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Benjamin T. Morris

Dr. Dan Morrill

The Atomic Bomb: To End World War II, Saving Thousands of Lives, and Limiting Soviet Influence

July 1, 2008

Historiography for Final Paper

The decision to drop the bomb has been one of the most controversial decisions of the 20^th century. As the decades have passed, debates surrounding this event are still continuously occurring to this day. If anything it continues to cultivate as more information has been released such as the letters written from President Truman to his family as well as his personal diary. The central focus of this heavily researched topic is the position how the United States used the atomic bomb with the main purpose of ending the war with Japan.  A secondary motivation behind the bombs use was the desire to prove the United States supremacy over the Soviet Union in a post World War II world.

The revisionist perspective is the most critical with the dropping of the atomic bomb. It disagrees with the belief that the atomic bomb was intended first and foremost to end the war in the Pacific.  This perspective favors the idea that, in the eyes of policy makers there truly was not an alternative to using the bomb. It supports the notion that it was a powerful diplomatic weapon against the Soviet Union in the post war era.  Gar Alperovitz is heralded for the label revisionist. In, Atomic Diplomacy, Hiroshima and Potsdam, the Use of the Atomic Bomb & American confrontation with Soviet Power, it discusses the strategy of the policymakers, keying on the atomic bomb potential political capabilities. Secretary of War Henry Stimson on April 25, 1945 reportedly said, “the bomb was “certain” to have a decisive influence on relations with other countries.”[i]President Truman had decided to wait to use the atomic bomb, his main strategy was to avoid a Soviet fait accompli in Poland, and establish a practical cooperative relationship in Germany. Alperovitz persuades the reader to believe that President Truman’s main objective of the atom bomb was to convey the military might of the United States to the Soviet Union and not to end the fighting with Japan.

Issues confronting the atomic bomb are complex. Evaluating the decision to use the bomb is exhaustive.  By no means was there one clear definitive motivation to why the bomb was dropped. Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed Hiroshima and Its Legacies, says, “The bomb must be seen as both scientists and policy makers saw it before Hiroshima; as possible of controlling the post war course in world affairs. For this the view point of the present is conceptually inadequate.”[ii] It is not fair to make such harsh criticism for the decision to use the bomb after the fact. Those confronted with making the final decision had to choose what the best short was and long term resolution, without knowing what the post bomb world would appear.

            Historians Ronald Takaki and J. Samuel Walker are centrists in their position of the atomic bomb decision.  In Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb Takaki references many issues that factor in the use of the bomb, such as; revenge for Pearl Harbor, racism, rising tensions with the Soviet Union, or President Truman’s “inferiority complex.”  Takaki understood the magnitude of the difficult decision. In his book he has the reader look at all the evidence impartially to comprehend its uniqueness.  J. Samuel Walker has a difficult time “choosing” sides in terms of the motive behind the atomic bomb. Walker acknowledges the alternative ambitions of the United States in dealing with the Soviet Union and believes that the bomb was dire to post war endeavors with the Soviet Union.

It was Herbert Feis who caught the fervor of the times when he wrote Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific.  In the text he praises the atomic bomb and its success in ending the war,[iii] liberating the United States, confidently looking towards the future. J. Samuel Walker made a few noteworthy statistics of Americans embracing the atomic bomb decision, a poll in August, 1945, showed that 85% of the respondents supported the decision to use the bomb, 10% opposed, and 5% were neutral. Pg. 98 It was a fairly overwhelming support, it met both of its criteria, to end the war with Japan and save thousands of American lives.

The writer makes a contribution to the scholarship in defending the position of the use of the bomb, primarily to end the war and save the lives of the United States and Japan. He believes that given the circumstances of the world and the potential power of the weapon it was a just cause. The writer understands the sacrifice of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had to occur to save thousands of lives from the endless fighting that had no end in sight. All the other possible alternatives were not certain in attaining peace.  The bomb was the best solution when looked at holistically from the short and long term for both the people of Japan and the United States

The battle over the decision to use a nuclear warhead in combat has been tirelessly debated.  It is a skeptical decision no matter where the author lies in terms of dropping the bomb. Certainly, the various viewpoints present strong arguments, challenging the very purpose of the bomb, saying it was used for a post war political gain. It is a controversial topic, multifaceted in that so many people and circumstances played into making “the call,” leaving the issue in many ways open for interpretation. However, it is difficult to argue against the simple fact that the decision to drop the atomic bomb ended the war in the Pacific and thus saved thousands of lives on both sides bringing an end to one of the world’s darkest moments in history.

