|
This writer contends that the dropping of atomic bombs over Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was unfortunately a necessary evil.
In order to bring the war in the Pacific to a speedy conclusion and save
many American and Japanese lives, deployment of the atomic bombs was a
necessary course of action. The use of the atomic bomb was very versatile,
not only did it bring the war to a close but it was also used to intimidate
the imperialist nation of Soviet Union. The creation of the atomic bomb and
the decision for its exploitation remains to be one of the greatest
accomplishments of mankind.
For one to understand the great importance of the decision to
release the bombs one must first understand the decision to initiate the
research program in which created of the bomb.
World War II was a very hostile,
brutal war.
The thought of Nazi Germany creating an atomic bomb is what sparked the
United States interest in rapidly creating nuclear warheads.
In 1933,
a Hungarian physicist named Leo Szilard realized the possibility of a
nuclear chain reaction releasing energy within an atom.
Without the knowledge of which particular element would create a chain
reaction,
Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman were able to split a uranium atoms.
This was the beginning of the race to create nuclear warheads.
In 1939 Leo Szilard convinced Albert Einstein to write a letter to President
Franklin D.
Roosevelt informing him of the possibility of creating nuclear weapons and
that Germany may already have a nuclear research program underway.
(Kelly, 17)
“It may be possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in large
mass of uranium by which vast amounts of power and large quantities of new
radium-like elements would be generated.” “This phenomenon would also lead
to the construction of bombs and it is conceivable-though much less certain-
that extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be constructed.” “To
speed up experimental work by providing funds” “I understand that Germany
has actually stopped the sale of uranium from the Czechoslovakian mines
which she has taken over. That she should have taken such early action
might perhaps be understood on the ground that the son of the German
Under-Secretary of State, von Weizsacker, is attached to the
Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute in Berlin where some of the American work on
uranium in now being repeated.” (Kelly, 43-44)
The above passage is from Albert Einstein’s letter to President Roosevelt in
reference to discovery of nuclear energy and the implications it may have on
the war. This letter was a decisive factor in determining to speed up the
research of atomic energy.
The United States wanted to have an atomic bomb in their possession prior to
any other country, especially an axis power. Possession of a bomb would
give the United States diplomatic power against other countries in case of a
nuclear threat. Otto Frisch and Rudolph Peierls stressed that if Germany had
possession of an atomic bomb, “No shelters are available that would be
effective….The
most effective reply would be a counter-threat with a similar bomb.”
(Kelly, 18)
In 1941 Roosevelt approved a full fledge research project under
Dr. Vannevar Bush. Once realized that such a bomb was possible Roosevelt
and his advisors expanded the project to work on developing the atomic bombs.
The small research program of 1939 soon became a multi-billion dollar
engineering project and by 1942 the Manhattan Project was born and fully
underway. The project was now given to the War Department and placed
under control of Brigadier General Leslie Groves. This project was kept
secret from the public population, most member of congress and even cabinet
members.
(Bernstein, VII-VII)
The bomb became reality in July of 1945 in Alamogordo, New
Mexico. On this date in Alamogordo, the first nuclear explosion took
place. Los Alamos Laboratory Director J. Robert Oppenheimer left the
shelter with a totally revised attitude. “We knew the world would not be
the same,” he stated. “A few people laughed, a few people cried.” (Takaki,
15) What was once thought impossible less than a century ago had been
transformed into a weapon of mass destruction. The accomplishment was even
bigger than expected; the success of the research was put on display during
the Alamogordo as noted by Henry Stimson:
“And
what an Explosion!” The blast illuminated the sky. “For a brief period
there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to sever suns
in midday; a huge ball of fire was formed which lasted for several seconds,”
in a blaze of colors, “golden, purple, violet, gray and blue,” lighting
“every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range,” the exploding
ball “mushroomed” and “rose to a height over ten thousand feet.” (Takaki,
14)
The United States wanted to stay one step ahead of the rest of
the world in atomic research. They did not know what stage Germany and the
Soviet Union were at throughout the war but the United States kept a sense
of urgency and a strong will to complete the bomb before anybody else.
Little did they know that the Germans were not yet involved in atomic
research. In 1942, Hitler said that it would take three to four years to
develop an atomic bomb and the decision was made to “scuttle” the project.
“The German scientist Werner Heisenberg stated that he and his fellow
physicists were “spared the decision as to whether or not they should aim at
producing atomic bombs.””
