History 4000

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Bright L. Riley

HIST 4000

Dr. Morrill

07-02-08

            This writer contends that the ever growing epic debate surrounding one of the greatest decisions in American history, to drop nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is in itself an enigmatic academic achievement.  Historians, scholars, students, and many various intellectuals have studied the events that took place in the summer of 1945 vigorously for sixty-three years, still trying to understand what motivated United States President Harry S. Truman and his administration in their decision to move man from the wisdom of conventional war-fare in the Pacific, and take the world Nuclear.  The highly sensitive debate surrounding the decision of the bomb has challenged intellectuals to look deeply into the questions of strategy, diplomatic implications, and moral dilemmas that came along with the United States resolution to drop the bombs.

            The writer recommends readers appreciate the development of the atomic bomb to fully understand the implications behind this historic debate.  On September 12, 1933, a Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard was sitting at a stop light in London, when he realized the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction.   Szilard had just conjured the world’s worst epiphany.  It would only be five years later, December 21, 1938, when two German scientists would split the first uranium atom.  Word spread rapidly, launching the world into a race to build the first atomic bomb[1].

            United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt plunged the America military into the race after receiving a letter from Albert Einstein in August 1939, warning him of Germany’s quest to develop atomic weapons.  The United States dedication to the project did not take off until September of 1942 when Colonel Leslie R. Groves took charge of what was known as the Manhattan Project.  The Manhattan Project consisted primarily of three sites where “secret cities” employed over 125,000 people during World War II.  Security and secrecy was taken to a new “unprecedented heights” for the locations of the projects.  Sites were established along the Clinch River in eastern Tennessee, beside the Columbia River in eastern Washington State, and in the very isolated Rio Grande in northern New Mexico.   Many other aspects of the Manhattan Project were taking part in other parts of the country as well[2].

            General Groves and Robert J. Oppenheimer, the scientific director of the laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico, recruited the brightest young minds and Ph.D.’s of their day from all over the country to take part in the top secret project.  The entire project employed more than 125,000 people mostly in their twenties and thirties.  Time was of the essence for the United States to finish an atomic bomb to use in the war.  The extensive amount of technical scientific research had to be resolved simultaneously, which pushed scientist to their absolute limits.  Oppenheimer and his scientist needed two elements to fuel the atomic bomb, plutonium and uranium.  Oakridge, Tennessee was used to enrich uranium; Hanford, Washington was built to produce plutonium, while Los Alamos, New Mexico was the site where scientist and engineers worked on the “theoretical and practical” components of the bomb[3].   

            For three and a half years chemist, physicist, and engineers worked vigorously to develop a revolutionary weapon that would hopefully end the war.  Security and secrecy were so tight that only a select few truly understood what the Manhattan Project was developing.  Employees were only told as much as they needed to know for their jobs, and prohibited to talk about their work with others including spouses and colleagues.   General Groves administered a security system known as “compartmentalization” during the war.  This coordination of security dictated the flow of scientific information among the scientists to be regulated on a “need to know” basis[4].  It would not be until that faithful day on August 6, 1945, that the entire Manhattan Project would comprehend through radio broadcast and newspapers what goal they had been working towards for three and half years, to some a life time[5].         

            On August 6, 1945, at 2:45 A.M. pilot Colonel Paul W. Tibbets and copilot Robert Lewis and a crew of ten took off from Tinian Island on a mission to Hiroshima, Japan.  Their plane, the Enola Gay was caring precious cargo, an atomic bomb fueled with uranium 235.  At 8:15 A.M. the Enola Gay released a nightmare from hell for its victims.  At an altitude of approximately 1,900 feet, forty-three seconds after it was released the “Little Boy” burst into a fire ball, searing a flash of light, and a deafening roar so powerful man could not imagine.   The initial blast vaporized everything with in a half mile radius of the epicenter almost instantaneously.  The blast area was estimated to be about 4.4 square miles surrounding ground zero.  Everything, accept for a few buildings that were built to resist earthquakes were left in utter ruins.  The United States Strategic Bombing Survey initially anticipated that the bomb claimed between 70,000 and 80,000 lives.  It is impossible to give an exact number of victims; however, today it is estimated that about 130,000 Japanese lost their lives including those who died of radiation contamination in the Hiroshima bombing[6].  

