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“Clashing Ideals:
Results of the collision between Japan’s Emperor Ideology and the United
States’ policy of unconditional surrender.”
Andrew Starnes
HIST 4000
Dr. Morrill
July 2, 2008
This writer contends that
the unwavering United States policy of unconditional surrender accompanied
with Japan’s relentless emperor ideology made it necessary to deploy nuclear
weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Prisoners of war were especially
affected by these two policies clashing time and time again. Katsugo
and gyokusai, death before surrender, were terms that the Japanese
people became very familiar with during World War II. Part of an emperor
ideology, which embodied fighting for a divine entity, had the psychological
effect of justifying militaristic actions. Emperor Hirohito was a God to the
Japanese people, when word came from his court people obeyed. This was a key
element why Japan would not accept unconditional surrender; the imperial
state could not be disbanded.
The emperor
ideology emerged around 1910, expressing a strong paternal relationship
between the emperor and his subjects. The ideology intensified as the
Japanese approached fascism leading into the thirties, in to the Second
World War. Such a strong relationship between the emperor and his subjects
directly correlated to a father child relationship, loyalty was essential.
His subjects knew of his divinity therefore, in majority, served as a solid
assemblage to the throne. A throne that was used as a symbol to the entire
nation for what was right, what was honorable. Japanese emperor ideology
provided one side of an equation that would ultimately result in nuclear
annihilation.
The United
States policy of unconditional surrender originated from union general
Ulysses S. Grant during the Civil War. It was a term that President
Roosevelt uttered at the Casablanca conference, one which Truman inherited.
Unconditional surrender not only meant complete disarmament, but the total
elimination of a philosophy. A policy anchored with the decision to
terminate the emperor’s influence over his country, unconditional surrender
provided the frame work, countering the side of the equation containing
emperor ideology. These two philosophies contained the perfect attributes to
combat each other, complete opposites in complete different parts of the
world, stained for eternity by killing thousands and thousands on both sides
of the fight.
Historiography
In her
monograph, The Manhattan Project, Cynthia Kelly (Ed.) provides a
compilation of excerpts from individuals who made great contributions to the
development of atomic weapons. Developments that began in Europe as
intelligent minds were busy at work testing and retesting hypotheses. Atomic
weapons were not conceived until a Hungarian physicist by the name of Leo
Szilard was crossing the street after a traffic light had changed, and it he
realized what would come to be known as the most destructive force the world
had ever seen. A nuclear chain reaction may occur if the controls were
correct. Through pivotal discoveries with the element of Uranium and nuclear
fission, the ideas of the soon to be atomic weapon progressed to the United
States. The Manhattan project, as it came to be known was an enigmatic
organization in charge of creating a nuclear arsenal. After one of the
largest, most expensive projects in American history was complete; the U.S.
was armed with a nuclear bomb.
In his book Hidden
Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II, Yuki Tanaka contends that
the atrocities committed by the Japanese, before and during World War II
were not customary; they were derived from deep seated cultural beliefs and
facilitated by the development of Japan’s emperor ideology. Ideology that
was precisely associated with Japanese fighting style of death before
surrender. He gives descriptive accounts of what took place giving evidence
for these brutal acts committed by the Japanese. Tanaka also researches the
morals of the victimizers throughout the China incident and World War II.
His motivations for writing the book was to “master history,” and determine
why events took place the way they did. The book was well written and
provides many maps and sketches which enable his words to evoke the
horrifying realties of war. Many historians have done extensive research
into all aspects of World War II, from the Manhattan Project to the
exceedingly contentious decision to drop the bombs.
J. Samuel
Walker’s book, prompt and utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic
bombs against Japan: Revised Edition is a compilation of events which
aided in determining the decision to drop the atomic bombs. The topic of
unconditional surrender by the Japanese was examined as a major point when
talking about casualties, and as a mean to ending the war. The book offers
insight from President Truman’s diary and his journey to the Potsdam
conference. Walker’s monograph researches the factors which led to the
decision to deploy nuclear weapons, including Japan’s unwillingness to
surrender unconditionally.