(Takaki, 18)
The Soviet Union was also far behind the United States when it came to
atomic research. It wasn’t until September 23, 1949 that President Truman
first announced that the Soviet Union had successfully deployed its first
atomic bomb.
(Takaki, 68)
The scientific breakthrough that would forever change the world
was the discovery of fission of uranium atoms. The breakthrough of fission
and the transformation of this atomic energy into a massive bomb remains to
be an imperative accomplishment for all of mankind.
The test bombing at Alamogordo was very important to Truman. Truman
postponed the Potsdam Conference, where he would meet with Joseph Stalin and
Winston Churchill, until after the testing on July 15th. Truman
knew that the outcome of the testing would heavily influence his
conversations with Stalin. Truman was now faced with another intricate
decision. Does he tell the Soviet Union about the bomb or do he and Winston
Churchill keep it a secret from the Soviets. If he was to tell the Soviets
about the bomb he feared an immediate crash program by Russia to develop a
atomic bomb of their own. They also feared that it would be very dangerous
for Truman to keep it a secret from Stalin. If they shared the information
with the Soviets they might be able to avoid a massive arms race with Soviet
Union and turn atomic technology over to international control. Two schools
of thought arose, the Quid-Pro-Quo strategy or the Monopoly strategy. This
was one thing Truman had to settle before making the decision for deployment
of the bombs.
(Takaki, 57-58)
At this point in time the United States had sole control of the technology
and resources needed to build the bomb but it was certain that the U.S.
would not be able to hold monopoly over this weapon forever.
If the decision was made to tell other nations of the new technology, the
question of how and under what terms then needed to be addressed.
Henry Stimson had doubts that any one organization could control such chaos
atomic bombs might cause.
Stimson’s “quid pro quo” strategy outlined that the Soviets in exchange for
nuclear secrets might agree to some of the American demands.
Truman and the United States were quite concerned with Soviet Union
expansionism and perhaps the Soviets would work with the United States if
nuclear secrets were shared. (Takaki, 59-60)
The Russians were planning world conquest and during the Potsdam conference,
Truman was getting nowhere in negotiation with Stalin concerning Soviet
expansionism. In fear of an atomic arms race the Interim Committee urged
Truman to tell Stalin of the new nuclear weapon the U.S. had in its
possession. The Committee thought that this directness with Stalin would
have a positive effect on the postwar world. They thought that the new
technology would become, “a substantial aid in preserving the peace of the
world rather than a weapon of terror and destruction.” (Takaki, 60-61)
Unknown to Truman, Stalin already knew about the atomic weapon, he had been
receiving information from his spies concerning the bomb. During the
conference Truman decided to take the monopoly strategy. He decided not to
tell the Soviets about the bomb and its destructive power shown at
Alamogordo. During the conference Truman did mention, “a new weapon of
unusual destructive force.” And Stalin simply replied that he was glad to
hear the news and that he hoped the U.S. would make “good use of it against
the Japanese.” (Takaki, 61)
Truman’s ultimate decision was that of the monopoly strategy. He thought it
was in the United States best interest to keep the technology of the atomic
bomb a secret. Truman’s decision was backed up by Secretary of State, James
F. Byrnes. Byrnes figures that the Soviets would not be able to build a
bomb of their own for another seven to ten years and that the U.S. would be
able to use the bomb to achieve diplomatic power. Byrnes thought that the
use of the bomb would not only end the war but intimidate Russia as well and
challenge Soviet expansionism. “Our possession and demonstrating the bomb
would make Russia more manageable in Europe.” He argued, “The demonstration
of the bomb might impress Russia with America’s military might.” (Takaki,
62)
General Leslie Groves also agreed with the monopoly strategy. Groves’s main
purpose for using the bomb in a “battle test” against the Japanese was to
discourage the Russians. “There was never from about two weeks from the
time I took charge of this project (Manhattan Project), any illusion on my
part but that Russia was our enemy, and the project was conducted on that
basis. I didn’t go along with the attitude of the country as a whole that
Russia was a gallant ally.” (Takaki, 63)
Like Groves, many others saw a reasonable purpose for the deployment of the
bombs but for different reasons. Unlike groves, many policymakers believed
that the best reason for dropping the bomb was to end the war in pacific as
soon as possible. The opportunity to end the war without invasions of Japan
would save many American lives. Along with saving lives it was also argued
that the bomb would be a technological demonstration that would warn the
world of the terrible effects that atomic warfare can have. This would make
the world aware of the tremendous power of the bombs and provide a precedent
for future wars. Interim Committee member Arthur Compton saw the bomb as a
force for the good.