            The events that took place from August 6-14, 1945, took off with incredible speed.  On August 8^th, the Soviet Union declared war on the Japanese Empire and began their invasion of Manchuria.  August 9^th, the United States dropped their second atomic bomb, “Fat Man” a plutonium weapon on Nagasaki.  The bombs blast was not as powerful and “Little Boy”; however, it was estimated to have destroyed the lives of 40,000 to 60,000 Japanese.  The Japanese inner circle, as well as the Emperor were so stunned on August 10^th they moved for conditional surrender.  The Japanese Emperor Hirohito broke his traditional silence on August 14^th surrendering unconditionally to the United States.  The world’s first and only nuclear war to date had ended in only four days[7].

            The essential issue that has divided scholars over a period more than six decades is whether the use of the bomb was necessary to achieve a victory in the war in the Pacific on terms satisfactory to the United States according to J. Samuel Walker[8].  This historiographical debate has become so monumental that historians have divided their interpretations into three various schools of thought: the traditionalist or orthodox, the revisionist, and the neo-revisionist.  Tsuyoshi Hasegawa elucidates that the traditional interpretation insisted that the decision to drop the bomb was necessary and justified; averting an invasion of Japan, motivating surrender without delay and therefore saving “millions” of both American and Japanese lives.  The revisionist analysis which became more popular in the mid-1960s took a differing view.  Revisionist scholars believe that Japan had systematically been defeated when the bomb was dropped; insisting that the bomb was not necessary to win the war, and that the bomb was used to intimidate the Soviet Union for post-war security.  The neo-orthodox interpretation insists that the bombs use was primarily to defeat Japan; however, the Soviet factor played an entirely separate role as well[9]. 

            For the first two decades preceding the use of the atomic bomb in 1945, historians did not challenge United States President Truman’s decision and justification of the bomb.  It was believed by many that the bomb brought the war to a speedy conclusion, and dismissed the United States from launching a conventional invasion of the Japanese mainland that would have cost hundreds of thousands of American and Japanese lives.  Scholars believed that is was the bomb, and the bomb only that impelled the Japanese government to fatally consider unconditional surrender[10].

            One of the first historians to write about the decision to drop the bomb was Michael Amrine in his manuscript, The Great decision: The secret History of the Atomic Bomb, in 1959.  At the time of his writing, Amrine believed that it was time to open classified records and documents to journalists, historians, and officials who remained “shut out.”  Amrine expressed his conclusions and conjectures in his final chapter of his text.  Knowing the facts that were available, Amrine believed that “the bomb should never have been dropped without a clear warning, or without a demonstration of it on an uninhabited territory, or without giving time for us and the enemy to understand something of what it meant.”  Amrine thought that the atomic bomb was not in the long-range interests of the United States, or humanity.  Amrine also added that “we” the Americans were quite unrealistic in our statements about unconditional surrender, and we were quite “ruthless” in approving a policy of area bombing.  Amrine’s final statement on the decision coincided with that of Admiral Leahy, “that mass bombing of women and children takes us back to the days of Genghis Khan.”  All though Amrine felt the bomb did not need to be dropped, he stated that he personally believed Japan had been beaten, but was not ready for surrender until the bomb[11].    

            The revolutionary idea of “atomic diplomacy” gained prevalence in the mid-1960s with the revisionist historians of the New Left.  Gar Alperovitz was the first to challenge the conventional view of the bombs use against Japan in his stimulating book Atomic Diplomacy, published in 1965[12].  Walker asserts that Alperovitz interpreted that the United States decision to drop the bomb was “primarily for diplomatic purposes rather than for military requirements, particularly to impress and intimidate the Soviet Union in the emerging Cold War[13].”  Alperovitz insisted that administrative policy makers understood there were alternative strategies for ending the war without the bomb, or launching an invasion that would possibly slaughter millions. He viewed the administrations decision as a way to introduce to the Soviets entry into the war in the Pacific, as well as give the United States the “military leverage” it would need to deal the Soviets on postwar matters.  Alperovitz believed that the bomb made American leader much more aggressive negotiators “which gave them confidence to reverse earlier understanding with the Soviet Union and contributed to the origins of the Cold War[14].”  Alperovitz’s interpretation of the decision to drop the atomic bomb detonated an everlasting debate among scholars that is still being challenged today. Michael J. Hogan stated that later generations of historians did not over analyze the decision as Alperovitz; however, they were ready to admit that political consideration played an imperative part in the way American leaders thought about the bomb. New questions were raised about the number of lives that would be lost in an invasion and whether the atomic bomb was the only way to end the war.  Those new questions have ignited a historiographical debate between the opposing positions[15]. 

