell back," Charles Lee reported to Branch.[xxxvi]  One Union officer writhed in agony when he was shot in the leg while urging his troops forward. Another, Foster reported, was "severely wounded by a grape shot in the shoulder."[xxxvii]  The 25^th Massachusetts was experiencing similar difficulties.  Deployed on the extreme Union right and closest to Fort Thompson, it came under heavy Confederate artillery bombardment. 

Meanwhile, General Reno sent four regiments against the Confederate right.  Among them were  George Whitman's 51^st New York  and William Gangewer's 51^st Pennsylvania.[xxxviii] "We marched right up under a terrible fire, formed in line of battle and went at them," Whitman told his mother. He described how a lieutenant who was shot just above the hip simply sat down for a few minutes to rest and then returned to the "thickest of it."[xxxix]  The soldiers of the  26^th North Carolina crouched behind embankments on the opposite side of Bullen's Creek and refused to give way.  "Drenched with rain, blistered feet, without sleep, many sick and wounded, and almost naked, they toiled on through the day," proclaimed Zebulon Vance.[xl]  "I retreated from the battlefield not until every other position had given way," Burgywn proclaimed in a letter to his mother.[xli]

It was the Confederate center that wavered and collapsed.  Proceeding cautiously through the woods just to the west of the railroad, Lieutenant Colonel William S. Clark, commander of the Massachusetts 21^st, could hear the clatter of gunfire as Foster's Brigade engaged the Confederate left next to the Neuse.  Smoke from this conflagration poured over Clark's men and made their eyes water.  " . . . it was impossible," Clark complained, "to derive any information respecting the position of the rebels except where it was indicated by the noise of the battle."[xlii]

 When they reached the brick plant, the Yankees could see that the only rebels to their immediate front were work crews unloading ammunition from boxcars.  Reno, realizing that the enemy was totally unaware of Clark's presence and that the Confederate flank was unprotected, ordered the Massachusetts 21^st to attack.  "At the first volley from Company C the enemy, in great astonishment, fled from the road and the trench to a ravine in the rear of the brick-yard," Clark reported.[xliii]

The North Carolina militiamen were ill-prepared to meet the Yankee onslaught.  Many simply  threw down their guns and scampered toward New Bern, literally running for their lives.  Their dumbfounded commander called it a "stampede."[xliv]  Branch, seeing that his entire front was in jeopardy, brought the North Carolina 33^rd forward from its reserve position in  a desperate attempt to plug the gap in the rebel line.  Ferocious hand-to-hand fighting ensued.  "We entered the field with 614 men, but lost in killed, wounded, and missing 196," reported Confederate Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Hoke of the 33^rd Regiment.[xlv]

  Private Gangewer walked over the same ground the next day and would never forget what he saw.  "A battlefield is a sad place to behold," he wrote, "the dead shot in the head, the heart, arms shot off, legs cut from the body."[xlvi]  Seeing his right flank exposed, Sinclair ordered the North Carolina 35^th to fall back, thereby widening the hole through which the Federals could advance. Sinclair would face a court of enquiry for this action.  He blamed the withdrawal on his subordinate, Lieutenant Colonel Marshall D. Craton   "At this time, however, my second in command, without consulting me, ordered four of my companies on the right wing to fall back," Sinclair contended.[xlvii] "I found my command completely flanked," the commander of the North Carolina 35^th  explained.[xlviii]

 General Parke learned that the Confederate center was vulnerable and sent the 10^th Connecticut, the  5^th Connecticut and the 4^th Rhode Island forward to reinforce Reno and  exploit the situation.  At almost the same moment Foster ordered his brigade to assault the Confederate left.  Outgunned and outmanned, Branch did not have sufficient strength to hold his position., especially after the militia and the North Carolina 35^th had left their posts. "For a short time," reported Lieutenant Colonel Albert W. Drake of the 10^th Connecticut, "we received in return a brisk fire from their artillery and infantry, but it was soon silenced."[xlix] "The national flag of the Fourth Rhode Island was planted on the parapet, and the enemy retired from the whole length of their lines on the left flank," exclaimed Colonel Isaac P. Rodman.[l] The sandy road leading from the battlefield to the long wooden bridge across the Trent River and into New Bern became clogged with hundreds of retreating rebels.