The Atomic Bomb’s Essential Role to World War II

This writer contends that the decision to use the atomic bomb was justified in its effort to end World War II, save thousands of lives, and limit Soviet influence. Circumstances in 1945 brought the atomic bomb to the world stage, where it raised many questions.  War in the Pacific had grown tiresome and claimed thousands of lives, and the Japanese refused to surrender. Also during this period the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly uncooperative.  Considering the circumstances, releasing the nuclear weapon was essential for United States to attain an end to the war and subsequent peace.

            The potential ability of nuclear warheads to end the war ultimately persuaded even the most reluctant of minds to support its use. Two renowned scientists, Leo Szilard and Neils Bohr, were among those who initially feared its power but eventually realized that it was a necessary evil. According to historian Martin Sherwin, “they became justifiably renowned for their opposition to nuclear weapons, took the positioning during World War II that only by witnessing its destructive effects would people of the world become so appalled that future wars would be averted.”[iv] World War II became so destructive that even those experts who traditionally opposed the use of the atomic bomb came to support its use as a way to end the war and deter potential future wars from occurring. Szilard, with the assistance of Albert Einstein, also a pacifist, wrote a letter to Franklin Delano Roosevelt raising the issue of atomic energy and the potential of Germany creating a bomb. This letter provided the United States with the motivation to move forward and develop a powerful bomb before their opponents.

            Policy makers hoped the fear of the future destruction of the world, following the detonation of the atomic bomb would bring peace and diplomacy to the international community. It was anticipated that the threat from weapons proliferation would be so strong that people would avoid it in return for stability and world order, something that proved elusive in the first half of the 20^th century. The world had immersed itself in World War I in hopes of bringing order, which resulted in the loss of millions of lives and then gave birth to harsh war reparations and the Great Depression.  Then World War II erupted into a brutal battle disrupting stability worldwide. The atomic bomb was not only seen as a tool that could not put an end to the current, but the  destructive power of the atomic bomb was expected to have a deterrence effect causing countries to avoid war in the future, thereby bringing peace to the global community.  

            The intention of the bomb was first and foremost ending the savage fighting war with Japan.  The bomb had the ability to save countless American lives which would be lost in the case of an increasingly likely Japanese land invasion. Japan was a defiant opponent who was ruthless in its effort to overcome the United States. The war in the Pacific was a challenge foreign to anything the United States had ever encountered in warfare. Even though American militants had made progress in crippling  Japan’s economy and industrial capacity and bombed away the majority of Tokyo, the Japanese were adamant about “fighting to the death,” dismissing the notion of unconditional surrender.  The atomic bomb, with its destructive force, was the only means to deliver the powerful blow to destroy the Japanese fighting spirit and cease the brutal fighting.

If the atomic bomb was not used, it would have dramatically changed the course of both countries for decades. The United States would have had to pursue an invasion into Japan. Not only would countless American soldiers die in the invasion of a country that was seemingly willing to sacrifice everything rather than surrender, but the enormous human and economic costs would have resulted in massive domestic uproar and people questioning the credibility of U.S. military policy. For Japan, a land invasion by the United States would have meant the destruction of not only of its imperial system but also its cultural heritage. For example, the city of Kyoto, the very core of Japanese culture, would have almost certainly been among the military targets. The atomic bomb offered a different course of history that would end the war at lower costs for both countries. 

Brutality and cruelty were mainstays during the war in the Pacific. Much of this was escalated by to racist sediments between the two nations. The attack on Pearl Harbor and Japanese-American internment camps are two examples of this. Race was easily exploited and wartime propaganda in the United States encouraged these discriminative notions.[v]  However, after a lengthy war, Americans lost their fervor to continue fighting the Japanese and wanted more than anything for the war to end. The atomic bomb provided the fastest answer to that request.

