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Patrick Tiernan
History 4000, The Atomic Bomb
Annotated Bibliography
J. Samuel Walker, prompt & utter destruction: truman and the use of
the atomic bombs against japan (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2004).
Walker
is able to delineate the most clear and concise elements that influenced
the decision to drop the Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The
book follows Truman’s sudden inheritance of the Presidency, and how
Truman lacking experience, and knowledge, relied heavily on the
decisions of his advisors. Walker also takes into account the
alternatives to deploying the weapons of mass destruction as a means to
force a Japanese surrender. Each option is examined, and analyzed as an
aleternative to deploying the bombs. Truman’s main objective was to
“end the war as soon as possible”, and this monogram is an excellent
source in interpreting the best way to accomplish ending the war with a
minimum number of casualties.
Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, Code-Name Downfall: The Secret
Plan to Invade Japan-And Why Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1995).
Allen and Polmar examine the planning stages and the forthcoming
operations of a planned invasion of Japan, and the consequences and
realities if the decision was decided upon to end the war. The two
authors begin with the pre-war preparation of the United States
military, and move forward into the planning of the invasion and finally
into the ensuing decision to drop the Atomic Bombs. The detailed
invasion plans allow the reader to understand all the factors involved
with a large scale movement towards the Japanese home land.
Code-Named Downfall is focused more on the decisions and planning
that coincides with the invasion of Japan more so than those pertaining
to the dvelopment and use of atomic weapons. However, by examining the
details of a planned invasion that was set for November 1945, it is best
determined that this was not the best course of action to pursue. The
invasion would involve a substantial amount of resources, troops, and
would have exceeded the time period the American people were willing to
accept.
Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981).
Power and Culture
provides an extensive look into Japanese culture during World War II,
and the basis for the hostilities against the United States. The
monogram is more aligned to how the Japanese culture influenced the
leaders to seek expansion throughout Asia than military decision making
in the war, atlhough the book does include vast military details. As
the book continues it takes into account Japanese decisions during the
war, such as Japans attempt to incorporate more of their conquered
people into their war effort once their military was losing strength
during the latter part of the war. Irive provides the reader with a
cultural background that allows the reader to fully understand Japans
culture before, during, and after the war. By examining the war from a
perspective that includs both Japanese and American culture, Iriye lays
foundations that the war was not fought specifically on cultural
differences, and the United States. Understanding Japanese culture and
the motivations of those in charge, the reader can gain a basis for how
difficult unconditional surrender would have been without the use of
atomic force.
Dan Kurzman, Day of The Bomb (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1986).
Day of the Bomb
takes into account 16 individuals who had significant contributions to
the decision the drop the Atomic Bombs or played key roles during World
War II. Kurzman does not specifically target American personalities,
but also those Japanese individuals who heavily participated in the two
countries maneuvers from 1941-1945. Americans who gain notoriety in the
book include Henry Stimson, Jimmy Byrnes, and Harry Truman. Japanese
officials who are recognized are Hirohito, Yoshio Nashina, and Koichi
Kido. This collection is a succinct route to explain how each
individual contributed towards the war effort, and the job each
individual had in accordance to the atomic bombs and the war effort.
Paul R. Baker, eds. The Atomic Bomb: The Great Decision
(Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1976).
A diversity of authors is encompassed in this collection of primary and
secondary sources. Baker uses essays and excerpts the writers provide
on the decision to use the Atomic bombs, the bombs influence on global
relationships, and the moral and administrative issues that deal with
the weapons. By examining the primary sources the reader is able to
acquire superior knowledge of the administrative proceedings in
accordance with the bombs. Moral issues are included as a means to
analyze the post war arguments for using the device, and the case for
how the bombs affected not only political demensions of government, but
also how the weapons have acted as a buffer between two hostile
countries in preventing war. The reader is bestowed an in depth
perspective, from an assortment of primary sources, historians, and
atomic bomb experts that produce an analytical work about the decision
to drop the bombs.
James Stimson, “The Decision the use the Atomic Bomb” Harpers
Magazine 194 (February 1947) 97-107.
James Stimson’s first hand account of the development of the Interim
committee and subsequent communications with President Truman is a
valuable resource in identifying administrative proceedings, which
include conversation with the President and other advisors. President
Truman relied heavily on those he surrounded himself with at the White
House, and therefore the Interim committee is an important aspect in the
decision to deploy the Atomic Bombs. Stimson discusses his personal
account of the Interim committee’s policies, and also the United State’s
policy and course of action toward Japan in 1945. Stimson includes
memorandums he shared with the President, which contained the Interim
committee’s decisions and suggestions for use of the bomb. Stimson’s
shared memorandums and his personal account of the issues is vital to
understand the Interim Committees proposals, and influence it contained
in the President’s decision.
Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996).
Tanakas Hidden Horrors examines the atrocities of the Japanese
held Prisoners of War. The book highlights many aspects of the harsh
treatment of POW’s including death marches, Japanese POW policy, and the
overall brutality of the Japanese towards Americans and other Asians.
This monogram is an excellent source to use in defense of the argument
the Atomic Bombs were justified because of the brutality of the Japanese
military. The Japanese were by no means innocent of killing
non-combatants as this book so closely validates. The United States
also participated in brutally killing enemy troops during the war, but
the deaths of the American, British, and Australian troops, as well as
Asian civilians, were beyond those of the Allied forces.
John Henry Poncio and Marlin Young, Girocho: A G.I.’s Story of Bataan
and Beyond (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003).
Girocho
is not aligned the specifics of the decision to drop the bombs, although
the book provides a primary resource of the Bataan death march, a well
known example of Japanese brutality towards POW’s in the Pacific front
of World War II. Poncio is able to create a vivid account of his
personal experience with the Japanese military in Asia. The book
provides a defense for the argument that the use of the bombs was
justified.
Ronald Takaki, Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb
(Little, Brown and Company, 1995).
Takaki’s endeavor to create controversy about why the bombs were dropped
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is accomplished in this monogram. His main
point is to hold Harry Truman personally accountable, based on his
childhood, for the decision to deploy the bombs over Japan. He also
concludes the decision was founded on the attempt to flaunt American
military power towards the Soviet Union; this argument has considerable
weight, as the argument has arisen in further documents and is defended
among additoinal historians. The monogram contains a detail account of
the Interim committee and the influence that Henry Stimson and James
Byrnes possessed on Truman’s decision. For this reason, this book is a
source for displaying the influence that the Presidents advisors
possessed in the decision to drop the bombs.
James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers, 1947).
Provided is this volume is a primary resource of an administrative
personality involved in the governments decision making process. Byrnes
acted opposite Henry Stimson in his philosophy towards the use of the
bombs, as well as future use of the weapons. This book is valuable to
examine the sway each individual official maintained on Truman during
his early presidential days. Byrnes defends his decision making
capabilities and his philosophies towards the bombs. He also defends
the Atomic bombs, claiming that it saved American lives from an epic
invasion that would have occurred on Japans home islands.
Leon V. Sigal, Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination
in the United States and Japan, 1945 (Cornell University Press,
1988).
The political and military presence during the Second World War II
combined in an effort to locate the best solution for ending the war are
highlighted and examined in this this book. Sigal makes valid points
and examines the attempt to modify war aims, mainly towards the
unconditional surrender the United States desperately pushed for.
Understanding the war aims of the different branches of the military, as
well as the non military aspects of the American government is vital in
understanding why the bombs were dropped on Japan. Unconditional
surrender was the ultimate goal of the United States, and was the
ultimate factor in the decision of how to end the war. Government
officials, including the President, thought it absolutely necessary to
eradicate the Emperors power post World War II. It was decided that a
Japanese surrender could go forward with the emperor in tact, although
he would retain less influence and power than before. Fighting to a
Finish analyzes the politics and military issues involved in gaining
surrender from the Japanese.
Conrad C. Crane, Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower
Strategy in World War II (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of
Kansas, 1993).
Crane expertly examines the strategies and actions of American air power
during World War II. He closely analyzes the bombing raids on Germany
and Japan, although we are strictly considered with Japan. The book
generalizes the bombing raids and strategies of those who participated
in attacks over Japan during World War II. Crane provides details of
the colossal damage to houses, buildings, and also provides the death
figures of Japanese killed by air raids. Bombing runs became more
successful as the war years continue, as the United State’s island
hopping campaign became more successful as it moved closer to mainland
Japan. This monogram solidifies the fact the air raids were a grand
success for the United States, but had further bombing continued, the
death rates would have eventually eclipse those produce by the atomic
bomb.
D.M. Giangreco, “A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas: President
Truman and Casualty Estimates for the invasion of Japan” The Pacific
Historical Review 72 (February 2003) 93-132.
Giangreco re examines the casualty reports of a predicted invasion of
Japan. Giangreco generalizes that the dead and wounded counts were
greater than predicted by previous historians have written on the
subject. Giangreco utilizes the specific formula the military used for
determining casualties to provide an accurate and more detailed
calculation than the ones “guessed” by military commanders. Giangreco
concludes that casualty reports were only provided for the first months
of the invasion rather than the entire period of the attack, which would
have lasted well into 1946. This article is important to gain resources
of casualty reports, and determine there is no “right” number because
the invasion never proceeded. Although based on previous battles in the
Pacific, it can be accurately calculated the casualties would have been
astronomical had the invasion plan been carried out.
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