Burgwyn, Zebulon Vance and the North Carolina 26^th stayed put on the Confederate right.  They were unaware that the rest of the  line had broken.  Told shortly after noon by his quartermaster that hundreds of Yankees  had reached the railroad between him and New Bern, Vance had no choice but to order an "immediate retreat."[li]  The men of the 26^th marched to Bryce's Creek on the western edge of the battlefield.  Only one small skiff was available to ferry them across.  Undaunted, Vance swam to the far bank and went about finding other boats to bring to the creek, which was about 75 yards wide at that point.  Burgywn assisted Vance in getting the exhausted but orderly soldiers across Bryce's Creek and away from the pursuing Federals. It took four hours to complete the job.  "I was the last to go over myself & William my servant & I then swam both of my horses across," Burgwyn stated in a letter to his mother.[lii]  William Morris also escaped.  "I drop you A Line to let you know that I am alive though it seems a Miracle to Me.," he wrote a day later.[liii]  Morris and his wife would meet again.  

The scene in New Bern during the afternoon of March 14^th was approaching chaos.  Having set the Trent River Bridge afire to retard the Yankees, Branch's defeated hordes boarded boxcars at the New Bern Depot and made ready to leave for Kinston, the nearest major town to the west.  Flames engulfed the cotton warehouses and consumed New Bern's bounteous supplies of naval stores. Some Confederate troops panicked when  Federal gunboats arrived at the wharf and began shelling the depot..  "My presence was demanded with my regiment," reported James Sinclair, "by the fact that on the first alarm of the enemy's cavalry being in close proximity my lieutenant-colonel deserted his regiment and sought safety for himself."  Sinclair described his men as "jaded and broken down by exposure, fasting, fighting and marching."[liv]

 As locomotive whistles announced the departure of each train, black slaves waited in their humble living quarters for the most opportune moment to come out and begin looting the town.  Colonel John Kurtz of the 23^rd Massachusetts reported that when he reached the former Confederate camp in New Bern at 5 p.m. it was "being plundered by the negroes."[lv]  Burnside considered the fugitive slaves a "source of great anxiety."  "Nine-tenths of the depredations on the 14^th," he insisted, "were committed by the negroes before our troops reached the city."[lvi]  One Yankee solider who arrived in New Bern several weeks later described what he saw when he looked through the windows of the fine homes in town.  "In passing along the streets and looking into the windows of the apparently richly-furnished rooms, one generally sees only the shoulder-strapped officer and attendants or black-faced Sambo dressed in his master's broadcloth."[lvii]

General Burnside was elated.  His troops had captured the "second commercial city in the State of North Carolina."[lviii]  "We have given the Secesshers another thundering thrashing," wrote George Whitman.[lix]  The Union forces had suffered 91 killed and 466 wounded but had captured "eight batteries containing forty-six heavy guns, three batteries of light artillery of six guns each, making in all sixty-four guns," said Burnside.[lx]

Catherine Edmondston was aghast.  She called Branch a "political General" and blamed the defeat mostly on "imbecility & bad management."[lxi]  Henry Burgwyn, Jr. was also harsh.  "The battle was lost by bad arrangement of the troops & the running off of the militia which exposed our centre completely," he maintained.[lxii] John Barrett, author of The Civil War in North Carolina, shares the opinion of most scholars.  He argues that Branch failed because he did not have sufficient strength to match Burnside's. Noting that the Confederacy dispatched substantial reinforcements to North Carolina in the weeks following the Battle of New Berne, Barrett speculates on what might have occurred if they had arrived sooner.  "Had part of these forces been transferred earlier," he writes, "it is highly possible that the results at New Bern would have been different."[lxiii] 

Regardless of the causes of the defeat, changes in Confederate military leadership were inevitable. Brigadier General Robert Ransom (1828-1892) replaced the thoroughly discredited Gatlin as commander of the Department of North Carolina immediately following the Battle of New Bern.  A native of Warren County, North Carolina and an 1850 graduate of West Point, Ranson began making preparations to defend Kinston and Goldsboro against an anticipated Union attack.