            A deep resentment for one another heightened the brutality of the war. Issues of morality were disregarded as Japanese and American forces showed little mercy for the dead of their enemies. Tactics of decapitating American soldiers along with placing their severed penis’s in their mouths was a glaring example of how barbaric war became. In Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World, Tanaka describes the truly gruesome behavior of Unit 731, a minimally documented unit of the Japanese military. He notes that they committed atrocities that for the most part have been hidden from scholarship. For example, “They regarded fleas as the most useful vector for pathogens, especially the black plague. The shrapnel from the bombs were successful at spreading the bacillus, the fleas on the victim.”[vi] In addition to various forms of cannibalism, which was widespread amongst various Japanese militants, Unit 731 victimized their own, indigenous populations, and prisoners of war. The activities that the unit participated in were truly one of the low points in World War II’s epic tragedy. 

All of the bitterness and mutilation needed to end. The atomic bomb appeared as a possible “cure,” a medicine that had not been approved for production in the common market. It was a high risk, high reward. The United States was confident about its chances of bringing closure to the war in the Pacific. President Truman, as the Commander in Chief would be the individual who had the prescription to the disease of World War II.

            Despite the amount of casualties that would suffer from the dropping of atomic bombs, President Truman believed that the locations of the bombing could be chosen to minimize the causalities while still having the impact necessary to bring the government to surrender. In order for the atomic campaign to succeed, it had to take the lives of a significant number of people or it may have been deemed insignificant by Japanese officials.  However, it was not the mission to release the bomb over a strictly civilian setting. The targets were selected to destroy military and industrial infrastructure, resources, and enough civilians to force the government to surrender in acknowledgment of suffering the United States was capable of inflicting.

            The targets for the nuclear attack were decided in July, 1945, after careful consideration. According to Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, the possible target cities had been reviewed and densely populated urban centers were purposely avoided. He says in his recollection, “we determined the city of Kyoto, decided to spare it because of its significance in culture and art to the Japanese. However, Hiroshima, the headquarters of the Japanese Army defending southern Japan, was a major military storage and assembly point and Nagasaki, a major seaport, which contained several large industrial plants.”[vii] The Japanese’s military campaign would be ruptured in the process, theoretically, convincing the Emperor that his county could not be victorious “with its back against the wall.”

            The nuclear warhead that was to be used was exceedingly more powerful than any other weapon constructed in the history of the world. Such a bomb had arrived at the right moment in history, when the United States, along with the rest of the world was searching for an answer to global carnage that had been on display for the past five years. World War II had far surpassed anything the world had ever experienced in terms of the death toll. President Truman, according to Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb, elaborates on the technological advancement that the war had created, “technology was outpacing morality, morality would have to be updated to keep pace with technological change.” [viii] Truman later describes the optimism encompassed in the aura of the bomb, “Never in history has society been confronted with a power so full of promise for the future of man and for the peace of the world.”[ix]  Peace at this crossroad in the world was an exciting idea; the bomb was somewhat of a utopian tool to reach that goal.

Harry Truman was “put into the line of fire” politically. He resided in the shadow of President Roosevelt for whom he served as Vice President for less than three months, and then was unexpectedly required to make an “atomic decision” to which he was alien. The world was in a hostile climate, repercussions of war had ravaged every continent. His country longed to secure victory in the war. The alliance with the Soviet Union had also begun to diminish. In acknowledging this relationship, it was apparent that they would become the post-war competitors.

There are those who argue that the Soviet Union was of main strategic importance to the United States, and that the atomic bomb was used merely to intimidate the Soviet Union. A leader of this theory is Gar Alperovitz, author of Atomic Diplomacy, Hiroshima and Potsdam, the Use of the Atomic Bomb & American confrontation with Soviet Power, who believed the atomic bomb was primarily used by the United States to show its star power to the Soviet Union and Japan was merely the location to see it displayed.[x] While intimidating the Soviet Union was certainly a motive for dropping the bombs, it was not the primary motive. As commander-in-chief, it was in President Truman’s greatest political interest was to end the war as soon as possible with the fewest casualties as possible. The atomic bomb offered that opportunity. Ending the war was the primary goal, but it was not a secret amongst those affiliated with the atomic bomb that it was established for multiple opponents.

