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 “Clashing Ideals: Results of the collision between Japan’s Emperor Ideology and the United States’ policy of unconditional surrender.”

Andrew Starnes

 

 

 

 

 

 

HIST 4000

Dr. Morrill

July 2, 2008

 

 

This writer contends that the unwavering United States policy of unconditional surrender accompanied with Japan’s relentless emperor ideology made it necessary to deploy nuclear weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Prisoners of war were especially affected by these two policies clashing time and time again.  Katsugo and gyokusai, death before surrender, were terms that the Japanese people became very familiar with during World War II.  Part of an emperor ideology, which embodied fighting for a divine entity, had the psychological effect of justifying militaristic actions. Emperor Hirohito was a God to the Japanese people, when word came from his court people obeyed. This was a key element why Japan would not accept unconditional surrender; the imperial state could not be disbanded.

            The emperor ideology emerged around 1910, expressing a strong paternal relationship between the emperor and his subjects. The ideology intensified as the Japanese approached fascism leading into the thirties, in to the Second World War. Such a strong relationship between the emperor and his subjects directly correlated to a father child relationship, loyalty was essential. His subjects knew of his divinity therefore, in majority, served as a solid assemblage to the throne. A throne that was used as a symbol to the entire nation for what was right, what was honorable. Japanese emperor ideology provided one side of an equation that would ultimately result in nuclear annihilation.

            The United States policy of unconditional surrender originated from union general Ulysses S. Grant during the Civil War. It was a term that President Roosevelt uttered at the Casablanca conference, one which Truman inherited. Unconditional surrender not only meant complete disarmament, but the total elimination of a philosophy. A policy anchored with the decision to terminate the emperor’s influence over his country, unconditional surrender provided the frame work, countering the side of the equation containing emperor ideology. These two philosophies contained the perfect attributes to combat each other, complete opposites in complete different parts of the world, stained for eternity by killing thousands and thousands on both sides of the fight.

 

Historiography

            In her monograph, The Manhattan Project, Cynthia Kelly (Ed.) provides a compilation of excerpts from individuals who made great contributions to the development of atomic weapons. Developments that began in Europe as intelligent minds were busy at work testing and retesting hypotheses. Atomic weapons were not conceived until a Hungarian physicist by the name of Leo Szilard was crossing the street after a traffic light had changed, and it he realized what would come to be known as the most destructive force the world had ever seen. A nuclear chain reaction may occur if the controls were correct. Through pivotal discoveries with the element of Uranium and nuclear fission, the ideas of the soon to be atomic weapon progressed to the United States. The Manhattan project, as it came to be known was an enigmatic organization in charge of creating a nuclear arsenal. After one of the largest, most expensive projects in American history was complete; the U.S. was armed with a nuclear bomb.

In his book Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II, Yuki Tanaka contends that the atrocities committed by the Japanese, before and during World War II were not customary; they were derived from deep seated cultural beliefs and facilitated by the development of Japan’s emperor ideology. Ideology that was precisely associated with Japanese fighting style of death before surrender. He gives descriptive accounts of what took place giving evidence for these brutal acts committed by the Japanese. Tanaka also researches the morals of the victimizers throughout the China incident and World War II. His motivations for writing the book was to “master history,” and determine why events took place the way they did. The book was well written and provides many maps and sketches which enable his words to evoke the horrifying realties of war. Many historians have done extensive research into all aspects of World War II, from the Manhattan Project to the exceedingly contentious decision to drop the bombs.

            J. Samuel Walker’s book, prompt and utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic bombs against Japan: Revised Edition is a compilation of events which aided in determining the decision to drop the atomic bombs. The topic of unconditional surrender by the Japanese was examined as a major point when talking about casualties, and as a mean to ending the war. The book offers insight from President Truman’s diary and his journey to the Potsdam conference. Walker’s monograph researches the factors which led to the decision to deploy nuclear weapons, including Japan’s unwillingness to surrender unconditionally.