Through his
work Hiroshima: Why America dropped the atomic bomb, Ronald Takaki
explored the various psychological components that possibly caused the
United States to use atomic warfare during World War II. His research was
influenced heavily by the background of President Harry Truman, linking many
events from his past to his presidency. Many facts were presented in this
book such as Japan’s relentless “no surrender” fighting style, as well as
many accounts by people who viewed the bomb as unnecessary. Takaki arranged
many historical truths in such a way to justify a biased position about why
Hiroshima suffered the fate of an atomic bomb.
The United
States handled the Japanese surrender at the end of the war with much
deliberation. Drafting a new constitution and handling the topic of
“unconditional surrender,” are a couple of the issues the U.S. had to
contemplate when dealing with a nation on the verge of destruction. Bringing
democracy to a defeated nation was an important topic reiterated by the
author, through various examples. Due to the range of evidence presented in
this piece, it will be useful to a wide range of researchers. See,
Hellegers, Dale M. We the Japanese People: World War II and the Origins
of the Japanese Constitution.
Japanese Emperor Ideology
Japanese
culture has been enriched with a strong familial framework for centuries, in
which a hierarchical system was established. Due to the absence in the
concept of universal human rights, responsibilities of such regards were
focused on the national family state. The issue of one’s duty was always to
the superior. A structure of subordination was established from the family
to the emperor. There were no limits on the responsibility of an individual
to the emperor; it was considered one’s duty to die for the emperor. Due to
the limitless guidelines of duty, acceptance of actions could easily be
pawned off to the superior. This universal responsibility made it acceptable
for actions to be made without thinking of the repercussions.
An obvious
example of this irresponsibility of individual conduct could be seen in the
treatment of allied prisoners of war, as well as in the Japanese soldiers
themselves. The latter was addressed with an authoritative based system of
principles, in which Japanese soldiers were faced with bentatsu (the
routine beating and abuse of soldiers.) One could gain a higher position in
society by becoming a soldier; becoming closer to the emperor. Therefore, it
meant a great deal for Japanese men to fight for their emperor. If these men
were being beaten in the military, what would happen to that of their
prisoners? Relating to the limitless responsibility of actions, it was
beyond question to carry out orders; especially when mandated in the name of
the emperor.[i]
While the
emperor ideology strengthened within Japanese society through the 1930’s,
similar changes were occurring in morals and ethics of the military. Since
the emperor was the supreme ruler of the nation, he led the armed forces.[ii]
The ancient code of bushido (the way of the warrior) has had a
discrepancy of origins.[iii]
Regardless of where it originated it went through drastic reconstruction
under Japans emperor ideology. Military academies began to institute codes
relating to a new form of bushido, Senjinkun and Gunjin Chokuron.
These codes demanded absolute loyalty to the emperor, and required
soldiers to commit suicide rather than surrender to the enemy. Codes such as
these had to be studied and memorized; a failure to do so would result in
punishment, or sometimes death.
[iv] The Kokutai No Hongi was a direct result of
these new changes in code of conduct for every citizen, not just the
military. Kokutai No Hongi was distributed in 1937 and concerned
itself with replacing any conflicts of individuality with “unswerving
loyalty to the Imperial Family.”[v]
The
Kokutai No Hongi explicitly addresses the ways of bushido, depicting
harmony between accepting the ultimate goal in life as death. It states
bushido became the way of loyalty in patriotism serving the spirit of the
Imperial forces.[vi]
The subordination of the emperor’s subjects was perpetrated with these types
of propaganda, and blindly accepted as truth because it was mandated from
the emperor. One can see how influential divine actions can be accepted
regardless of content. This type of propaganda was the influence for
policies such as Katsugo and Gyokusai which griped the nation.
This work also offers the correlation between the ideology and militaristic
projections which influenced such affiliates as Kamikaze warfare.[vii]
The Kokutai No Hongi deliberately addresses the issue of military
affairs, stating that the concept of national identity under the emperor is
just the same in military construct. One very important statement from this
piece reads “Truly, the mission of the Imperial Forces lies in doing the
Emperor’s will.”[viii]
This quotation associates to the ability of passing blame to one’s superior,
as stated earlier, with the belief that the soldier and citizens were
carrying out the will of the emperor.