“What
a tragedy it was that this power should become available first in time of
war and that it must first be used for human destruction. If however, it
would result in the shortening of the war and the saving of lives---if it
would mean bringing us closer to the time when war would be abandoned as a
means of settling international disputes --- here must be our basis for
courage. If the bomb were not used in the present war, the world would have
no adequate warning as to what was to be expected if war should break out
again.” (Takaki, 64-65)
With the new technology of the bomb President Truman did not need Russia to
enter the war against Japan in order to end it. With the Russians in the
war in the Pacific, the U.S. was scared that it would hurt their postwar
interests. “Neither the President nor I,” Byrnes said, “were anxious to
have them [the Russians] enter the war after we had learned of this
successful test.” Byrnes was talking about the successful test at
Alamogordo. They were concerned that once Russia enters the war that it
would lead to greater Russian expansionism that the U.S. feared so much.
The war with Japan had to be ended as soon as possible. (Takaki, 65-67)
With monopolization course of action taken with advisors backing him up,
Truman’s next and most troubling decision would have to be made. The choice
for deployment of the bombs over Japan would be the toughest most
controversial decision Truman would ever have to make.
President Roosevelt was responsible for enabling the Manhattan Project and
after his death on April 12, 1945 the Vice President Harry Truman was thrown
into the presidency with little knowledge concerning the atomic bomb.
President Roosevelt’s ultimate goal in the Pacific war was to achieve
unconditional surrender; the war had to be won on U.S. terms. After the
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, in an annual message to congress Roosevelt
stated, “There never has been – there never will be – successful compromise
between good and evil. Only total victory can reward the champions of
tolerance, and decency, and faith.” President Roosevelt also stated,
“Practically all Germans deny the fact they surrendered in the last war, but
this time they are going to know it. And so are the Japs.” (Takaki, 34-35)
This goal of unconditional surrender played a major role in the final
decision to deploy bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Roosevelt was very clear on what needed to be done and how the war needed to
end. He was not going to cooperate with the enemy in any way. This war
needed to be ended on United State’s terms with no compromising. President
Truman did however remain true to the former president’s foreign policies
and his commitment to achieve unconditional surrender from the axis powers
of World War II. After the war in Europe ended, Truman informed the
American people on what needed to be done with the in the Pacific.
“The
Japanese people have felt the weight of our land, air and naval attacks. So
long as their leaders and the armed forces continue the war, the striking
power and intensity of our blows will steadily increase, and will bring
utter destruction to Japan’s industrial war production, to its shipping, and
to everything that’s supports its military activity…. Our blows will not
cease until the Japanese military and naval forces lay down their arms in
unconditional surrender.” (Takaki, 35)
Winston Churchill was not in total agreement with Truman’s commitment to
unconditional surrender. Churchill thought that the United States should
not enforce it strictly. Churchill new that the Japanese would fight to the
end and that would cause “tremendous cost in American and to a smaller
extent in British life.” (Takaki, 35) Churchill thought that the terms
should be expressed in a way that might save some the Japanese military
honor and secure future peace and security. Churchill informed Truman that
the Japanese had “something for which they were ready to face certain death
in very large numbers, and this might not be so important to us as it is to
them .” Truman stubbornly rejected Churchill’s proposal. (Takaki, 36)
Truman’s commitment to unconditional surrender was also opposed by Secretary
of State Joseph Grew.
Grew warned Truman that unconditional surrender would make the
Japanese people desperate which would directly correlate to a dramatic
increase in American casualties. The United States would be threatening
Japanese culture by forcing the removal of their Emperor. In Japanese
culture, the Emperor was a divine being, a direct descendant from the gods.
Grew argued that the U.S. should let the Japanese “save face” and let them
determine their own government after the war.
A conditional surrender had been proposed by the cabinet that would allow
for the continuation of their emperor as head of state.
Truman gave this a great amount of consideration until he was informed of
the successful testing at Alamogordo. With this new weapon of mass
destruction, Truman knew he now had the power to force Japan into total
submission. In the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, Truman provided Japan
with an ultimatum, “unconditional surrender” or face “utter devastation of
the Japanese homeland.” (Takaki, 38)
It is a constant argument that the decision cannot be morally justified.
This was a terribly difficult decision that had to be made. Truman’s
decision ultimately weighed on the fact that by ending the war quickly and
without an invasion would save many American lives. In order to morally
justify releasing the bombs on two Japanese cities that would cause many
casualties, Truman put the war in the Pacific into context.