            Through his work Hiroshima: Why America dropped the atomic bomb, Ronald Takaki explored the various psychological components that possibly caused the United States to use atomic warfare during World War II. His research was influenced heavily by the background of President Harry Truman, linking many events from his past to his presidency. Many facts were presented in this book such as Japan’s relentless “no surrender” fighting style, as well as many accounts by people who viewed the bomb as unnecessary. Takaki arranged many historical truths in such a way to justify a biased position about why Hiroshima suffered the fate of an atomic bomb.

The United States handled the Japanese surrender at the end of the war with much deliberation. Drafting a new constitution and handling the topic of “unconditional surrender,” are a couple of the issues the U.S. had to contemplate when dealing with a nation on the verge of destruction. Bringing democracy to a defeated nation was an important topic reiterated by the author, through various examples. Due to the range of evidence presented in this piece, it will be useful to a wide range of researchers. See, Hellegers, Dale M. We the Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the Japanese Constitution.

 

Japanese Emperor Ideology

            Japanese culture has been enriched with a strong familial framework for centuries, in which a hierarchical system was established. Due to the absence in the concept of universal human rights, responsibilities of such regards were focused on the national family state. The issue of one’s duty was always to the superior. A structure of subordination was established from the family to the emperor. There were no limits on the responsibility of an individual to the emperor; it was considered one’s duty to die for the emperor. Due to the limitless guidelines of duty, acceptance of actions could easily be pawned off to the superior. This universal responsibility made it acceptable for actions to be made without thinking of the repercussions.

            An obvious example of this irresponsibility of individual conduct could be seen in the treatment of allied prisoners of war, as well as in the Japanese soldiers themselves. The latter was addressed with an authoritative based system of principles, in which Japanese soldiers were faced with bentatsu (the routine beating and abuse of soldiers.) One could gain a higher position in society by becoming a soldier; becoming closer to the emperor. Therefore, it meant a great deal for Japanese men to fight for their emperor. If these men were being beaten in the military, what would happen to that of their prisoners? Relating to the limitless responsibility of actions, it was beyond question to carry out orders; especially when mandated in the name of the emperor.[i]  

            While the emperor ideology strengthened within Japanese society through the 1930’s, similar changes were occurring in morals and ethics of the military. Since the emperor was the supreme ruler of the nation, he led the armed forces.[ii] The ancient code of bushido (the way of the warrior) has had a discrepancy of origins.[iii] Regardless of where it originated it went through drastic reconstruction under Japans emperor ideology. Military academies began to institute codes relating to a new form of bushido, Senjinkun and Gunjin Chokuron. These codes demanded absolute loyalty to the emperor, and required soldiers to commit suicide rather than surrender to the enemy. Codes such as these had to be studied and memorized; a failure to do so would result in punishment, or sometimes death. [iv] The Kokutai No Hongi was a direct result of these new changes in code of conduct for every citizen, not just the military. Kokutai No Hongi was distributed in 1937 and concerned itself with replacing any conflicts of individuality with “unswerving loyalty to the Imperial Family.”[v]

            The Kokutai No Hongi explicitly addresses the ways of bushido, depicting harmony between accepting the ultimate goal in life as death. It states bushido became the way of loyalty in patriotism serving the spirit of the Imperial forces.[vi] The subordination of the emperor’s subjects was perpetrated with these types of propaganda, and blindly accepted as truth because it was mandated from the emperor. One can see how influential divine actions can be accepted regardless of content. This type of propaganda was the influence for policies such as Katsugo and Gyokusai which griped the nation. This work also offers the correlation between the ideology and militaristic projections which influenced such affiliates as Kamikaze warfare.[vii]  The Kokutai No Hongi deliberately addresses the issue of military affairs, stating that the concept of national identity under the emperor is just the same in military construct. One very important statement from this piece reads “Truly, the mission of the Imperial Forces lies in doing the Emperor’s will.”[viii] This quotation associates to the ability of passing blame to one’s superior, as stated earlier, with the belief that the soldier and citizens were carrying out the will of the emperor.