Sustaining
the validity of the imperial state was a primary concern for the Japanese
government as the issue of surrender approached in August of 1945. For a
nation to be embedded with these traditions and cultural ideologies it was
no surprise there was so much resistance to the terms of the Potsdam
conference. The Japanese people were serving under a divine entity; these
ideological customs were imposed on citizens for years upon years building
this egocentric belief system which could not accept unconditional
surrender.
The ideology
flourished in the closing days of the war. In name of the Emperor, his “one
hundred million” subjects became able ammunition against the allied forces.
Okinawa citizens killed their families, medic’s killed their wounded, and
suicide were all common methods used to escape surrender; in the name of the
emperor. Therefore, the question of whether or not the emperor should be
charged with war crimes after the war was obvious. People were acting in the
name of the emperor, acting upon his will, his divine affluent orders.[ix]
Due to these actions, subjects imposing the emperors will faced the cruelest
weapon ever created. The atomic bombs were a direct result of an ideology
which lead the people to keep fighting, death was better than surrender and
occupation. Pearl Harbor was a huge catalyst for Japan, fighting spirit was
in full force, a display of the emperor’s motives.[x]
Unconditional Surrender
The first
time the term unconditional surrender was uttered in regards to World War II
was by President Roosevelt at the Casablanca conference in 1943. This
writer as already expressed that unconditional surrender not only meant
submission of the armed forces, but complete extermination of a philosophy.
Some experienced persons in the U.S. government such as Joseph Balantine,
George Blakeslee, and Hugh Borton who had served on the State Department’s
Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, disagreed with unconditional
surrender.[xi]
The soviets also brought up the issue of unconditional surrender to Truman
at the Potsdam Conference. President Truman along with James Byrnes learned
that the Japanese wished to send Prince Konoye to Moscow to deliver a
message that Japan wished to end the war but would fight to the death, as
long as the policy of unconditional surrender was mandated.[xii]
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had presented an outline of ideals to
offer Japan in terms of surrender. While meetings were being held at
Potsdam; Byrnes, Truman, and Churchill all made suggestions for the terms of
surrender towards Japan. One major difference between Stimson’s memorandum
and the one agreed upon by the three was the issue in the status concerning
Emperor Hirohito; it was not addressed. The final document came to be known
as the Potsdam Declaration and was committed to the unconditional surrender
of Japan.[xiii]
When
deliberating the factions of unconditional surrender, the justifications for
such must be called upon to gain understanding why disagreement occurred.
The term “soft peace” refers to the reconstruction of Japan in such a way
that the monarchy was essential. Soft peace advocates argued, stripping the
emperor of all powers and trying him as a war criminal would cause a long
and arduous occupation of Japan by allied forces. Fluidity was possible if
the government used the monarchy as a puppet to control a population, which
would bow to him regardless of title. Soft peace advocates such as Joseph
Grew fell under heavy criticism and was labeled an appeaser due to
overwhelming animosity towards Japan by the American public. Calls for
these revisions came during Roosevelt’s term, resurging once a new less
knowledgeable man assumed the position of president; Harry S. Truman.[xiv]
Under Truman
more and more scrutiny was applied to the issue of unconditional surrender.
Committees were formed, revisions were issued, and an abundance of aspects
of what the term meant came under fire. Truman had to decide the most
logical resolve after hearing debates from those who were in favor of the
monarchical system as a figure head while others felt like any situation in
which the emperor was threatened would lead to more and more loss of life.
Was there a possibility of the Japanese not accepting any form of
unconditional surrender? That question would ultimately lead to the invasion
of Japan which was already set in motion by Truman and top military advisors
on May 25, 1945; codenamed Olympic. While troops began to realize they were
about to continue the bloody campaign, terms which may have ended the war
were trying to be negotiated between the two powers.[xv]
The Potsdam
Declaration is what came to be known as the final clarified diplomatic
address, offering Japan terms of surrender. Its intentions were clear; from
the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and Japanese government
would come under the command of the Allied powers.[xvi]
Through the process reiterated in Japanese culture, influenced by the
emperor ideology, retention of the divine ruler meant freedom. Coming under
allied control would mean imprisonment. The policy of unconditional
surrender was in complete opposition of what Japan stood for; in this the
Japanese government was tattered.