Truman realized that the war was very vicious. The fighting by the Japanese
was very relentless, merciless,
and that the
Imperial army of the Japanese continually committed inhumane war crimes
prior and throughout WWII.
One of the first and most extreme examples of the war crimes committed by
the Japanese was the Rape of Nanjing.
When the imperial Japanese army took over the Chinese city of Nanjing, many
prisoners of war and civilians were killed, especially women and children.
The Japanese forces committed many crimes.
Theft, arson and rape became a common act committed towards the Chinese
population. The raping of women became very common and punishment would be
given when they refused the Japanese soldiers.
The Nanking massacre was described by American missionary James McCallum,
“Never have I heard or read of such brutality. Rape! Rape! Rape! We
estimate at least 1,000 cases a night, and many by day. In case
resistance…there is a bayonet stab or bullet. We could write up hundreds of
cases a day.” (Tanaka, 80) Iver Mackey was a British resident living in
Nanjing and recounts the following information regarding the crimes
committed by the Japanese.
“On the night of December 15 a number of Japanese soldiers
entered the University of Nanking buildings at Tao Yuen and raped 30 women
on the spot, some by six men…. At 4 p.m. on December 16 Japanese soldiers
entered the residence at 11 Mokan Road and raped the women there. On
December 17 Japanese soldiers went into Lo Kia Lu No. 5, raped four women
and took one bicycle, bedding and other things…. On December 17 near Yuan a
young girl after being raped was stabbed by a bayonet in her abdomen. On
December 17at Sian Fu Wua a women of 40 was taken away and raped. On
December 17 in the neighborhood of Kyih San Yuin Lu two girls were raped by
a number of soldiers. From a primary school at Wu Tai Shan many women were
taken away and raped for the whole night and released the next morning,
December 17.” (Tanaka, 80)
Japanese researchers estimate that approximately 100,000 –
200,000 people were killed during the Japanese occupation of Nanjing. Other
nations believe the death toll can more accurately be approximated at
150,000 – 300,000 people. (www.wikipedia.com)
The Japanese did not show any remorse for the captured prisoners
of war. Originally the POW’s were used for physical labor. The Sandakan
airfield had been damaged by continual allied bombings. The POW’s were used
to repair the airfield after each attack but this was discontinued due to
persistent bombings. Due to ever invading Americans, the Japanese decided
upon a reorganization of the Island’s defenses. Three battalions stationed
at Sandakan were forced to march westward toward Api. The Japanese used 500
healthy POW’s as supply carriers. They would end their journey near Api and
be stationed at a new camp. This relocation of the POW’s became known as
the death marches. The 500 POW’s were divided into nine smaller groups, and
were sent out one group out at a time. The Japanese had supply points
stationed along the chosen path which would supply the POW’s with more food
rations and offer resting points. The Japanese soon realized that they did
not have enough food to for the nine groups. As each group was sent on the
march, the food situation continued to get worse. The second group to leave
Sandakan contained 50 POWs and 49 soldiers and after only 17 days, 15 POWs
had died. (Tanaka, 47-49)
POW’s also faced a great chance of getting shot or left behind.
The malnourished POW’s would often fall ill or just be too weak to keep up
with the main group. These soldiers would often be left behind to die or
shot to death. Japanese Privates were often ordered to shoot the POW’s who
could not go on. A Testimony from Private Endo provides evidence that
shooting POWs and leaving them behind to die was a common course of action
on during the march.
“Those of them that were too ill to travel at all we were
instructed by lieutenant Abe to kill. Shortly after leaving Boto another
one of the POW’s became too ill to continue the march. Private Sato and
myself under the orders of S/M Sato then took the POW into the jungle at the
side of the track and shot him. Between Boto and Paginatan a further nine
POWs died. The first four were left with Private Sato and then later I was
left with a party of five. These five men were sick and suffering a great
deal. Although my orders from Lieutenant Abe were to kill them I did not
have the heart to do such a thing, and so left them behind, without food and
water, to die. Looking back now and remembering how ill the POWs were I it
might have been more humane to have killed them and buried them before going
on.” (Tanaka, 51)
After the second march from Sandakan, there remained 288 POWs at Sandakan.
Most of these soldiers were too weak to have participated in the march.