            Alperovitz gave the explanation in 1965, that it is all but “impossible” to understand the instant change in American thinking the bomb gave our government.  The world’s first atomic explosions gave America a new confidence in their outlook on diplomacy, particularly when establishing postwar relations with the Soviet Union.  Alperovitz viewed the bomb and decisive factor that took anti-Soviet American policy and continued to make it much more complicated.  His conclusions are drawn from the work of Herbert Feis, a special consultant to three Secretaries of War who published in 1966 an essay of the use of the atomic bomb.  Feis described the bombing of Hiroshima as “by no means essential” to end the war in the Pacific[16].

            The 1970s brought new important official documents and key primary sources to the table.  However, the debate between traditionalist and revisionist historians remained unaffected.  Revisionist of the time had divided their thoughts into three categories according to Peter Bastian.  They insisted that the United States had ignored that by July 1945; Japan had systematically been defeated and was ready to begin surrender negotiations as long as the future of the Emperor remained undamaged.  Revisionist claimed that the United States also stalled the Soviets entry into the war, ignoring their significance, declaring that the Red Army’s invasion would have been enough to force surrender.  The last critical aspect of the new documentations was the casualty estimations of an invasion of the Japanese mainland.  The revisionist believed that the President and his advisors had over estimated intentionally to justify their decision to use the bomb.  Traditionalist remained loyal to the President’s decision; countering, that the Japanese were divided on surrender policies.  The Japanese military and civilians had adopted a policy of Katsugo, or death before surrender.  They also maintained that the United States had supported a Red Army invasion; however, this would have not been significant enough to force the Japanese to surrender or avoid a U.S. invasion[17].  It is in these critical years that historians began to understand the implication of Alperovitz’s work.  Historians such as Lisle A. Rose defended the President and his administration against the claim of “strategy of delay”.  Alperovitz claimed that the President delayed the Potsdam meeting with Stalin and Churchill, asserting that Truman wanted the weapon in his pocket as a negotiation tool.  Rose made a strong effort to defend Truman, alleging that the United States did not practice any form of atomic diplomacy at Potsdam, or bomb Hiroshima for political gain[18].

            Lloyd C. Gardner in his book, The Origins of the Cold War, looks closely at the personalities of the Truman administration, particularly at Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Secretary of War Harry L. Stimson, and the President.   Gardner believed that Byrnes relied on the bomb as a diplomatic lever more so than any other.  Specifically sighting Stimson in his diary saying the secretary was full “of his problems with the coming meeting of the foreign ministers and he looks to having the presence of the bomb in his pocket, so to speak, as a great weapon to get through the thing he has.”  Gardner stated that Stimson had recently come to the conclusion that atomic energy technology should be shared information between the U.S. and the Soviets, and he had discussed his ideas with both the Secretary and the President.  Stimson wrote to Truman in a memorandum that the atomic bomb had come to dominate all political questions.  Gardner pointrd out that the theory that Truman delayed the Potsdam meeting in order to have this “trump car” in his hand when he met Stalin had gained supportive evidence in recent years.  Truman in small talk with one of his secretaries said, “If it explodes, as I think it will, I’ll certainly have a hammer on those boys!”  However, it is statements such as these that Gardner declares are overemphasis on Truman’s personality, which reduces the perspective on the origins of the decision to drop the atomic bomb, subsequently leading to the Cold War.  It is this author’s interpretation that Gardner believed the bomb was used specifically to end the war.  However, after the war the United States “relied on the bomb as the security backing for the new United Nations[19].”