The
vacillations of the emperor’s messages were apparent dealing with
unconditional surrender. On July 13, 1945 a telegram was issued from the
court of Hirohito stating that he wanted the war to be “quickly terminated.”
However, he commanded his military to continue fighting the tenacious
battles waged in the Pacific and China. Hirohito’s counterpart, President
Truman, also made wavering decisions about unconditional surrender. He
wished to know all of his options, and while he deemed the “soft peace”
considerations admirable, they never came to fruition.
[xvii] While these two factions continued to dodge
concrete policies during the summer of 1945, they made reaching an
acceptable negotiation unrealistic on either side.
Results of the clash
between unconditional surrender and Emperor Ideology
While the
deliberations continued between the two nations the emperor realized defeat
was inevitable. However, once he realized the fall of Saipan his cabinet
began to think about leverage in surrender negotiations. This leverage came
in the form of gyokusai, “glorious self-annihilation.” The purpose
behind this demonic concept was to inflict as much bloodshed as possible on
the enemy by whatever means necessary. Such a distorted psychological makeup
was to be inflicted on the allies in one final battle, Okinawa.[xviii]
The island of
Okinawa was seen by both the American’s and Japanese as a staging point for
an invasion of the mainland. This concept made Okinawa one of the most
disgusting tragedies witnessed in history. By this time Japan had realized
defeat was forthcoming, as mentioned earlier Japan was trying to inflict as
much bloodshed as possible in hopes that the allies would end the combat on
terms of Japan. On April 1, 1945 the invasion of Okinawa took place with
surprising ease. Occupation of the northern end of the island offered
virtually no resistance, where was the opposition? The Japanese had
fortified themselves at the southern end of the island, hidden in the
mountain sides and caves connected by tunnels for supplies. These
fortifications were so well hidden that many troops might as well have
walked across the plains with a “bull’s-eye” on their backs. While the
battle on land intensified the Navy also witnessed the most severe
afflictions of emperor ideology; kamikaze.[xix]
On April 6,
1945 the psychology of gyokusai became reality as kamikaze
missions departed to attack ships strung about the surrounding waters of
Okinawa.[xx]
The pilots of these human bombs were mainly composed of intelligent young
men who believed in the protection of their country by any means necessary.
If there was any way possible one could protect his family and the empire,
it was an honor to do so.[xxi]
Wave after wave of planes smashed into everything from picket ships to
carriers, located near Okinawa. These men were giving up their lives in the
name of the emperor; there is nothing left to give once life no longer
offers its assistance. The idea behind the kamikaze illustrates to
what extent the Japanese were willing to brutalize their enemy.
Non-combatants in Japan lost their lives as well, some due to the fighting,
but others killed themselves and their families to avoid capture by the
Americans.
[xxii] A Japanese prisoner of war, Bob Wodnik recalled the
story of Margret Billings who worked aboard the USS Comfort; a
hospital ship. The ship was plainly marked with enormous red crosses on its
deck, and still the Kamikaze pilots inflicted colossal damage, attaining the
“bravery” of gyokusai.
Both of these
policies eventually concerned themselves with the Soviet Union. The Soviets
were part of the Potsdam conference while Japan sought to use them as a
negotiator between foes. Prior to the successful atomic test at Trinity, a
major point of the Potsdam conference was to secure Soviet entry into the
war. However, Japan and the Soviets had a neutrality pact which prevented
conflict.[xxiii]
The Soviets knew victory lay ahead of the U.S. and confirmed entrance into
the war on August 15.[xxiv]
The Soviets had the ability of lending the U.S. every advantage during the
invasion of Japan. However, after the trinity test proved successful there
was no real necessity for the Soviet entrance. The timing of all these
factors was essential when examining how nations struggled for power. The
soviet entrance after finally being obtained was suddenly not such an
impending issue. The soviet entrance had its pitfalls on an international
diplomatic stage as well. If the Soviets attained a key role in the invasion
of Japan it could seek to extend its communist hand throughout Asia; part of
what the allies were fighting against in Japan. The U.S. moved towards the
dropping of the bomb before the Soviets could gain a foothold in invading
Japanese occupied Manchuria.[xxv]
What would become of the Japanese?