These POWs had not been given any medicines or food since the marches
departed and many had acquired deadly diseases such as malaria. A majority
of the remaining POWs were either shot by the Japanese or sent on other
marches to die, 75 of the remaining 288 POWs were sent on a 260-kilometer
march to Ranau. All that is known of these POWs is that they died or were
killed within the first 50 kilometers of the march. The POWs who were not
massacred at Sandakan airfield, died from the lack of medicine needed to
fight the deadly tropical diseases. (Tanaka52-66)
The Japanese would also use inhumane biological warfare that would spread
terrible diseases. Unit 731 was a secret biological warfare unit set up in
Manchukuo, China. This unit would research, develop, produce, and test
biological weapons. The Geneva Convention prohibited the use of chemical
and bacteriological weapons in 1925. Japan obviously had plans to ignore
the convention as they began to seek out all bacteria and viruses that could
prove as useful weapons. Many faculty members of the military medical
school were sent to unit 731 to be involved in developing biological
weapons. In the northeastern part of China various methods were developed
for the spread of biological weapons such as contaminating the local water
supply and using a bomb that could be dispersed by aircraft. During a clash
between the Japanese and Russia in 1939, unit 731 contaminated the areas
rivers with typhoid-fever pathogen. In 1940 and 194, unit 731 used aircraft
to spread cotton and rice husks that were contaminated with the black
plague. The unit bred enormous amounts of fleas and rats because they
found that these animals worked best in the transmission of the plague. The
unit also developed anthrax-bacillus bombs that contained heat resistant
bacillus so they could be dropped from aircrafts. When the bombs exploded,
the infected shrapnel would transmit the disease to the targeted
population. The anthrax bomb was tested on people (POWs) numerous times in
Anta, China. The Japanese were also known for spraying cholera, typhoid,
plague, and dysentery pathogens against their Chinese enemies. (Tanaka,
137-138)
The Japanese would also use Chinese people and allied POWs for medical
experiments. As part of the Japanese research program, they would use
humans and animals. Chinese people who would rebel against the Japanese
invasion of China would often be arrested and sent to unit 731 to be used as
test dummies for experiments. The prisoners would be sent to individual
rooms and infected with particular pathogens by injections or contaminated
food or water. The Japanese would carefully study how the humans responded
to the pathogens and when the contaminated human died the body was usually
dissected and then cremated. Unit 731 also conducted frostbite experiments
on their prisoners. Prisoners would be tied up outdoors in temperatures
that would reach -20 degrees Celsius with body parts spayed with salt water
to stimulate freezing. The victims were hit with hammers to diagnose the
frostbite, when they were frostbitten enough they would be dipped into
various water temperatures. The Japanese experimented with frostbite
because it was a major problem for their troops stationed in northern China
and they wanted to know the best possible treatments. During this treatment
many prisoners would instantly lose their skin and muscles, and many
instantaneously died. The Japanese would also experiment on their prisoners
with mustard gas. The prisoners would be exposed to mustard gas in
different locations, wearing different types of clothing. Some had gas
masks and some were forced to drink a liquid form of the mustard gas then
the Japanese would monitor the victim’s conditions over a 5 day time
period. The Japanese were also known for performing diet, malaria
immunization, and poison experiments along with suspected massacre of these
POWs. (Tanaka, 135-156)
The Japanese soldiers justified their criminal actions in the name of the
emperor. They felt that anything would be vindicated if they did it for
their emperor and their country. Even thought the Japanese knew they were
defeated, they would continue to fight. The Japanese imperial army believed
that if they would fight till the death, they would be able to force a peace
treaty that contained favorable Japanese conditions. This policy was known
as Ketsu-Go (Katsugo), death before surrender. The Ketsu-Go plan emerged as
a defense plan against an invasion of their homeland by the Americans. This
defense scheme’s purpose was to save Japan from unconditional surrender. One
of the key elements to Ketsu-Go was a military buildup where they figured