            Sustaining the validity of the imperial state was a primary concern for the Japanese government as the issue of surrender approached in August of 1945. For a nation to be embedded with these traditions and cultural ideologies it was no surprise there was so much resistance to the terms of the Potsdam conference. The Japanese people were serving under a divine entity; these ideological customs were imposed on citizens for years upon years building this egocentric belief system which could not accept unconditional surrender. 

            The ideology flourished in the closing days of the war. In name of the Emperor, his “one hundred million” subjects became able ammunition against the allied forces. Okinawa citizens killed their families, medic’s killed their wounded, and suicide were all common methods used to escape surrender; in the name of the emperor. Therefore, the question of whether or not the emperor should be charged with war crimes after the war was obvious. People were acting in the name of the emperor, acting upon his will, his divine affluent orders.[ix] Due to these actions, subjects imposing the emperors will faced the cruelest weapon ever created. The atomic bombs were a direct result of an ideology which lead the people to keep fighting, death was better than surrender and occupation. Pearl Harbor was a huge catalyst for Japan, fighting spirit was in full force, a display of the emperor’s motives.[x]

Unconditional Surrender

            The first time the term unconditional surrender was uttered in regards to World War II was by President Roosevelt at the Casablanca conference in 1943.  This writer as already expressed that unconditional surrender not only meant submission of the armed forces, but complete extermination of a philosophy. Some experienced persons in the U.S. government such as Joseph Balantine, George Blakeslee, and Hugh Borton who had served on the State Department’s Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, disagreed with unconditional surrender.[xi]  The soviets also brought up the issue of unconditional surrender to Truman at the Potsdam Conference. President Truman along with James Byrnes learned that the Japanese wished to send Prince Konoye to Moscow to deliver a message that Japan wished to end the war but would fight to the death, as long as the policy of unconditional surrender was mandated.[xii] Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had presented an outline of ideals to offer Japan in terms of surrender. While meetings were being held at Potsdam; Byrnes, Truman, and Churchill all made suggestions for the terms of surrender towards Japan. One major difference between Stimson’s memorandum and the one agreed upon by the three was the issue in the status concerning Emperor Hirohito; it was not addressed. The final document came to be known as the Potsdam Declaration and was committed to the unconditional surrender of Japan.[xiii]

            When deliberating the factions of unconditional surrender, the justifications for such must be called upon to gain understanding why disagreement occurred. The term “soft peace” refers to the reconstruction of Japan in such a way that the monarchy was essential. Soft peace advocates argued, stripping the emperor of all powers and trying him as a war criminal would cause a long and arduous occupation of Japan by allied forces. Fluidity was possible if the government used the monarchy as a puppet to control a population, which would bow to him regardless of title. Soft peace advocates such as Joseph Grew fell under heavy criticism and was labeled an appeaser due to overwhelming animosity towards Japan by the American public.  Calls for these revisions came during Roosevelt’s term, resurging once a new less knowledgeable man assumed the position of president; Harry S. Truman.[xiv]

            Under Truman more and more scrutiny was applied to the issue of unconditional surrender. Committees were formed, revisions were issued, and an abundance of aspects of what the term meant came under fire. Truman had to decide the most logical resolve after hearing debates from those who were in favor of the monarchical system as a figure head while others felt like any situation in which the emperor was threatened would lead to more and more loss of life.  Was there a possibility of the Japanese not accepting any form of unconditional surrender? That question would ultimately lead to the invasion of Japan which was already set in motion by Truman and top military advisors on May 25, 1945; codenamed Olympic. While troops began to realize they were about to continue the bloody campaign, terms which may have ended the war were trying to be negotiated between the two powers.[xv] 

            The Potsdam Declaration is what came to be known as the final clarified diplomatic address, offering Japan terms of surrender.  Its intentions were clear; from the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and Japanese government would come under the command of the Allied powers.[xvi] Through the process reiterated in Japanese culture, influenced by the emperor ideology, retention of the divine ruler meant freedom. Coming under allied control would mean imprisonment. The policy of unconditional surrender was in complete opposition of what Japan stood for; in this the Japanese government was tattered.