The clash
between emperor ideology and unconditional surrender was symbolized by the
rebellion which took place in the Japanese government once Hirohito issued
that Japan would accept the conditions set forth by the Potsdam declaration.
Several men began an attempt at a coup to overthrow the government and
continue fighting against the enemy. A division in emperor ideology is seen
in this situation. In one case it can be considered honorable to obey the
emperor since he is a divine entity and his word is final. On the other hand
the emperor’s imperial line dates back further than he does and the ways of
bushido and gyokusai must be upheld at all costs. The occupation of
the country held no chance for the imperial throne to have any fortitude in
the minds of the Japanese. After having such a strong ideology forced upon
them, surrender was not an option, not even if it came from the emperor.
Years and years of psychological control could not be switched off from the
words of the emperor. The coup failed as high members of the court realized
its futile efforts.[xxvi]
The Bomb
While relentless fighting
continued in the Pacific, President Truman was busy with deliberations at
Potsdam. His main objective was to figure out a way to end the war with
Japan. During his time at the conference he received news that the United
States had successfully tested their atomic weapon at the Trinity site. This
information instantly provided Truman with leverage unbeknownst to any
person in history.[xxvii]
While the Japanese emperor looked for leverage with gyokusai, Truman
would do the same with the bomb. The similarities continue in the facts that
Hirohito had not deliberately told the U.S. that the policy of Japan would
consist of brutalizing the enemy in every line of attack. The Potsdam
declaration did not tell the Japanese they were going to face atomic
weapons, it merely stated the terms of surrender or face “prompt and utter
destruction;” a severe understatement. The declaration was received by the
Japanese and broadcast to the public along with the word, mokusatsu.
This term could be loosely translated to mean “pay no attention to.”
Premiere Suziki rejected the declaration and urged the country to continue
fighting until a successful conclusion would be reached. These actions
revealed there would be no retort in halting the combat in Japan unless the
emperor intervened.[xxviii]
“There never has been-
there never can be- successful compromise between good and evil. Only total
victory can reward the champions of tolerance, and decency, and faith.”
Stern words from President Roosevelt offered a clear and noble example of
what must be achieved in this war. President Truman was far less popular
than his predecessor and held this slogan in the back of his mind throughout
the remainder of the war.[xxix]
The brutality of war in the Pacific was in fact doing the job that the
emperor had intended; killing Americans any way possible. Such an irony can
be found in the rational of both countries. The Japanese felt as if they
could kill as many enemy forces as possible with persistent force, they
would be compelled to accept terms set forth by Japan. Due to this force,
loss of American lives in Saipan and Okinawa made it absolutely necessary to
consider using the bomb against Japan. While Japan felt as if pressing on
with the war would diminish American morale, it in fact, accrued the
attention of the deadliest force on earth. The American policy mandated the
issue of unconditional surrender which was in direct opposition to
everything the imperial throne embodied. Due to the vast differences between
the countries likelihood of an acceptable outcome through negotiation on
either side was doubtful.