the Americans would attack. Another key strategy of the Ketsu-Go plan was
suicide attackers. The Japanese plan was to attack the naval ships out at
sea before they could transport troops to smaller landing crafts which would
bring them to shore. Many Japanese soldiers would sacrifice their lives,
kamikaze aircraft; one-man suicide torpedoes (kaitan), crash boats (renraku-tei),
and human mines (fukuryu) were all suicide missions that were carried out by
soldiers and civilians. The kamikaze aircraft would fly directly into the
large American battleships; the pilots sacrificed their own lives in order
to sink an American naval vessel. The Japanese crash boats filled with
explosive would be crash into the American transports and the human mines
were divers carrying explosives who would swim underwater to a landing craft
and blow them up. Under the policy known as “every citizen a soldier,” The
Japanese civilians were also willing to die for the emperor; they would
contribute to the fighting and suicide attacks. The Ketsu-Go policy rejected
the idea of surrender and called for fighting to the bitter end. The
emperor believed that if the Japanese could inflict enough damage on the
United States it would eventually lead to a conditional surrender that would
preserve the old Japanese order. Since the Japanese soldier looked to the
emperor as a direct descendant from the gods, the policy of Ketsu-Go became
a way of life and created aggressive, fearless soldiers. (Kort, 63)
The Japanese were merciless killers which created a war more brutal and
vicious than any before its time. A feeling of hatred for the enemy was
also at its peak; hatred for the Japanese did not get stronger than it was
for the marine infantry men fighting the front lines in the Pacific. The
marine’s hatred for the Japanese would continue to grow throughout the war
because of the sneaking, dirty tactics they would use to kill. The Japanese
soldiers would often play dead and then throw a grenade or act like a
wounded soldier stab the medic when he approached. (Sledge, 34)
“The
attitudes held toward the Japanese by noncombatants or even sailors or
airmen often did not reflect the deep personal resentment felt by Marine
infantrymen. Official histories and memoirs of Marine infantrymen written
after the war rarely reflect that hatred, but at the time of battle, Marines
felt it deeply, bitterly, and as certainly as danger itself. To deny this
hatred or make light of it would as much a lie as to deny or make light of
the esprit de corps or the intense patriotism felt by the Marines with whom
I served in the Pacific.
My
experiences on Peleliu and Okinawa made me believe that the Japanese held
mutual feelings for us. They were a fanatical enemy; that is to say, they
believed in their cause with an intensity little understood by many postwar
Americans – and possibly many Japanese, as well
This
collective attitude, Marine and Japanese resulted in savage, ferocious
fighting with no holds barred. This was not the dispassionate killing seen
on other fronts or in other wars. This was a brutish, primitive hatred, as
characteristic of the horror of war in the Pacific as the palm trees and the
islands.” (Sledge, 34)
E.B. Sledge was a Marine infantryman who served in WWII and fought on the
front lines. Sledge points out the clear hatred they had for one another.
The Japanese believed in the Ketsu-Go policy and fought with pure hatred for
the American; they were going to inflict as many casualties as they could,
without discretion to their own lives.
As the war continued, so did the American hatred for the Japanese. It was
quite obvious that the Japanese had absolutely no respect for their
enemies. No respect was shown to the captured POWs, to enemy civilians
(especially women and children), and completely no respect was shown for the
dead American soldiers who died on the front lines of battle. It was not
uncommon for American soldiers to pillage through the pockets of the dead
Japanese to find a souvenir but the Japanese would butcher their fallen
enemies.
“The
bodies were decomposed and nearly blackened by exposure. This was to be
expected of the dead in the tropics, but these Marines had been mutilated
hideously by the enemy. One man had been decapitated. His head lay on his
chest; his hands had been severed from his wrists and also lay on his chest
near his chin. In disbelief I stared at the face as I realized that the
Japanese had cut off the dead Marine’s penis and stuffed it into his mouth.
The corpse next to him had been treated similarly. The third had been
butchered, chopped up like a carcass torn by some predatory animal.”