Burnside's next assignment was to take control of Beaufort, "one of the best harbors" in the South.[lxiv]  In addition to serving as the principal base of operations for the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, Beaufort would give the Yankees excellent lines of communication and supply, certainly far superior to those available through Hatteras Inlet, across Pamlico Sound, and up the Neuse River. A Yankee victory was certain.  The fall of New Bern had cut off Fort Macon from any hope for reinforcement, thereby assuring the eventual capitulation of the 22 officers and 419 men stationed there.[lxv]

 Situated at the eastern tip of Bogue Banks at the entrance to Beaufort Harbor, Fort Macon had once been among the most powerful citadels on the Southern coast.  Its commander was Colonel Moses James White, a native of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Most of the guns protecting the landward approaches to Fort Macon had been removed and taken to New Bern.   Burnside therefore ordered Brigadier General Parke to take his men by ship and train the 36 miles to Carolina City, a former Confederate encampment just west of railroad terminal at Morehead City, ferry them across Bogue Sound to Bogue Banks, and launch an overland attack against White's defenses.  Parke's Brigade began leaving New Bern on March 19^th.

The greatest difficulties encountered by the Yankees during the Fort Macon campaign were logistical.  Parke had to rebuild the railroad bridge across the Newport River that White's troops had destroyed. Having no locomotives and almost no rolling stock, the Federal troops were forced to use mules and horses to pull the cars to Carolina City.  "Owing to the absence of engines and cars on the railroad and the burning of the bridges by the enemy the work of General Parke at Fort Macon has proved to be exceedingly difficulty," Burnside declared.[lxvi]

 Rebel cavalry, headquartered in nearby Swansboro,  swooped  down repeatedly on the Federal workers, mostly blacks, to delay the completion of repairs to the railroad.  The Confederates knew that the attack against Fort Macon had to await the arrival of heavy artillery from New Bern. When the siege train did finally pull into Carolina City  on March 31^st, Parke undertook to have the heavy guns placed on flat boats and floated across the three miles of water separating  Bogue Banks  from the mainland.  By the end of March, Federal troops had occupied Beaufort and Morehead City to assure the cessation of all communications between Fort Macon and local authorities.

White's men could do little more than watch while the Yankees spent more than two weeks digging gun emplacements amid the sand dunes west of Fort Macon.  Confederate morale was dismal.  "During the siege some discontent arose among the garrison, which ended in several desertions,"  said White.[lxvii]  Parke's big rifled guns opened up at 5:40 a.m. on April 25^th.   It was no contest.  Signalmen stationed in Morehead City watched the conflagration through spyglasses and helped the Yankee gunners calculate the correct range. Mortar shells rained down on the Confederate garrison. Other projectiles slammed into Fort Macon's rigid brick walls.

  By late afternoon the Confederate gunners were running out of powder.  Fatigued and frightened, they could only discharge their guns at 5-minute intervals at best.  The Yankee bombardment was incessant.  "At 4:30 in the afternoon a white flag was displayed on the ramparts of the fort and the firing ceased upon both sides," Parke stated in his official report.[lxviii]  Exact terms for the surrender were worked out the next day.  "Two days more of such firing would have reduced the whole to a mere mass of ruins," said White.  The Stars and Stripes flew over Fort Macon once more.  Victory followed victory.  Federal troops occupied Washington, N.C. at the confluence of the Tar and Pamlico Rivers on March 21^st  and Plymouth on the Roanoke River on May 17^th,

Not everything went right for the Yankees during the Burnside Expedition.  Believing that  the Confederates Navy  was about to dispatch ironclad gunboats from Norfolk into Ablemarle Sound,  Burnside ordered General Reno to assemble a force of five regiments, including Rush Hawkins's New York 9^th, and destroy the locks on the Dismal Swamp Canal at South Mills, N.C.  Reno's troops landed on the right bank of the Pasquatank River about 3 miles south of Elizabeth City on April 19^th and immediately set out for their objective.