            The vacillations of the emperor’s messages were apparent dealing with unconditional surrender. On July 13, 1945 a telegram was issued from the court of Hirohito stating that he wanted the war to be “quickly terminated.” However, he commanded his military to continue fighting the tenacious battles waged in the Pacific and China. Hirohito’s counterpart, President Truman, also made wavering decisions about unconditional surrender.  He wished to know all of his options, and while he deemed the “soft peace” considerations admirable, they never came to fruition. [xvii] While these two factions continued to dodge concrete policies during the summer of 1945, they made reaching an acceptable negotiation unrealistic on either side.

Results of the clash between unconditional surrender and Emperor Ideology

            While the deliberations continued between the two nations the emperor realized defeat was inevitable. However, once he realized the fall of Saipan his cabinet began to think about leverage in surrender negotiations. This leverage came in the form of gyokusai, “glorious self-annihilation.” The purpose behind this demonic concept was to inflict as much bloodshed as possible on the enemy by whatever means necessary. Such a distorted psychological makeup was to be inflicted on the allies in one final battle, Okinawa.[xviii]

            The island of Okinawa was seen by both the American’s and Japanese as a staging point for an invasion of the mainland. This concept made Okinawa one of the most disgusting tragedies witnessed in history. By this time Japan had realized defeat was forthcoming, as mentioned earlier Japan was trying to inflict as much bloodshed as possible in hopes that the allies would end the combat on terms of Japan. On April 1, 1945 the invasion of Okinawa took place with surprising ease. Occupation of the northern end of the island offered virtually no resistance, where was the opposition? The Japanese had fortified themselves at the southern end of the island, hidden in the mountain sides and caves connected by tunnels for supplies. These fortifications were so well hidden that many troops might as well have walked across the plains with a “bull’s-eye” on their backs. While the battle on land intensified the Navy also witnessed the most severe afflictions of emperor ideology; kamikaze.[xix]

            On April 6, 1945 the psychology of gyokusai became reality as kamikaze missions departed to attack ships strung about the surrounding waters of Okinawa.[xx] The pilots of these human bombs were mainly composed of intelligent young men who believed in the protection of their country by any means necessary. If there was any way possible one could protect his family and the empire, it was an honor to do so.[xxi] Wave after wave of planes smashed into everything from picket ships to carriers, located near Okinawa. These men were giving up their lives in the name of the emperor; there is nothing left to give once life no longer offers its assistance. The idea behind the kamikaze illustrates to what extent the Japanese were willing to brutalize their enemy.  Non-combatants in Japan lost their lives as well, some due to the fighting, but others killed themselves and their families to avoid capture by the Americans. [xxii] A Japanese prisoner of war, Bob Wodnik recalled the story of Margret Billings who worked aboard the USS Comfort; a hospital ship. The ship was plainly marked with enormous red crosses on its deck, and still the Kamikaze pilots inflicted colossal damage, attaining the “bravery” of gyokusai.

            Both of these policies eventually concerned themselves with the Soviet Union. The Soviets were part of the Potsdam conference while Japan sought to use them as a negotiator between foes. Prior to the successful atomic test at Trinity, a major point of the Potsdam conference was to secure Soviet entry into the war. However, Japan and the Soviets had a neutrality pact which prevented conflict.[xxiii] The Soviets knew victory lay ahead of the U.S. and confirmed entrance into the war on August 15.[xxiv]  The Soviets had the ability of lending the U.S. every advantage during the invasion of Japan.  However, after the trinity test proved successful there was no real necessity for the Soviet entrance. The timing of all these factors was essential when examining how nations struggled for power. The soviet entrance after finally being obtained was suddenly not such an impending issue.  The soviet entrance had its pitfalls on an international diplomatic stage as well. If the Soviets attained a key role in the invasion of Japan it could seek to extend its communist hand throughout Asia; part of what the allies were fighting against in Japan.  The U.S. moved towards the dropping of the bomb before the Soviets could gain a foothold in invading Japanese occupied Manchuria.[xxv] What would become of the Japanese?