(Sledge, 148)
This type of behavior by the Japanese would often push many of the Marine’s
over the edge. The hatred for the Japanese would only increase throughout
the war as they would encounter such barbaric measures taken by the
Japanese. “My emotions solidified into a rage and a hatred for the Japanese
beyond anything I ever had experienced. From that moment on I never felt
the least pity or compassion for them no matter what the circumstances. My
comrades would field strip their packs and pockets for souvenirs and take
gold teeth, but I never saw a Marine commit the kind of barbaric mutilation
the Japanese committed if they had access to our dead.” (Sledge, 148)
There was a great fear of invading the mainland of Japan in order to seek an
unconditional surrender. The American government knew that they would lose
many soldiers on these invasions. The Japanese policy of Ketsu-Go, created
fierce warrior like soldiers that would seek to inflict as many American
casualties as humanly possible. “The Japanese success depended on killing
large amounts of American servicemen.” (Marston, 208) The Japanese had the
advantage when fighting on the main islands of metropolitan Japan and the
smaller islands such as Okinawa. Unlike the Philippines which provided the
United States with ample space to maneuver, the Japanese islands would prove
to be difficult to capture. (Marston, 208)
The American Government was afraid to encounter battles similar to one at
Peleliu and Okinawa. The Ryukyu island chain and the main island of Japan
were close enough to the island of Kyushu – home to a large number of
kamikaze squadrons, which would make it possible for suicide missions to
have an impact in the defense of the islands. The location and terrain of
Okinawa also made it very difficult for the Americans. The random placement
of the hills, ridgelines and ravines, fields and villages, jungles and towns
divided the island into a large number of small sections. Okinawa presented
the Americans with hundreds of small battlefields. This terrain provided
the Japanese with what they needed to fight a long, bloody battle. Long
bloody battles were all the Japanese had in hopes of getting a better peace
settlement. (Marston, 208-209)
Kamikaze missions were the most hopeful tactic for killing Americans. For
these missions to have an impact the Japanese would allow the largest amount
of American troops onto the island’s shores as possible. Once the troops
were on the land, kamikaze planes and suicide boats would attack the allied
ships that surrounded Okinawa, destroying as many as possible and driving
off the rest. The Japanese wanted to deprive the American soldier of their
highly advanced weaponry, supplies and reinforcements. After the Japanese
inflicted as mush possible damage by kamikaze attacks, over 100,000 Japanese
ground troops on the island would emerge from their cover and completely
annihilate the invading American troops. (Marston, 209-210) Thirty four
allied ships and crafts had been sunk, 368 were damaged and the fleet lost
763 aircrafts due to these suicide missions. (www.wikipedia.com)
Once on land the American troops underwent one of the most vicious,
bloodiest battles ever fought. The Japanese were heavily supplied with
close-range heavy weapons and the Japanese key to success was large scale
counterattacks. The Americans fought long and hard to take over the island,
dismantling one cave at a time in order to defeat the Japanese defense of
Okinawa. The fighting would last for over two and a half months. (Marston,
211-222)
The battle of Okinawa became known as the “typhoon of steel” and “tetsu no
ame” which means “rain of steel” in Japanese. More people were killed in the
battle of Okinawa than were killed when the atomic bombs were dropped over
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. More than 100,000 Japanese and over 100,000 Okinawa
civilians were killed during the fight. It is also assumed that over one
third of the surviving Okinawa civilians were wounded. American casualties
total over 12,000 dead or missing and 36,000 wounded. The amount of
casualties, time and material loss played a heavy role in determining to
drop the atomic bomb. (www.wikipedia.com)
On September 11, 1945, (two days after Nagasaki was bombed) the USS
Montpelier sailed into Japan’s Wakanoura Bay with guns fully loaded just in
case “a few Japs might want to continue the war.” (Coox, 411) J.J. Fahey
served on the USS Montpelier and recounts the terrible amount of hardships
the United States would have suffered if choosen to invade mainland Japan.
Fahey stresses that Japans unique terrain and bizarre will to fight would
have would have made the invasion of Japan very disastrous. Japans terrain
provided little room for maneuvering and would have made it easy for the
Japanese to inflict massive amounts of casualties on the allied side.
“I
never saw so many islands. One right after the other are on both sides of
us. I imagine the Japs have guns on most of the islands. These islands are
all very high. It would have been suicide if we ever had to come in here
and fight for them, island by island. We never would have gotten in. There
must be hundreds of islands in the Inland Sea. It is like a fortress
guarding the main island of Japan. Almost all of the hundreds of miles of
land I have seen in Japan have been hilly.” (Coox, 411)
The Japanese had guns placed in the hills on both sides of the bay that were
capable of covering the whole entire landing area. The Japanese troops
would be safely covered in underground tunnels for the pre-invasion
bombardment and then attach the forces that made it to shore. (Coox, 412)
The Americans feared that if an invasion of mainland Japan was necessary in
order to achieve unconditional surrender that many troops would be killed in
the effort. From the USS Montpelier and J.J Fahey’s evidence, it would have
been “suicide” to go into Japan and fight. The battle for Okinawa had
killed more people than both atomic bombs combined and the horrors of that
fight would have been a reality once again. The former President Herbert
Hoover favored more lenient terms of surrender because he was scared that
the invasion of Japan would cause between 500,000 to a million allied
casualties. (Kort, 53) Major General Charles Willoughby estimated the
invasion would cause the Unites States 720,000 casualties. (Kort, 104)
Whatever the actual number of casualties would have been it is estimates to
be in the hundreds of thousands on behalf of the United Stated which does
not include the enormous amounts of Japanese casualties. The primary
objective of the United States was to win the war with the fewest American
casualties as possible and Truman ultimately decided that the atomic bombs
would be the most effective way to end the war as quickly and painlessly as
possible. (Walker, 92)
In an assessment of the war by Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson, Stimson writes a memorandum for President Harry Truman which
considers invasion of mainland Japan. Stimson stresses that the occupation
of Japan may be very long, costly, and strenuous struggle. He states that
the Japanese terrain leaves little room for maneuvering and would leave the
United States vulnerable to attack, such as in Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The
Japanese are also very patriotic and would rally in an effort for resistance
which would leave the U.S. more thoroughly destroyed than was the case in
Germany. (Fernlund, 305)
Putting this vicious war into context and after examining all
possible solutions for ending the war with the least amount of damage to the
Unites States, Harry Truman decided to drop the atomic bombs on Japan.