President Truman was aware of Joseph Stalin’s ambitions to expand Soviet influence abroad. As the new commander in chief, Truman had minimal experience in foreign policy, but seemed confident when discussing issues with Russians because he thought it was vital that the Russians did not become relaxed with the transition in command. As Takaki explains, “Winston Churchill noticed a more confident Truman, whose country had the atomic bomb, the fact that the weapon was in his possession, showed when discussing matters with the Soviets. The Prime Minister Molotov expressed his discontent with the American President, saying that he had never been spoken to so harshly in his life.”[xi] It was clear that the United States and the Soviet Union were quickly shifting from allies to competitors. The world’s two remaining superpowers were about to enter a different kind of battle, the battle for world supremacy, and Truman understood that the possession and demonstration of the atomic bomb would give the United States an edge in that competition. Still, the bomb’s primary purpose was to end the war.

Although President Truman is remembered for his use of the nuclear warhead, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt could have just as likely used it in hopes of ending the war. It was under President Roosevelt where the majority of the development had been conducted. Truman simply continued it, reasoning that the advancement of the weapon was in the best interest of the country.  In fact, President Truman’s relative inexperience in foreign affairs contributed to him adopting the policies of his predecessor. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was aware of the wartime climate, acknowledging the benefits of a nuclear warhead. To him it was an intriguing weapon and he decided to have it built and keep its matters secret to those outside of his advisers. When Truman took over office, he “was confined politically, psychologically, and institutionally, from critically reassessing this legacy.”[xii] In addition, Harry Truman did not want to lose the support of the American public that had embraced Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It also was imperative for him to have America committed to him, especially, with the use of the bomb in the near future.

Under President Roosevelt, the attack on Pearl Harbor sped up the development of the atomic bomb. It became evident that American soil was not exempt from the destruction that had toiled across the globe. Never before “the day that will live in infamy,” had a country led a successful military attack in American soil. The United States needed to take drastic measures to let the world know it would not been taken lightly. The atomic bomb would do just that. It was a weapon so powerful that it could strike fear in any opposing country. Pearl Harbor also began the hostility between Americans and the Japanese. However, it was not this resentment that led to the decision to use the atomic bomb and a response of revenge was not justifiable. Rather, the decision was difficult for President Truman. After the blast at Hiroshima and the following attack on Nagasaki, which was not at his command, Takaki found that President Truman spoke with Henry Wallace saying that, “he could not think of killing another 100,000 people was too horrible, he did not like the idea of taking the lives of so many children, many days afterward he complained of terrible headaches.”xi Thus the heart wrenching decision was not made with revenge in mind, but rather with the end to the war as the objective.

To potentially end the war in an extremely short period of time was enticing to others besides the President. Soldiers had suffered significant losses from casualties and were confronted with psychological scars, having seen the remains of thousands of their fallen comrades who were tortured or dismembered.  To them an end to the war could not come sooner. Also, families of soldiers were anxiously waiting for the war to end in hopes that soldiers would make it home alive. American public in general was also ready for the long war to be over, so the economy and country could return to normal.  

Even though Japan was gradually weakening as of July and August of 1945, the government refused to surrender. As the Allied forces came closer to mainland Japan, it became inevitable that they would need to invade the island, engaging in fierce combat. The Japanese military would fight “tooth and nail” knowing that they were the last line of defense. They vowed to fight to the death, inflicting as much suffering as possible on the American forces in the process. At the same time, if the nuclear bomb was not dropped, the United States would have had to inflict enormous damage on Japan in a land invasion. The entire country would have been susceptible to air strikes similar to that of Tokyo in March of 1945. Unfortunately, it would be the civilians who would experience the brunt of these attacks which were conducted in major metropolitan areas. The bomb, therefore, had the capability of lessening the casualties on both sides by ending the war quickly instead of allowing it to drag on indefinitely. In a sense, the unfortunate victims of the powerful bomb would be sacrificed in order to save a greater number of people from both countries.