            John Lewis Gaddis wrote The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947, published in 1972.  Gaddis construes the idea that the successful testing of the first atomic bomb on July 16, 1945, almost certainly made any impenetrability with the Soviets seem far less overwhelming to the new President.  This great news of the secret explosion delighted the President and his advisors, making it much easier for them to stand tough on reparations concerning Germany and helped move them away from pressuring the Russians to move into the war in the Pacific.  Gaddis implies that President Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed as early as September, 1944, “after mature considerations,” to utilize the bomb if it was ready.  Gaddis looks to Secretary of War Stimson to explain “at no time, from 1941 to 1945, did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or by any other responsible member of the government, that atomic energy should not be used in the war.”  Gaddis believed that Truman viewed the bomb in the same manner quoting Truman, “I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used.”  Gaddis contends that throughout the war, military strategy had been to seek a victory as quickly as possible through the use of technology, not manpower.  He stated that the decision to drop the atomic bomb marked the “logical culmination” of that effort[20].  

            Nevertheless, Gaddis also believed that the bomb was much more than a pure military implication.  He argued that the United States possession of the “revolutionary” weapon altered the post war balance of power tremendously.  Calling the bomb the technically feasibility devise for the United States to compel its policies upon the rest of the world.  Gaddis does not believe that any liable advisor to the President or Truman himself intended on doing this, but the new idea of a nuclear monopoly would improve the “West’s bargaining position” with the Soviets.  Gaddis added to the debate, in his opinion after the bomb fell on Japan, the United States found it just as difficult, if not more so, to shape the development in the postwar world after the “awesome events” that took place in August[21].          

Martin J. Sherwin in A World Destroyed, published in 1975, contended that after deploying atomic weapons against Japan, the “world entered a new era in which great-power diplomacy was conducted perilously close to the abyss of nuclear war.”  Sherwin believe that the scientist and policymakers saw the bomb as a means of controlling the postwar course of world affairs before its use on Hiroshima.  He believes that both President Roosevelt and Truman believed that the bombs impact on diplomacy had to await its development, and quite possibly a demonstration of its power.  Sherwin made a distinguishing attribute to the debate; asserting that from the time of the first organized meeting on atomic energy in October of 1941, all members of the “Top Policy Group” conceived of the development and use of the atomic bomb as an essential part of the total war effort.  Later in his text, Sherwin insisted the more frightful the bomb seemed as a weapon of war, the more useful it appeared as an instrument of peace for the Russians[22].

            Barton J. Bernstein is a leading scholar in the neo-orthodox school of thought.   In his article, published in the spring of 1975, Bernstein emphasized how both President Roosevelt and Truman both considered the bomb to be a conventional weapon of war, which could also be used as a diplomacy leaver, military ballast, or a threat for dealing with the Soviets in the postwar.  Bernstein argued, America controlling the postwar world was not the reason for dropping the bomb contrary to some historian’s accusations.  The number one reason that Truman deployed the bomb was to bring the speedy defeat of Japan, and the second was for “impressing” the Soviets which would help the United States have control in shaping the postwar.  Bernstein theorized five possible alternatives the U.S. should have considered before the bomb.  First, wait for the Soviets to declare war on Japan, implying that it may be enough pressure to force surrender.  The U.S. could have given a warning, or a demonstration shot to the Japanese government.  Reconsider all aspect of the demands made by the United States and Great Britain, and the policy of unconditional surrender.  Try exploring the proposals of Japanese “peace feelers.”  Bernstein’s last argument is to rely on time-honored warfare, such as a invasion using conventional weapons.  However, Bernstein believed that the alternatives seemed to be less desirable and of higher risk than the bomb for the administration[23].

            Gregg Herken wrote in his text, The Winning Weapon, published in 1980 that it was only three years after Hiroshima that scholars began to speculate that the bomb was not dropped primarily to force Japan to surrender.  He claimed that many believed the bomb was used to keep the Red Army out of Manchuria and to impress them with the new revolutionary weapon of war.  Herken believed that the “atomic diplomacy” used by the United States, using the bomb as a “political advantage” is the center of the controversy.  Herken gave the explanation that both responsible traditionalist as well as revisionist view two products of the bomb.  The first is the immediate military rationale regarding Japan.  The second was the possible diplomatic advantage relating to Russia in the postwar.  Herken said that because America was the only country to possess atomic weapons it gave the government a “unique position of power and responsibility” in history.  This arrangement gave the United States the opportunity to attempt to use that “monopoly” as a negotiating tool when attempting peace settlements, and possibly beyond[24].  