On August 6, 1945 the
world changed. The United States and its allies had issued an ultimatum to
the Japanese government which they did not entirely accept. In a telegram
received through the Swiss Government on August 10, 1945; after two nuclear
weapons were enforced upon Japan, its government wished to end the war but
could not accept the abolition of imperial rule.[xxx]
Two atomic bombs had been dropped, the worst devastation known to man had
been inflicted upon the Japanese; still they were defiant. Finally a resolve
came in the form of a response to a letter drafted by Secretary Byrnes,
approved by the president, stating that the Emperor will issue all demands
of the Supreme Allied Commander to his subjects and resume not functioning
powers over the nation. On August 14, the Japanese accepted the letter
composed by Byrnes and at seven o’clock Truman announced to the nation the
end of the world’s most ghastly discord.[xxxi]
The situations which lead
to Truman’s decision on August 14 had a much different feel in Japan earlier
that day. Emperor Hirohito gathered his cabinet in the same room which he
was present in the night Nagasaki was bombed. Many members of the cabinet
voiced their opinions about what should be done with regards to the allied
ultimatum. After much deliberation the emperor spoke. Muffling his words and
holding back his tears, the emperor expressed that he could not let his
people be annihilated from history. He commanded his subjects to follow his
lead and accept the terms as the only way to save the nation. He offered his
services to anyone who wished to speak with him within his military and
offered to stand in front of a microphone and address his people. He stated
“It matters not what happens to me but I wonder how I can answer the spirits
of the ancestors if the nation is reduced to ashes with great sacrifice of
life.”
[xxxii] When noon arrived the next day a recorded message
of the emperors voice, which the people had never heard, was broadcast
announcing Japan would agree to the terms set forth by the Potsdam
declaration. In his message Hirohito never mentioned the fact of
surrendering nor did he apologize in any way. Instead the stated that the
war had not developed to the advantage of the Japanese people. He continued
to say that the enemy had developed a cruel bomb that would destroy
civilization if Japan did not take these actions.[xxxiii]
The emperor himself had
avoided what the ideology had created. Instead of surrendering he
sidestepped the issue claiming that he was the reason civilization will be
saved by accepting these conditions, preventing another bomb from being
dropped. The emperor ideology was so engrained in the Japanese people that
some of his officers were still defiant. After the conference with Hirohito
on the fourteenth General Anami, still plagued with the question of if he
had done enough for his country confided in his secretary. He employed that
there was an American convoy stationed outside of Tokyo. “What do you think
of the idea of proposing peace after striking the convoy?” He was still
thinking about ways to damage the enemy even after the emperor himself had
issued acceptance of the Potsdam declaration.[xxxiv]
He wanted to attack a ship the day of official surrender. Anami would later
commit the ultimate form of gyokusai, impaling himself with a sword;
the ancient ways of bushido and the samurai was complete. Even after two
atomic weapons were enforced upon Japan, the psychological stranglehold of
emperor ideology held firm its grasp on Japanese people.
POW’s
While the
battles raged on in the Pacific, victories were won by both sides. Due to
the emperor ideology more Japanese were ready to die than surrender. The
United States had no official policy of death before surrender and
consequently faced the hardship of prison life if captured. The following
are all results suffered by allied prisoners due to the psychological
mindset of the emperor ideology; ordering his subjects to brutalize the
enemy into submission. Sandakan POW camp was a key strategic position which
linked the oil fields off the east coast of Borneo to the Philippines and
the majority of the Japanese occupied Asia-Pacific. In 1943, after many
atrocities and deaths had already occurred, a new group of prisoners arrived
at the camp. Accompanying these new prisoners were new guards whose main
purpose was to govern punishment to defiant prisoners. These new guards
carried an ax handle or a club to administer their beatings if the pace of
the prisoners was to slow. The prisoner’s job detailed work on an airfield
that was present in Sandakan. The guards did not just beat one prisoner if
the pace slowed; the entire group was punished for any one person’s
misfortune. Another form of punishment was for the prisoners to stand
upright with arms stretched out in front of them, usually holding heavy
logs, and had to stare at the sun for twenty or thirty minutes. If the logs
were dropped or the punishment was not sufficient enough, it would continue.[xxxv]
The emperor ideology was surely present in Sandakan; viciousness was
reality. POW, Keith Botterill, spent forty days in a prisoner cage in
Sandakan. His testimony read, “The first seven days got no food. No water
for the first three days. And then they forced you to drink until you were
sick on the third night. Every night would be a bashing. Hit with sticks and
fists and kicking……. There wasn’t room to lie down at night, we’d all lie
side by side, squashed up, and had to sit up again at dawn.” The prisoner
cage was a tool used by the Japanese for virtually all prisoners held at
Sandakan.