The fighting in the Pacific against the Japanese had already proven to be among the fiercest of the war. Thousands of troops had been slaughter in a few brutal battles. The battle of Okinawa, the largest amphibious invasion of the Pacific campaign, was a pivotal island in gaining control in preparation for invasion of the main island.[xiii] At this point, in June 1945, the grave losses at Okinawa left the United States in search of a quick solution to end the war, and the possession of an atomic warhead was underway. A consensus feeling throughout the country left a strong impression on President Truman, Robert Oppenheimer, and Leslie Groves in their attitude towards using the weapon if it was necessary.

A the Potsdam Conference, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union discussed issues dealing with Japan post-war settlements. Stated in the meetings was a warning to Japan demanding their unconditional surrender and threatening devastation if they refused. Typical bombings had already crippled Japanese infrastructure, so the Japanese may have interpreted the warning as simply meaning more bombings campaigns. However, Cynthia Kelly in the Manhattan Project mentions that on July 25, 1945 “Japan was called for immediate unconditional surrender; otherwise, the allies said there would be ‘prompt and utter destruction.’”[xiv] Thus the magnitude of the threat was unclear.

The response by Japanese Premier Baron Kantaro Suzuki indicated to those in the West that the Japanese would not “unconditionally surrender” as recommended to them at Potsdam. On July 28, he stated that the Japanese would “continue war with full application of military power, backed by our resolve, , will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably, the utter destruction of the Japanese homeland.””[xv]From a strategic point of view detonating “the secret weapon” on Japan was a more attractive option for ending the war than continuing the war indefinitely with a country willing to fight to the death. As indicated by Premier Suzuki, Japan did not express signs of surrender or relaxation in his response to the Potsdam recommendation of “unconditional surrender,” even amidst threats of great destruction. Even though victory was all but assured for the United States, Japan’s refusal to stop meant that a final end to the war was not attainable without, as Premier Suzuki mentioned, the ruination and deaths of millions of the Japanese soldiers and civilians. Indeed, the Japanese had made up in their minds that, in the spring and summer of 1945, death was inevitable for them and they would inflict as staggering affliction on American forces as they possibly could. The Kamikaze suicide tactic exemplified this ideology, as the participants in these missions were revered as martyrs for their country. The words of Premier Suzuki thus encouraged the United States to resort to the atomic bomb as it offered a less costly way to end the war than the dragged out ruthless warfare that Japan promised to continue.

There was a consensus feeling among the prominent American officials charged with decision making that the atomic bomb was the best approach in such dire circumstances. Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, and President Truman all became increasingly convinced that it was the best option. J. Samuel interprets Stimson’s recommendation to President Truman to use the bomb saying, “The bomb is needed to spare the lives of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers, along with saving the lives of thousands of Japanese boys and millions more of the Japanese people.”[xvi] On paper, the decision seemed clear, the potential afflictions of continuing the war were immense and no other strong alternative emerged. It became obvious that the reality of the war was that thousands of people had to die in order to save countless thousands more and restore global peace.

The atomic bomb’s power of human obliteration could not be minimized; and with this power it offered an opportunity for a peaceful world. Theoretically, war would come to an end in response to the fear of nuclear warfare, and millions of lives and resources would be saved as a result. An enduring support of this belief is noted by Dr. Dan Morrill, stating that, “more people had died during World War II (1939-1945) than the entire post war era from combat in the 63 years that followed.”[xvii] In actuality, fear grew from the power of a nuclear arms race, and not one nuclear warhead has been used in combat ever since Fat Man landed in Nagasaki on that fateful August 9^th, 1945 day. To members of the public, it may have seemed as a barbaric, subhuman act, but it was a sacrifice that the United States had to make to halt the barbarity that was occurring in the war in the Pacific. It was an attempt to save both countries from increasingly unbearable costs of war, salvage Japan from the brink of annihilation, and discourage such wars from occurring in the future.