            The clash between emperor ideology and unconditional surrender was symbolized by the rebellion which took place in the Japanese government once Hirohito issued that Japan would accept the conditions set forth by the Potsdam declaration. Several men began an attempt at a coup to overthrow the government and continue fighting against the enemy. A division in emperor ideology is seen in this situation. In one case it can be considered honorable to obey the emperor since he is a divine entity and his word is final. On the other hand the emperor’s imperial line dates back further than he does and the ways of bushido and gyokusai must be upheld at all costs. The occupation of the country held no chance for the imperial throne to have any fortitude in the minds of the Japanese. After having such a strong ideology forced upon them, surrender was not an option, not even if it came from the emperor. Years and years of psychological control could not be switched off from the words of the emperor. The coup failed as high members of the court realized its futile efforts.[xxvi]

           

The Bomb

While relentless fighting continued in the Pacific, President Truman was busy with deliberations at Potsdam. His main objective was to figure out a way to end the war with Japan. During his time at the conference he received news that the United States had successfully tested their atomic weapon at the Trinity site. This information instantly provided Truman with leverage unbeknownst to any person in history.[xxvii]  While the Japanese emperor looked for leverage with gyokusai, Truman would do the same with the bomb. The similarities continue in the facts that Hirohito had not deliberately told the U.S. that the policy of Japan would consist of brutalizing the enemy in every line of attack.  The Potsdam declaration did not tell the Japanese they were going to face atomic weapons, it merely stated the terms of surrender or face “prompt and utter destruction;” a severe understatement. The declaration was received by the Japanese and broadcast to the public along with the word, mokusatsu. This term could be loosely translated to mean “pay no attention to.” Premiere Suziki rejected the declaration and urged the country to continue fighting until a successful conclusion would be reached. These actions revealed there would be no retort in halting the combat in Japan unless the emperor intervened.[xxviii]

“There never has been- there never can be- successful compromise between good and evil. Only total victory can reward the champions of tolerance, and decency, and faith.” Stern words from President Roosevelt offered a clear and noble example of what must be achieved in this war. President Truman was far less popular than his predecessor and held this slogan in the back of his mind throughout the remainder of the war.[xxix] The brutality of war in the Pacific was in fact doing the job that the emperor had intended; killing Americans any way possible. Such an irony can be found in the rational of both countries. The Japanese felt as if they could kill as many enemy forces as possible with persistent force, they would be compelled to accept terms set forth by Japan. Due to this force, loss of American lives in Saipan and Okinawa made it absolutely necessary to consider using the bomb against Japan. While Japan felt as if pressing on with the war would diminish American morale, it in fact, accrued the attention of the deadliest force on earth. The American policy mandated the issue of unconditional surrender which was in direct opposition to everything the imperial throne embodied. Due to the vast differences between the countries likelihood of an acceptable outcome through negotiation on either side was doubtful.

On August 6, 1945 the world changed. The United States and its allies had issued an ultimatum to the Japanese government which they did not entirely accept. In a telegram received through the Swiss Government on August 10, 1945; after two nuclear weapons were enforced upon Japan, its government wished to end the war but could not accept the abolition of imperial rule.[xxx] Two atomic bombs had been dropped, the worst devastation known to man had been inflicted upon the Japanese; still they were defiant. Finally a resolve came in the form of a response to a letter drafted by Secretary Byrnes, approved by the president, stating that the Emperor will issue all demands of the Supreme Allied Commander to his subjects and resume not functioning powers over the nation. On August 14, the Japanese accepted the letter composed by Byrnes and at seven o’clock Truman announced to the nation the end of the world’s most ghastly discord.[xxxi]  