            The mid-1990s brought around a new meaning to this controversial debate.  To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the War, the National Air and Space Museum, part of the Smithsonian Institution planned to display the fuselage of the American-B29 bomber the Enola Gay that dropped the atomic bomb “little boy” on Hiroshima, Japan on August 6^th.  Along with the bomber, curators intended to include a photographic exhibition and a commentary on the bombing.  Originally there was to be discussion of the decision to use the bombs, the targets, photographs of the Japanese victims, as well as a brief interpretation of how the bomb caused the nuclear arms race with the Soviets throughout the Cold War.  As prepared the Smithsonian believed it was, nothing could have warned them of the outrage the planned exhibit was about to spark.  A variety of veteran organizations, such as the American Legion, backed by the United States Senate were enraged believing that the museum was trying to call the bomb “aggressive, immoral, and unjustified.”  The action taken place by the veterans and protesters showed how much of an emotionally charged issue the atomic bomb still remained fifty years later[25].  The demonstrators believed that the exhibition lacked patriotism, as well as respect of World War II veterans, condemning it for its Japanese compassion[26]. 

            Robert James Maddox published during the year of the fifth anniversary of the bombing of Japan.  Maddox insist that it is a misleading notion for someone to theorize that the Japanese would have surrendered in the summer of 1945 had the United States made clear that the emperor of Japan would rest on the throne.  Maddox explained that it is the way of the traditional samurai, which had such great influence on the Japanese warrior spirit.  He described how unthinkable it would be for a Japanese warrior to give up to “racial inferior” without fighting to the death.  Maddox does comply with the argument that Japan had been systematically defeated in the summer of 1945.  However, his counter argument is that the real issue was how long were the Japanese militarists willing to go on fighting in hope of negotiating a peace treaty with the help of the Soviets?  Maddox explained that when considering a conventional invasion over dropping the bomb, Washington had two main sources to determine how the Japanese planned to respond.  The first, “MAGIC intercepts” the code Japan used had been broken, which informed the U.S. government that the Japanese had continued to seek Soviet assistance for peace negotiations even after the first bomb was dropped.  The second, ULTRA the decryption of high-level cryptanalytic sources gave the government a warning that the Japanese were building up their military at Kyushu, the island the planned to invade[27]. 

            Maddox argued that the greatest charge in this debate is against President Truman and his advisors made the decision to drop the atomic bomb principally as a diplomatic weapon against the Soviets, not to speedily end the war in the Pacific. Maddox quoted Charles L. Mee Jr., who described the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as “wanton murder.”  Maddox understand that the select few of scholars who theorized that the people responsible for the atomic bombs were plotting to hide their real motives, by sparing Japanese and American lives in not employing an all out invasion.  He described that historians such as Alperovitz and Mee believed that the reality is that the United States knew Japan was on the verge of collapse; however, they wanted to demonstrate a new age of weaponry to the Soviets.  He opposed the alleged notion and asserted that it is nothing but unsupported allegations along with the altercation of historic records to fit their obscene justifications.  Maddox’s final resolution is that at the time of his publication and with the evidence available, President Truman approved the bomb for the reason he always stuck to, “to end a bloody war that would have become far bloodier had an invasion proved necessary[28].”

            Ronald Takaki in his book, Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb, opened a new theory to why President Truman chose to deploy atomic weapons against Japan.  Takaki asserted that Truman was motivated by his personal insecurities, racist’s attitude toward “Japs”, and believed that the bomb would intimidate the Soviets, making them easier to manipulate in the postwar.  Takaki, a revisionist; agrees with historians such as Alperovitz and Sherwin, believing that the bombs were more than a means to end the war quickly.  The focus of his argument surrounded the President, born in Missouri in 1911.  Takaki believed that the Presidents racist attitude allowed him to justify the bomb.  Takaki wrote that Truman considered the “Japs” to be savages and beastly, much less superior than the white man.  He interpreted that “anti-Asian prejudice contributed to the way Americans quickly racialized the Pacific war.”  Takaki said that this racial rage was fueled by the Japanese demoralizing surprise attack on Pearl Harbor[29].   