Although the primary objective in using the atomic bomb was to end the war, as previously mentioned, the post-war relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union provided a secondary motivation for the bomb’s use. Amidst the great debate in reference to the atomic bomb with Japan lie the escalating complications of foreign affairs with the Soviet Union. Policy toward the Soviets changed throughout the war. Initially, the West was encouraged by the idea that the Soviets would be entering the war against Japan which they hoped would bring a shortened period of war. Unfortunately, as time passed the thought of Russian intervention dissatisfied Western expectations. Japanese and Soviet regimes were similar in that both of them frowned upon freedom and democracy, the very ideals that the West represented. Alternatively, the United States disapproved of both regimes for their ideology, purges and degradation of human beings at home and abroad. Thus the United States feared Soviet influence in Japan after the war. The United States did not want the Soviets to enter Manchuria and on into Japan because Josef Stalin did not hide his ambitions to expand Soviet influence and communism throughout the world. The bomb therefore provided a way to end the war before the Soviets could get to Japan and also acted as an instrumental bargaining tool with the Soviet Union in the post-war decades.

Additionally, the Soviets were pushing for a weaker set of war reparations in Japan. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union did not demand anything short of “unconditional surrender” from Japan. The Soviets were in favor of allowing the political system headed by the Emperor to remain in tact, something to which the United States was adamantly opposed. In fact, destroying the Japanese political system was a primary objective of the United States throughout the war. This partly stemmed from Japan’s discriminative behavior toward the Chinese. Mark Seldon, Voices From Hiroshima, explains that while Japan was the victim in the cases of the nuclear attacks, it was the aggressor that inflicted large dosages of suffering on the Chinese people, exemplified by the bombing of Shanghai, the rape of Nanjing and the attacks on the civilians[xviii] Japan’s harsh treatment of prisoners of war also provided incentive to remove Imperial system in Japan.  It was therefore imperative to the United States that Japan surrender unconditionally so the U.S. could set the terms of how post war Japan would operate. Using the atomic bomb to end the war before the Soviets got to Japan would make this more easily accomplished.

The United States was also adamant about addressing provisions over land. The Japanese government attempted to secretly establish an agreement that would grant them ownership of Manchuria as well additional lands in Northern China, and would grant independence to European colonies Japan had conquered.[xix]  The atomic bomb would provide the United States with power to over these land issues as well as furure issue in the post-war world.  

Another area that placed strain on the Soviet-United States affairs was economic aid. The United States sympathized with the Soviet Union, in view of the fact that its country had taken a beating from the war. It made sense for the strong ally to come to the others aid, which the United States had been doing by implementing the Lend Lease Program. However, the Soviet Union was distributing its aid in an unorthodox way that raised concerns in the United States. The Russians were perceived to be taking advantage of American openhandedness. Industrial equipment that was believed to fulfill much of the needs for the USSR was not being adequately used, often even being sold to other countries in hopes of enhancing relationships in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. [xx] This frustrated United States officials, weakening their trust in the Soviet Union. More importantly, it provided proof of Soviet post-war ambitions to expand its sphere of influence. In this way, the United States received further motivation to progress with the development of the atomic bomb, as it would serve as a powerful diplomatic arsenal in the face of communism in the post-war world.

            Further straining relations was the Soviets failure to adhere to the Yalta Agreement, an agreement of democratic policies in Poland and the Soviet Union’s entrance in the war in Pacific following Germany’s surrender. This seriously hurt the Soviet Union’s credibility, and its commitment in approaching the Japan issue was loose. President Truman in April of 1945 rebuked Prime Minister Molotov for the Soviet’s inaction towards arrangements stated at Yalta.

According to Truman the Soviets were not expressing characteristics that merited his country’s support, which made the creation of nuclear warheads more complex as the relationship was headed south. Under the former Roosevelt administration the Soviets had too much leeway. At this point they needed to be checked, and the bomb would provide the ability to do just that.