The situations which lead to Truman’s decision on August 14 had a much different feel in Japan earlier that day. Emperor Hirohito gathered his cabinet in the same room which he was present in the night Nagasaki was bombed. Many members of the cabinet voiced their opinions about what should be done with regards to the allied ultimatum. After much deliberation the emperor spoke. Muffling his words and holding back his tears, the emperor expressed that he could not let his people be annihilated from history. He commanded his subjects to follow his lead and accept the terms as the only way to save the nation. He offered his services to anyone who wished to speak with him within his military and offered to stand in front of a microphone and address his people. He stated “It matters not what happens to me but I wonder how I can answer the spirits of the ancestors if the nation is reduced to ashes with great sacrifice of life.” [xxxii] When noon arrived the next day a recorded message of the emperors voice, which the people had never heard, was broadcast announcing Japan would agree to the terms set forth by the Potsdam declaration. In his message Hirohito never mentioned the fact of surrendering nor did he apologize in any way. Instead the stated that the war had not developed to the advantage of the Japanese people. He continued to say that the enemy had developed a cruel bomb that would destroy civilization if Japan did not take these actions.[xxxiii]

The emperor himself had avoided what the ideology had created. Instead of surrendering he sidestepped the issue claiming that he was the reason civilization will be saved by accepting these conditions, preventing another bomb from being dropped. The emperor ideology was so engrained in the Japanese  people that some of his officers were still defiant. After the conference with Hirohito on the fourteenth General Anami, still plagued with the question of if he had done enough for his country confided in his secretary. He employed that there was an American convoy stationed outside of Tokyo. “What do you think of the idea of proposing peace after striking the convoy?” He was still thinking about ways to damage the enemy even after the emperor himself had issued acceptance of the Potsdam declaration.[xxxiv] He wanted to attack a ship the day of official surrender. Anami would later commit the ultimate form of gyokusai, impaling himself with a sword; the ancient ways of bushido and the samurai was complete. Even after two atomic weapons were enforced upon Japan, the psychological stranglehold of emperor ideology held firm its grasp on Japanese people.

POW’s

            While the battles raged on in the Pacific, victories were won by both sides. Due to the emperor ideology more Japanese were ready to die than surrender. The United States had no official policy of death before surrender and consequently faced the hardship of prison life if captured. The following are all results suffered by allied prisoners due to the psychological mindset of the emperor ideology; ordering his subjects to brutalize the enemy into submission. Sandakan POW camp was a key strategic position which linked the oil fields off the east coast of Borneo to the Philippines and the majority of the Japanese occupied Asia-Pacific. In 1943, after many atrocities and deaths had already occurred, a new group of prisoners arrived at the camp. Accompanying these new prisoners were new guards whose main purpose was to govern punishment to defiant prisoners. These new guards carried an ax handle or a club to administer their beatings if the pace of the prisoners was to slow. The prisoner’s job detailed work on an airfield that was present in Sandakan. The guards did not just beat one prisoner if the pace slowed; the entire group was punished for any one person’s misfortune. Another form of punishment was for the prisoners to stand upright with arms stretched out in front of them, usually holding heavy logs, and had to stare at the sun for twenty or thirty minutes. If the logs were dropped or the punishment was not sufficient enough, it would continue.[xxxv] The emperor ideology was surely present in Sandakan; viciousness was reality. POW, Keith Botterill, spent forty days in a prisoner cage in Sandakan. His testimony read, “The first seven days got no food. No water for the first three days. And then they forced you to drink until you were sick on the third night. Every night would be a bashing. Hit with sticks and fists and kicking……. There wasn’t room to lie down at night, we’d all lie side by side, squashed up, and had to sit up again at dawn.” The prisoner cage was a tool used by the Japanese for virtually all prisoners held at Sandakan.