Continuing to
examine the facet of affliction suffered by POW’s through emperor ideology;
the story of Henry Chamberlain recounts. Chamberlain was a member of Bilibid
Prison. While fighting continued in 1944 the allied victories were mounting,
and he had to be transported. The Haro Maru (a prisoner ship),
was a gruesome reality for the prisoners, for they knew what hell lay ahead
of them. Being a prisoner was not bad enough; the psychological toll of the
thousand men with Chamberlain was exhausting. In one month earlier that year
American submarines torpedoed more than 300,000 tons of Japanese shipping.[xxxvi]
There was no way to know if those ships contained American prisoners. The
thousand men were divided in two separate groups of five hundred. One group
descended in to a small metal chamber filled with rigid thick coal, while
the others to a scummy hull littered with rotten horse excrement.
Chamberlain fell upon the midst of coal filled darkness where breathing was
as difficult as escape. One physician among them carried a thermometer that
topped out at 108 degrees before giving out. Buckets swung from the top of
the hull filled with excrement used by the soldiers; meeting each other as
the ship swayed sloshing the defecating contents on to the prisoners below.
Disease was acquainted with every person at the bottom of the hole. They
psychological battle continued as the men began to hear the “ping” of sonar
bounce off the ship’s hull. The men knew what this meant. Allied submarines
had spotted the ship and were zeroing in. Dismay erupted among the
prisoners; men started beating their canteens on the side of the ship in
hopes to aid sonar to their location. Fights began to break out between
panicked prisoners in the face of death.
[xxxvii]
Thirty nine
prisoners died on the thirty nine day voyage to their destination. Men like
Chamberlain were faced with one of their comrades dying every single day
along this voyage. The emperor system produced the thought of katsugo,
brutalizing the enemy. To say that these men were brutalized would be a
sever misinterpretation of what they experienced. The events that fell upon
these men were so atrocious many of them found it hard to recall the
experience at all.[xxxviii]
The
conditions of Sandakan discussed earlier ended in a horrible fate. While the
allies approached, more and more of the prisoners were being transferred out
of Sandakan, with the hopes that they would die on the trip to their
destination. The exact number of prisoners remaining after the ones healthy
enough to be transported is unknown, however testimony of guards recalls the
egregious acts committed against some of the remaining detainees. Out of a
group of fifty, twenty three prisoners who were considered healthy were
taken, on July 17 1945, to an air-raid shelter trench and shot. The idea was
that the prisoners who were deemed unhealthy would die on the march making
it easier for the guards to survive the trip. Physical and psychological
torment continued at Sandakan. One day a Japanese officer recognized that a
pig had gone missing from its group. The officer began to investigate the
disappearance, to discover pork in the bowls of prisoners. After
interrogation, one prisoner admitted to stealing the pig and cooking it. A
few days later one of the Japanese guards saw the prisoner being dragged
behind a hut, as he followed secretly. The prisoner was then held up to a
large wooden cross where one officer approached him with a stool, hammer,
and large knife. The officer proceeded to nail each one of the prisoner’s
limbs to the cross. He cut pieces of flesh from the man’s stomach and arms;
these were placed upon a wooden board beside the prisoner. He also put on a
rubber glove and removed the prisoners intestines from his body and placed
the on the board beside the pieces of flesh. The remaining prisoners were
all called out into the center of the camp where this board filled with
parts of their comrade were on display as a sign of what would happen when
these instances occurred.[xxxix]
These actions
were more than just murder; they were acts committed to utterly dismantle
the will to live in others. The men remaining in Sandakan were already in
horrible condition when learning of appalling acts such as these, symbols of
dominance by their captors. The Japanese were once again, not only carrying
out orders disregarding the life of prisoners, but inflicting psychological
warfare. It is hard to imagine there was any deliberation of dropping the
bomb while these degrading acts were being committed.