Stalin’s inaction towards nuclear energy production gave the West the belief that the USSR, would not be able to compete with the United States initially within the international forum. He was not reported as discussing the carrying a nuclear weapon, or participating in its proliferation. In the beginning of the war Roosevelt was not proactive in his pursuit of an atomic bomb, and Stalin did not think that Truman would display policies that contrasted that of Roosevelt. However, Stalin failed to realize that both presidents became increasingly open over time to the idea of using the atomic bomb as a necessary solution to ending the war. Vladislav Zubok in “Atomic Works on a Russian Scale,” questions Stalin, indicating that his arrogance prior to Hiroshima was one of his greatest mistakes as he was reluctant to confide in many of his leading officials or scientists.[xxi] This was excellent news to the West, in knowing the lack of progress and theoretical obstacles the Soviets faced in developing nuclear weapons, and the United States appeared geared for success in their democratic ambitions.

            With the United States and the Soviet Union careful watching every move of the other, tensions grew greater. The Soviet mishandling the United States’ economic aid, its intensified effort to develop communism elsewhere in the world, and its failure to honor the Yalta Agreement were precursors to the inevitable Cold War. If the atomic bomb had not been developed, it is all but certain that these two superpowers would have declared all out war on one another. It was the Weapon of Mass Destruction that kept them for coming to those circumstances. The United States anticipated this situation and put great trust in the ability of the atomic bomb to deter war.

Overall, in confronting the complexities of war, dealing with the consequences of not using the atomic bomb was not feasible. The challenges that were presented from Japan, along with the Soviet Union, were significant. The decision to halt the war was essential.  Michael Shermin, A World Destroyed Hiroshima and Its Legacies,, supports this notion, “in light of the alternatives which on fair estimate were open to us,  I believe in our position and subject to our responsibilities, a weapon with such possibilities could not be denied.”[xxii] 

The bomb was essential to restoring order, despite extensive claims that believe otherwise. Estimations as to how close the Japanese were to surrender are far from concrete. It was unknown, how fixed the Emperor Hirohito, or even Suzuki, were in their commitment for the country to fight to the death. The Japanese were extremely obedient citizens to Hirohito and his representatives, giving strong reason to believe that the civilians, regardless of the hardships they encountered, were willing to support the Emperor. The country did in the end powerfully back Hirohito’s decision to surrender and submit to the Western demands of war. Thus there is no reason to believe that Japan would not have stuck to its word and continued to fight in the face of destruction. As such, the atomic bomb was necessary in assuring a quick and less costly end to the war. It was also a necessary bargaining chip in the increasingly confrontation realtions with the Soviet Union.            

            The hope vested in the bomb over 60 years ago reigns true. Since August 9, 1945, the attack on Nagasaki, there has not been another nuclear attack. A fear of a “World War III” keeps countries reluctant to use the weapons. Unfortunately, is has not discouraged the globe from increasing their stock. It is a widely accepted belief that ownership of nuclear weapons is a sign of prestige. The proliferation of the weapons was a fear that policymakers envisioned possibly occurring. In many ways the post-war perceptions prior to Hiroshima and Nagasaki may appear as wishful thinking. However, the end result of the use of the bomb appears to be better than if the bomb not had been used.

            The atomic bomb captured a unique position in history in its ability to halt the lengthening of World War II, deter future human suffering, demise an exploitative political structure, and halt Soviet expansion, all in pursuit of a peaceful post-war world. It was a compelling weapon. The implications of the nuclear warhead were foreign to any other weapon that had been known to man. It was believed that using the atomic bomb would demonstrate its destructive power thereby encouraging the world to do whatever necessary to avoid such destruction in the future and maintain peace. The use of the atomic bomb was justified by its objectives to first and foremost end the war and save lives, and to secondly limit Soviet influence in the post-war world. Ultimately, the United States carefully calculated that the thousands of Japanese lives that would be lost to the atomic bomb were necessary sacrifices that would save a greater number of American and Japanese lives by ending the war immediately, and would also save future people from the horrors experienced during World War II. At the same time, the bomb detonation would provide bargaining power of the Soviet Union in the decades to come.