Hiroshima was bombed on August 6, and Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. Both of
these cities played a role in the Japanese war effort, one was naval and
industrial and the other was an army center. Nagasaki was a major seaport
and contained many large industrial plants which were very important to the
Japanese war cause. Hiroshima was the headquarters of the Japanese army and
a major storage and assembly point. The Japanese surrender on the August
10, based on the terms given at the Potsdam Conference. The emperor’s
position would remain to be recognized but he was stripped of his powers and
was subjected to the orders of the Allied Supreme Commander. All terms were
finalized by August 14 and the official surrender was signed on September 2,
1945. (Fernlund, 307) “The controlling Factor in the final Japanese
decision to accept our terms of surrender was the atomic bomb.” (Fernlund,
308)
This writer contends that the creation and deployment of the atomic bomb was
necessary due to the thought of intimidating the Soviets but more
importantly to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, thus saving many
American lives. With the fear that nuclear weapons would first be created by
Germany, the United States joined the world of nuclear research. The
physical creation of the atomic bomb by the scientist involved in the
Manhattan Project was a miraculous accomplishment. Although the war in
Europe had ended without the use of an atomic bomb, the war in the Pacific
was getting bloodier than ever. As the gruesome conflict continued, despise
for the Japanese grew into deep passionate hatred. The Japanese had been
devastated by war but were unwilling to give up. Their inhumane war crimes
and fearless attitude proved to have a tremendous affect on the war as the
allied casualty list continued to grow. The Japanese policy of Ketsu-Go
called for death before surrender and made for a reckless Imperial Army.
With Japans only chance to force better terms of surrender, they would try
to spoil America’s moral by inflicting as many casualties as possible. The
Unites States fear that a planned invasion of Japan would lead to a high
death toll due to the Japanese’s willingness to fight to the bitter end.
The Japanese called for every citizen to fight for their country whether in
battle or suicide missions which created an American impression that, “THERE
ARE NO CIVILIANS IN JAPAN,” (Takaki, 29) which would greatly encourage the
use of the atomic bombs. With no other reasonable solutions for ending the
war in the Pacific, Harry Truman and the United States of America unleashed
two powerful nuclear bombs on Japan which immediately forced surrender by
the Japanese.
President
Harry Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bombs remains a very
controversial topic and will continue to be cause for debate well into the
future.
Bibliography
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanking_Massacre.
Nanking Massacre.
Wikimedia Foundation, Inc.
June 16, 2008
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Okinawa.
Battle of Okinawa. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. June 25, 2008
Coox, Alvin D. "Needless Fear: the Compromise of U.S. Plans to Invade Japan
in 1945." The Journal of Military History 64 (2000): 411-437.
Kort, Michael. The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb. New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007. x-435
Sledge, E. B. With The Old Breed At Peleliu And Okinawa. New York
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981. ix-326.
Kelly, Cynthia C. The Manhattan Project: The Birth of the Atomic Bomb in
the Words of Its Creators, Eyewitnesses, and Historians. New York: Black
Dog and Leventhal, 2007. xiii-495.
Takaki, Ronald. Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb.
Boston, New York, Toronto, London: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. 1-193.
Marston, Daniel. The Pacific War Companion: From Pearl Harbor To
Hiroshima. New York: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2005. 6-264
Tanaka, Yuki. Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1996. ix-269
Bernstein, Barton J. The Atomic Bomb: The Critical Issues. Boston,
Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1976. Vii-169
Walker, Samuel J. prompt and utter destruction: TRUMAN AND THE USE OF
ATOMIC BOMBS AGAINST JAPAN. United States of America: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1997, 2004. 1-142
Fernlund, Kevin J. Documents to Accompany America's History. 6th ed.
Vol. II. Levittown: Bedfors/St. Martin, 2008. v-493.
|