            Continuing to examine the facet of affliction suffered by POW’s through emperor ideology; the story of Henry Chamberlain recounts. Chamberlain was a member of Bilibid Prison. While fighting continued in 1944 the allied victories were mounting, and he had to be transported. The Haro Maru (a prisoner ship), was a gruesome reality for the prisoners, for they knew what hell lay ahead of them. Being a prisoner was not bad enough; the psychological toll of the thousand men with Chamberlain was exhausting. In one month earlier that year American submarines torpedoed more than 300,000 tons of Japanese shipping.[xxxvi] There was no way to know if those ships contained American prisoners. The thousand men were divided in two separate groups of five hundred. One group descended in to a small metal chamber filled with rigid thick coal, while the others to a scummy hull littered with rotten horse excrement. Chamberlain fell upon the midst of coal filled darkness where breathing was as difficult as escape. One physician among them carried a thermometer that topped out at 108 degrees before giving out. Buckets swung from the top of the hull filled with excrement used by the soldiers; meeting each other as the ship swayed sloshing the defecating contents on to the prisoners below. Disease was acquainted with every person at the bottom of the hole. They psychological battle continued as the men began to hear the “ping” of sonar bounce off the ship’s hull. The men knew what this meant. Allied submarines had spotted the ship and were zeroing in. Dismay erupted among the prisoners; men started beating their canteens on the side of the ship in hopes to aid sonar to their location. Fights began to break out between panicked prisoners in the face of death. [xxxvii]

            Thirty nine prisoners died on the thirty nine day voyage to their destination. Men like Chamberlain were faced with one of their comrades dying every single day along this voyage. The emperor system produced the thought of katsugo, brutalizing the enemy. To say that these men were brutalized would be a sever misinterpretation of what they experienced. The events that fell upon these men were so atrocious many of them found it hard to recall the experience at all.[xxxviii]

            The conditions of Sandakan discussed earlier ended in a horrible fate. While the allies approached, more and more of the prisoners were being transferred out of Sandakan, with the hopes that they would die on the trip to their destination. The exact number of prisoners remaining after the ones healthy enough to be transported is unknown, however testimony of guards recalls the egregious acts committed against some of the remaining detainees. Out of a group of fifty, twenty three prisoners who were considered healthy were taken, on July 17 1945, to an air-raid shelter trench and shot. The idea was that the prisoners who were deemed unhealthy would die on the march making it easier for the guards to survive the trip. Physical and psychological torment continued at Sandakan. One day a Japanese officer recognized that a pig had gone missing from its group. The officer began to investigate the disappearance, to discover pork in the bowls of prisoners. After interrogation, one prisoner admitted to stealing the pig and cooking it. A few days later one of the Japanese guards saw the prisoner being dragged behind a hut, as he followed secretly. The prisoner was then held up to a large wooden cross where one officer approached him with a stool, hammer, and large knife. The officer proceeded to nail each one of the prisoner’s limbs to the cross. He cut pieces of flesh from the man’s stomach and arms; these were placed upon a wooden board beside the prisoner. He also put on a rubber glove and removed the prisoners intestines from his body and placed the on the board beside the pieces of flesh. The remaining prisoners were all called out into the center of the camp where this board filled with parts of their comrade were on display as a sign of what would happen when these instances occurred.[xxxix]   

            These actions were more than just murder; they were acts committed to utterly dismantle the will to live in others. The men remaining in Sandakan were already in horrible condition when learning of appalling acts such as these, symbols of dominance by their captors. The Japanese were once again, not only carrying out orders disregarding the life of prisoners, but inflicting psychological warfare. It is hard to imagine there was any deliberation of dropping the bomb while these degrading acts were being committed. 