Takaki insist that Truman demanded the most attention when evaluating what motivated him and his administration to drop the bombs. He insisted that the policy makers made the choices that greatly influenced the wars end.  In the words of Secretary Stimson, “No single individual can hope to know exactly what took place in the minds of all of those who had a share in these events…”  Takaki over and over again, affirms that President Truman, as Commander and Chief of the armed forces made the decision and insisted that he was alone responsible.  Takaki quoted from a letter from Truman to his sister, Marry, “On that trip coming home I ordered the Atomic Bomb to be dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  It was a terrible decision.  But I made it.”  Takaki noted that years later, when Truman’s memoirs were published he stated: “The final decision of where and when to use the atomic bomb was up to me.  Let there be no mistake about it[30].” 

“Never, never waste a minute on regret,” the words of President Truman.  Takaki described how the President throughout his terms, presented himself as man of “great self-assurance.”  Takaki assumed that underneath all that, Truman was a man of intricate personality, holding inside an inferiority multipart, a racist attitude, a drive to flex his masculinity, and feelings of uncertainty and remorse.  Takaki believed that the real Truman can be reviled through his personal letters to his wife, Bess, and private conversation.  Takaki thought that Truman was a thoughtful man who dreaded using the bomb, and expressed regret over it[31].

            Martin J. Sherwin the general editor of The End of the Pacific War wrote the atomic bomb was “conceived by scientists, delivered by the military, and adopted by policymakers, nuclear weapons emerged from the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to dominate our time.” Secretary of War Stimson warned the President that this new revolutionary weapon “has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which we cannot shirk without very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization.”  Today in the twenty-first century the role of “nuclear armaments and strategic policies” has become the leader in our policy making procedures.  Sherwin challenged that it is the role of academic community to study the questions related to the development, the deployment, and the diplomacy of nuclear arsenals from the beginning August 6, 1945[32].    

            With the new minimum, historians began to investigate new ideas and theories, once more expanding the ever growing debate surrounding the decision to drop the atomic bomb.  Richard B. Frank believed that the key Japanese leaders in the summer of 1945 are the crucial elements in understanding the United States deployment of the bomb.  Frank argued that the military leaders of the Imperial army were coherent and thoughtfully conceived military and political strategy called Ketsu Go.  Frank asserted that American decision making cannot be comprehended correctly without the knowledge of United States strategic thinking surrounding the intelligence intercepted via radio.  It is this brutal and barbaric military plan that is the most important component of how and when the war in the Pacific ended.  Frank argument surrounds the issue of race once more.  He wrote that the Imperial Army and Navy officers had plunged the country into a war without an exit strategy.  He believes that the Japanese never sought to conquer the United States.  It was many of the Imperial officer’s belief that the “Americans” lacked racial purity and spiritual stamina, believing that they only possessed brittle morale. The Japanese were counting on American pity to force political leaders to negotiate an end to the war in terms that would be “favorable” to Japan[33].

            April 8, 1945 Imperial officers commenced the master plan for protecting the homeland and contiguous areas, Ketsu Go.  This unthinkable strategy had three distinctive features in its operation.  First, operations would not be aimed at destroying the enemy at the “water’s edge,” such as Normandy.  The Japanese Ketsu Go tactic would destroy the beachhead after the invasion had taken place.  The second became known as the devotion to tokko, a “special” or suicide tactic.  The attacks would take place by land, air, and sea.   The last and most astonishing part of the scheme was the amalgamation of civilian population.  The “National Resistance Program”, allowed Imperial commanders to call on any “able-bodied civilian,” regardless of gender to combat against the invading forces.   Frank believed that American leaders confronted the military realities that summer that mystified just how and when the war with the Japanese would end.  He asserted that it was the radio intelligence that gave the United States the knowledge of Ketsu Go they needed to comprehend how far the Japanese were going to drag this war before accepting surrender.  Frank’s final contribution to understanding why the war ended how it did, is confronting the harsh campaign the Japanese were ready to take to end the war with a favorable victory[34]. 