 The battle opened at midday when the Third Georgia Regiment opened fire on the Yankees about 28 miles south of Norfolk.  Reno's attempt to turn the Confederate's left flank was thwarted when Hawkins launched an unauthorized frontal  assault against the entrenched Georgians and sustained severe losses. Reno called Hawkins an "infernal scoundrel" and "rascal."   "In fact, it was his bad conduct in placing his regiment in a position to get whipped and demoralized that principally induced me to change my first intention, which was to remain on the field and proceed to South Mills in the morning," Reno insisted.[lxix] No doubt Hawkins had hoped that the same verve and elan that had allowed the Zouaves to overwhelm the defenders of Roanoke Island and burn Winton would also carry the day at South Mills.  He was wrong.

The setback at South Mills notwithstanding, Burnside could take great satisfaction in what his troops had accomplished since coming to North Carolina in January.  The United States controlled all or part of thirteen counties, many of them among the most agriculturally productive in the State.  Union forces occupied such important coastal towns as New Bern, Morehead City, Beaufort, Washington, Plymouth, Edenton, and Elizabeth City.  The Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad between Morehead City and Kinston was no longer available to the Confederates.  The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron could operate out of Beaufort and bring its fleet more readily to bear upon Wilmington, the last haven for North Carolina's troublesome blockade runners. Finally, Federal troops could now provide greater protection for the many Yankee sympathizers in the Ablemarle and Pamlico Sound region.  Historian William R. Trotter calls the Burnside Expedition the "finest feat of arms yet accomplished by a Union commander."[lxx] Still, the job was not yet done.

Burnside understood that there was more to do.  He still wanted to move inland and seize Goldsboro and perhaps Raleigh and Wilmington, thereby achieving his ultimate  objective of destroying the Wilmington and Weldon and the Raleigh and Gaston Railroads. To do so, however, he needed reinforcements and supplies, especially cavalry, artillery, locomotives and rolling stock. Unfortunately, Burnside did not get them in adequate numbers.  "The engines and cars, for which we made requisition immediately after the battle, have not yet arrived, and as the re-enforcements sent me brought no wagons with them, we are absolutely crippled for want of transportation," Burnside informed McClellan on April 17^th.[lxxi]

 Burnside expressed extreme frustration in a dispatch to Secretray of War Stanton on May 3^rd.  "Of course I do not consider my work as finished," he exclaimed.[lxxii]  Just like General David Hunter, whose troops were making ready to invade James Island,  Burnside found his interests subordinated to those of General George McClellan in Virginia and General Henry Halleck in Mississippi and Tennessee.  "I regret to say that the Government has not at this moment any troops that can be sent to you," Stanton told Burnside on May 7^th.  Indeed, when McClellan  sustained a series of severe setbacks at the  hands of Robert E. Lee outside Richmond in June, Burnside was ordered to reinforce his former boss at the Illinois Central. Leaving New Bern on July 6^th with some 7,000 troops, he left General Foster in command in North Carolina.[lxxiii]  

Rowena Reed argues that the Burnside Expedition, despite its impressive attainments, was a strategic failure or at least a great opportunity squandered.  To her way of thinking, the failure to follow up the capture of North Carolina's sounds with a full scale assault upon the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad was an enormous blunder. Reed insists that if Secretary of War Stanton had authorized the sending of large amounts of  equipment and men to  New Bern and Morehead City, the United States could have delivered a crippling blow to the Confederacy and could most probably have accelerated the end of the war.  "Because Burnside's expedition. . . . was interrupted after attaining only its preliminary objectives, the true offensive power of combined operations remained unrecognized," Reed contends.[lxxiv]  In a sense like Secessionville, the Burnside Expedition was a potential turning point that refused to turn.  The calamitous Civil War would continue.