In conclusion, this writer contends that the United States policy of unconditional surrender accompanied with Japanese emperor ideology made it necessary to drop atomic bombs over Japan. The ideas behind both countries standards were so opposed to one another negotiations were hardly a possibility. It was always on terms set forth by one country to another. Either the Japanese were going to brutally mutilate their enemy until they accepted their terms or they would be faced with nuclear weapons. Neither country knew of the others actual intentions, but fruition was quickly realized by both sides. The atrocities suffered by those in battles such as Okinawa and Saipan suffered the same fate as many in Hiroshima and Nagasaki; death. The termination of life results in nothing, whether it is from a nuclear explosion or the end of a Japanese bayonet. Japanese citizens and soldiers were inflicted with emperor ideology that resulted in uncontested ferocity in the form of the Japanese people. The concept of unconditional surrender was not fathomable, the emperor was a deity. The United States had advocates who understood this ideology however; this did not keep American soldiers from being killed.  Dropping the Atomic bombs was necessary to attain surrender from an enemy who had no intention of unconditional surrender.

 

Notes


 

[i] Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II. (Colorado: The Westview Press, 1998), 201-203.

[ii] Ibid., 206.

[iii] Hurst III, G. Cameron. “Death, Honor, and Loyalty: The Bushido Ideal.” Philosophy East and West 40 (1990): 511-527.

[iv] Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II. 206-207.

[v] John Owen Gauntlett (ed.), Kokutai No Hongi. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1949), v.

[vi] Ibid,. 145-146.

[vii] Sabine Frühstück (review). “Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms, and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History.” The Journal of Asian Studies 62 (2003): 958-960.

[viii] John Owen Gauntlett (ed.), Kokutai No Hongi., 171.

[ix] Dale M. Hellegers. We The Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the Japanese Constitution. (California: Stanford University Press: 2001) 223-225.

[x] J. Samuel Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic bombs against Japan. (University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 20-28

[xi] Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Racing the enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the surrender of Japan. (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard Univeristy Press, 2005), 21-22.

[xii] James F. Byrnes. Speaking Frankly. (Tennessee: Kingsport Publishers Inc., 1947), 205.

 

[xiii] Ibid., 206-207

[xiv] Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Racing the enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the surrender of Japan. 22-23.

[xv] Ibid.,  51-54.

[xvi] James F. Byrnes. Speaking Frankly. (Tennessee: Kingsport Publishers Inc., 1947), 209.

 

[xvii] J. Samuel Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic bombs against Japan. 47-48.

[xviii] Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II. 195.

[xix] J. Samuel Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic bombs against Japan. 31-32.

[xx] William Craig. The Fall of Japan. (New York: The Dial Press:1967), 6.

[xxi] Yasuo Kuwahara. Kamikaze: A Japanese pilot’s own spectacular story of the famous suicide squadrons. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957) 6-10.

[xxii] J. Samuel Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic bombs against Japan. 33.

[xxiii] Dale M. Hellegers. We The Japanese People: World War II and the Origins of the Japanese Constitution. 34-36.

[xxiv] J. Samuel Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic bombs against Japan.57-58.

[xxv] James F. Byrnes. Speaking Frankly. 207-208.

[xxvi] William Craig. The Fall of Japan. 181-184

[xxvii] J. Samuel Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic bombs against Japan. 55-57.

[xxviii] Ibid,.71-72.

[xxix] Ronald Takaki. Hiroshima: why America dropped the atomic bomb. (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995) 34-35.

[xxx] James F. Byrnes. Speaking Frankly. 209-210.

[xxxi] Ibid,. 210-211

[xxxii] William Craig. The Fall of Japan. 171-172.

[xxxiii] J. Samuel Walker. Prompt & utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic bombs against Japan. 87.

[xxxiv] William Craig. The Fall of Japan. 173.

[xxxv] Bob Wodnick. Captured Honor: POW Survival in the Philippines and Japan. (Washington: Washington State Univeristy Press, 2003). 35.

[xxxvi] Ibid,. 105

[xxxvii] Ibid,. 107-110.

[xxxviii] Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II.12.

[xxxix] Bob Wodnick. Captured Honor: POW Survival in the Philippines and Japan. 59-64.