            Michael Kort described in his book, The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb, published in 2007, the decision to drop the bomb was the most critical and controversial resolution made in World War II.  Kort pointed out that the United Sates had already written the conclusion to use the bomb the day planning for the project began.  Kort noted that it should have been the assumption from the beginning that when the atomic bomb became available, and the war was still prolonging, the bomb would be dropped.  Kort’s second great addition to this debate is his challenge to the critics who claim that racism played a key factor in determining the bombs deployment against Japan.  Many skeptics try to argue that Truman would have never used the bomb against “white” Europeans.  Kort believed that it is the general consensus of many scholars that if the bomb had been available to defeat Germany that it would have been used.  He argued that the massive bombing campaigns the United States dropped on German cities as a counter to questioning if the United States was in fact basing their decision to use the bomb on racial issues.  Kort made an important declaration, stating that it was President Roosevelt who oversaw the Manhattan Project in response to the threat of Germany.   Germany was no longer a target to the United States by the fall of 1944.  With the Nazi party diminishing, the bomb would not be completed before their defeat[35].

            Kort identified a great argument in defining Japan as a legitimate target for the allies to use the new weapon against.  Kort wrote that from the end of 1944 up until the first bomb was dropped in August the next year; there was no drastic change in the war that would have made the United States question dropping the bomb.  Kort points out that in these devastatingly brutal months of war, Japan only helped reinforce the idea of using the bomb to speed up the end of the war.  From the American’s view point, they saw Japan approaching closer and closer to the home islands that had increased the wars battlefront.  The morale among the troops, and especially the United States civilians were very low due to the massive casualties from the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.  Kort pointed out two central influences that led the United States to use the bomb.  First, the United States and their allies were dedicated to the unconditional surrender policy to end the war.  Second, no American or ally could have predicted the immediate Japanese surrender from the dropping of one or two atomic bombs[36]. 

            Kort explains that the last important aspect when considering the Presidents final decision to deploy the bomb are the great internal stresses he was feeling, to drop the bomb or keep it allude?  The Presidents decision came at a time after horrible causalities had been taken at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, military soldiers and civilians morale was low, pressure from home to end the war as quickly as possible with the least loss of life was growing,  not to mention the new domestic issues the new President faced.  After the Presidents Potsdam Declaration on July 28^th, there was no longer a question.  Kort confirmed that the only factor that stood in front of the United States atomic bomb and Japan were a few technical problems for delivery and a target[37].

            J. Samuel Walker wrote in both Prompt & Utter Destruction and Historiographical Essay: Recent Literature on Truman’s Atomic Bomb Decision that he intended to be both a synthesis and an original contributor to the debate.  Walker does not define a definite yes or no to answering if the bomb was necessary.  Walker wrote that yes, the bomb was necessary to end the war at the earliest possible moment in the way to save American lives, perhaps numbering in the several thousands.  However, Walker also writes that no, the bomb was probably not necessary to end the war in a short amount of time before an invasion took place.  He also pointed out that the bomb did not save hundreds of thousands of American lives.  Walker notes that he based his uncertainty on the casualty estimations on the number of Army deaths in July of 1945.  Walker explained that in the last full month of the war, 775 Americans lost their lives in combat action, 2,458 died of other noncombatant origins.  Walker concluded that from these numbers, the war lasting only a few more short weeks, the United States could not have expected American casualties to range in the thousands.  Walker justified that in Truman’s mind he saw “a relatively small but far from inconsequential number” of American lives.  He believed this was a defensible reasoning to use the atomic bomb.  This new weapon “offered the way most likely to achieve an American victory on American terms with the lowest in American lives[38].”

            Walker portrayed himself and those alike as the “middle ground” historians, categorizing their own school of thought.  He explained these new age historians avoided the extremes of unalloyed traditionalism or revisionism on the use of the atomic bomb, although they often disagree on significant issues.  Walker gave an example in books by authors such has Hamby an Offner, showing how the middle ground covers a “wide spectrum” of opinions, which allowed a great deal of room for conflicting arguments.  The wide verities of scholars, who identify with this school of thought, conform from a large background: United States and Japanese historians, government historians, independent historians, and those nonhistorians whose professional training and personal backgrounds vary.   Walker explained that these historians generally agree that the traditionalist and revisionist interpretation of the atomic bomb that came about in the mid-1990s are insufficient to the true argument at hand[39].