In conclusion, this
writer contends that the United States policy of unconditional surrender
accompanied with Japanese emperor ideology made it necessary to drop atomic
bombs over Japan. The ideas behind both countries standards were so opposed
to one another negotiations were hardly a possibility. It was always on
terms set forth by one country to another. Either the Japanese were going to
brutally mutilate their enemy until they accepted their terms or they would
be faced with nuclear weapons. Neither country knew of the others actual
intentions, but fruition was quickly realized by both sides. The atrocities
suffered by those in battles such as Okinawa and Saipan suffered the same
fate as many in Hiroshima and Nagasaki; death. The termination of life
results in nothing, whether it is from a nuclear explosion or the end of a
Japanese bayonet. Japanese citizens and soldiers were inflicted with emperor
ideology that resulted in uncontested ferocity in the form of the Japanese
people. The concept of unconditional surrender was not fathomable, the
emperor was a deity. The United States had advocates who understood this
ideology however; this did not keep American soldiers from being killed.
Dropping the Atomic bombs was necessary to attain surrender from an enemy
who had no intention of unconditional surrender.
Notes
[i] Yuki Tanaka,
Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II.
(Colorado: The Westview Press, 1998), 201-203.
[iii] Hurst III,
G. Cameron. “Death, Honor, and Loyalty: The Bushido Ideal.”
Philosophy East and West 40 (1990): 511-527.
[iv] Yuki Tanaka,
Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II. 206-207.
[v] John Owen
Gauntlett (ed.), Kokutai No Hongi. (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1949), v.
[vii] Sabine
Frühstück (review). “Kamikaze,
Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics
in Japanese History.” The Journal of Asian Studies 62 (2003):
958-960.
[viii] John Owen
Gauntlett (ed.), Kokutai No Hongi., 171.
[ix] Dale M.
Hellegers. We The Japanese People: World War II and the Origins
of the Japanese Constitution. (California: Stanford University
Press: 2001) 223-225.
[x] J. Samuel
Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic
bombs against Japan. (University of North Carolina Press, 2004),
20-28
[xi] Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Racing the enemy:
Stalin, Truman, and the surrender of Japan. (Cambridge,
Massachusetts:Harvard Univeristy Press, 2005), 21-22.
[xii] James F. Byrnes. Speaking Frankly.
(Tennessee: Kingsport Publishers Inc., 1947), 205.
[xiv] Tsuyoshi
Hasegawa. Racing the enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the surrender of
Japan. 22-23.
[xvi] James F.
Byrnes. Speaking Frankly. (Tennessee: Kingsport Publishers
Inc., 1947), 209.
[xvii] J. Samuel
Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic
bombs against Japan. 47-48.
[xviii] Yuki
Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II.
195.
[xix] J. Samuel
Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic
bombs against Japan. 31-32.
[xx] William
Craig. The Fall of Japan. (New York: The Dial Press:1967), 6.
[xxi] Yasuo
Kuwahara. Kamikaze: A Japanese pilot’s own spectacular story of
the famous suicide squadrons. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957)
6-10.
[xxii] J. Samuel
Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic
bombs against Japan. 33.
[xxiii] Dale M.
Hellegers. We The Japanese People: World War II and the Origins
of the Japanese Constitution. 34-36.
[xxiv] J. Samuel
Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic
bombs against Japan.57-58.
[xxv] James F.
Byrnes. Speaking Frankly. 207-208.
[xxvi] William
Craig. The Fall of Japan. 181-184
[xxvii] J. Samuel
Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic
bombs against Japan. 55-57.
[xxix] Ronald
Takaki. Hiroshima: why America dropped the atomic bomb. (New
York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995) 34-35.
[xxx] James F.
Byrnes. Speaking Frankly. 209-210.
[xxxii] William
Craig. The Fall of Japan. 171-172.
[xxxiii] J. Samuel
Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic
bombs against Japan. 87.
[xxxiv] William
Craig. The Fall of Japan. 173.
[xxxv] Bob
Wodnick. Captured Honor: POW Survival in the Philippines and
Japan. (Washington: Washington State Univeristy Press, 2003).
35.
[xxxviii] Yuki
Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II.12.
[xxxix] Bob
Wodnick. Captured Honor: POW Survival in the Philippines and
Japan. 59-64.
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