            Walker emphasized that middle ground historians “generally” agree with the traditionalist explanation, that Truman used the bomb primarily to end the war quickly and save American lives; however, they reject that the President faced a direct decision between the bomb and an invasion.  Details of extremes are disagreed on, but most commonly agree that the war was likely to be over before an invasion would be necessary.   Many scholars such as Walker express great doubt and skepticism about Truman’s administration casualty estimations for a homeland invasion.  New sources have brought a great deal of damage to revisionist positions, such as the theory that Japan was ready to surrender on the condition that the Emperor remain on the throne.  Walker depicted the middle ground school as “ill-defined, precarious, and diverse,” although he believes that their contribution represents a “major historiographical milestone[40].”

            Walker explained that the questions about whether to use of the bomb was necessary are “perpetually inconclusive,” calling scholars theories “dependent on counterfactual analysis.”  Walker believed that Thomas W. Zeiler interpretation of the traditionalist and revisionist literature said it best, the debate “boils down to a guessing game and interpretation.”  Walker seemed to embrace the fact that the controversy over the use of the bomb will continue, due to questions that cannot be resolved because they require “speculation and extrapolation” from deficient facts.  Walker believed however, that new and recently revised research has formed a balanced position on the decision to drop the atomic bomb.  Walker wrote that by demonstrating the seriousness of the flaws in both traditionalist and revisionist work, the middle ground has provided a new point of view and made significant corrections to what he calls an “oversimplified and uncompromising” set of formulas that structured much of the historiographical and accepted debate[41].

            This author insists that it is time for scholars and historians of all background to once again reorganize their thoughts on the decision to drop the bomb.   The implication behind the decision to drop the bomb has focused primarily on “what if” and post war relations with the Soviets.  The twenty-first century world and security should put an entire new concept on the decision to take the world Nuclear.  As Michael Kort point out, the debate over the bombs might have settled down long ago had it not became part of the much larger postwar debate surrounding America’s international conquest.  The days before World War II, when the United States remained an isolated country had past.  With innovating technologies, such as long range bombers, and eventually intercontinental ballistic missiles, questions of security have become a factor for everyone.   Although every incident that the United States was involved in after World War II can be at much greater debate alone, it is crucial to evaluate the connections between the use of the atomic bombs dropped on Japan, and the way the United States projects its power today.  Problems that the United States faced after the eventual end of World War II were the containment of Soviet power, spreading communism throughout Europe, communist North Korea and South Korea conflict, communist expansion in Vietnam, and of course the nuclear arms race between the United States and the U.S.S.R.  It is time for historians to consider the connection between the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the United States reaction to Kosovo and Bosnia, the Gulf War, or the crisis that lead up to the war in Iraq in 2003.  Today, historians have a new line to interpret the question of nuclear power and post 9-11 Islamic extremists who may be sponsored by nations who have acquired nuclear weapons.  The United States decision can be linked to all these vital world issues, for the reason that this is when the debate is reevaluated of the use of America’s power, and to what extent the use of nuclear weapons can be justified in the defense of this country[42].

            Historian, scholars, students, and all intellectuals will never truly settle with how and when the United States chose to end the war in the Pacific.  There will be those who argue there were other military alternatives, and that the bomb was a diplomatic factor against the Soviets and not necessary to force Japan to surrender unconditionally.  There will be those such as the Veterans and the government who stand united beside the theory that the bomb was the only way to receive a speedy surrender, and that the intimidation the Soviets felt was only a bonus.  Kort explained it best, that in the end of debating the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is a matter of confronting what he calls the grim truth.  When dealing with international affairs there are no “ideal solutions” to major world crisis.  Nations can only respond and hope to survive with the least loss of human life as possible.  A nation must always leave itself in a position to manage with the next unavoidable calamity[43].

            Today’s most recent literature on the decision to use the atomic bomb has once again expanded and improved our comprehension, while at the same time brought a variety of new questions to the table. In the words of J. Samuel Walker, “the events that led to Hiroshima are so innately interesting, so vital to understanding subsequent developments, so politically and morally ambiguous, and so much a part of popular mythology that it seems certain that they will perpetually occupy the attention of and stir discord among scholars of World War II and the nuclear age.”  When someone deeply contemplates a great historic question such as, why did the United States drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki it is hard to react?  It is true however, the world today has still not come to terms with the consequences of a decision made sixty three years ago, ending the war in the Pacific[44].